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Robert W. Tucker

THE NUCLEAR DEBATE

In the almost four decades since the appearance of nuclear weapons, concern over the dangers these weapons raise has varied markedly. A preoccupation with nuclear weapons has characterized only a very few, and even among these few anxiety over the prospects of nuclear war has not been a constant. Beyond the nuclear strategists and a small entourage, the nuclear question has not evoked a steady level of attention, let alone of anxiety. On the contrary, the attention of foreign policy elites, and even more the general public, has swung from one extreme to the other and within a brief period of time.

Thus at the outset of the Kennedy Administration, a preoccupation with the prospect of nuclear war characterized a portion of the foreign policy elites, but hardly the public at large. That preoccupation, in part the product of high and sustained international tension and in part the response to Administration calls for measures of civil defense, quickly dissipated in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. Within the period of scarcely a year it had virtually disappeared. Yet there had been no significant change in the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor had the arms competition between the two powers been significantly altered. Certainly the 1963 partial test ban did not alter this competition, whether by making it less intense or less dangerous than it had been earlier. But the test ban did signal that the political relationship between the two states had changed modestly for the better and might register still further improvement. A substantial and even dramatic change in outlook toward the prospects of nuclear war went hand in hand with a changing political relationship.

A generation later, the same process, only now working in the opposite direction, marked the outset of the Reagan Administration. On this occasion, an anti-nuclear weapons movement developed that was unprecedented in the breadth of support it appeared to enjoy. In this respect, there is no real comparison between the anti-nuclear movement of a generation ago and that of today. Whereas the movement of yesterday represented little more than

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Robert W. Tucker is a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and President of the Lehrman Institute. He wishes to thank Michael Mandelbaum, Josef Joffe and Paul Dyster for their help.

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the stirring of a few, the movement of the 1980s assumed mass proportions. Even so, the appearance of the later movement was almost as sudden as the disappearance of the earlier one. As late as the winter of 1979–80 there was little to indicate that nuclear weapons would become the critical issue of public life and discourse they did become by the summer of 1981.

The sudden rise of the anti-nuclear weapons movement and the attendant debate over nuclear strategy must be attributed in the first place to a renewed fear of war with the Soviet Union. By the same token, it also reflects a decline in the faith by which we have come to live in the nuclear age. For we are nearly all believers in deterrence, and this despite the different ways in which this faith may be expressed. We are nearly all believers if only for the reason that once we seriously admit nuclear war as a distinct historical possibility, we not only conjure up a very dark landscape but one in which our accepted categories of political and moral thought no longer seem relevant. In the still alien world of nuclear weapons, it is only a faith in deterrence that preserves continuity with a familiar past.

The idea of deterrence is, of course, as old as the history of human conflict. But the functions that strategies of nuclear deterrence are expected to serve and the expectations these strategies have raised are as novel as the weapons on which deterrence today rests. If nuclear deterrence is indeed something new under the sun, it is so not only because of the weapons but because of the expectations it has evoked. These expectations constitute the core of faith and their intensity has invested nuclear deterrence with a reliability that is tantamount, for all practical purposes, to certainty. In turn, faith in the effectiveness of deterrence is largely a function of the consequences generally expected to follow from the use of nuclear weapons. By a psychological mechanism as simple as it is pervasive, it is assumed that if the results of an act are inconceivable, the act itself must be inconceivable. The death of a nation is an event difficult to conceive, and the extinction of humanity far more so.

Nor is this all. It is faith in the effectiveness of deterrence that has enabled us to entertain what otherwise would prove to be irreconcilable convictions: a continued readiness to threaten the use—even the first use—of nuclear weapons to preserve interests deemed vital, but at the same time a conviction that nuclear war would in all likelihood destroy the ends for which it is waged; a belief, if not in the moral rectitude, then at least in the moral neutrality of a deterrence strategy, but also a disbelief that the use

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of nuclear weapons could ever be morally justified; these and other convictions can be reconciled if only the expectations placed in a deterrent strategy are strong enough. With enough faith in deterrence there is no need to torture oneself over the justification for ever employing nuclear weapons; the issues arising from the use of these weapons deal with a contingency that has been virtually excluded from our vision of the future.

The faith commonly placed in deterrence has never gone unquestioned. The history of strategic thought in the nuclear age is, after all, a history of the persisting controversy between the deterrence faithful and the deterrence skeptics, between those who believe that deterrence follows from the existence of nuclear weapons and those who believe a credible theory of use must be developed if deterrence is to be assured. The nature of that controversy is often misrepresented, not least of all by the participants themselves. It cannot properly be characterized simply as one "between those who wish to give nuclear weapons a war-deterring and those who want to give them a war-fighting role."[1] Those accused of wishing to give nuclear weapons a war-fighting role have not abandoned deterrence. At least, they have never admitted to doing so. Instead, they insist that the effort to fashion a war-fighting role for nuclear weapons, however precarious and even abortive that effort may ultimately prove, is undertaken in the first instance in order to enhance their role as a deterrent. The deterrence skeptics do not deny deterrence. They do deny a faith that is given, in the manner of all true believers, unconditional expression.

To the deterrence faithful, the position of the skeptics has always smacked of apostasy and perhaps never more so than today. To be sure, the faithful no less than the skeptics have regularly warned against the dangers of taking deterrence for granted. Still, there is a world of difference between what skeptics have understood taking deterrence for granted to mean and what true believers have understood it to mean. To the believer, deterrence is not only an inherent property of nuclear weapons, it is very nearly a self-sufficient property. "The strategy," one of them declares, "is determined by the weapon. The missiles have only to exist and deterrence is the law of their existence."[2] Deterrence is the law of

[1] Theodore Draper, "Nuclear Temptations," *The New York Review of Books*, January 19, 1984, p. 43.

[2] Leon Wieseltier, *Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983, p. 38. This is, of course, the essential rationale for "existential deterrence." At the dawn of the nuclear age, Bernard Brodie provided the first formulation of existential deterrence in observing that "everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically great." Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1945, p. 52.

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their existence by virtue of their inordinate and uncontrollable destructiveness. Given this destructiveness, the failure of deterrence is not the beginning but the end of strategy. This being so, if deterrence fails, the only rational course is to end the conflict as quickly as possible and without regard to calculations of relative advantage. McGeorge Bundy, in a recent elaboration of the concept of "existential deterrence," echoes the well-known dictum of Bernard Brodie in declaring that if deterrence ever breaks down "the attention of both sides must be driven toward the literally vital need for *ending* the nuclear battle if possible, not winning it."[3]

The controversy over the necessary and sufficient conditions of deterrence is more intense today than it has ever been. This persisting debate does not, in the end, turn on technical considerations, though the disputants regularly foster that mistaken impression. Instead, what is ultimately at issue are varying judgements about the character and aspirations of the Soviet regime and, to a lesser extent, the American government. Whether asymmetries in strategic systems have political significance, whether some capacity for war-fighting is a necessary element of deterrence, are not issues that, at bottom, can be resolved by technical considerations but only by one's assessment of the two great adversaries. Among the priesthood of experts, the nuclear debate is not primarily a debate over nuclear weapons but a debate over politics. In this debate, both sides share a common faith; but how they interpret the conditions of faith depends on what they believe to be the truth about the Soviet-American conflict.

Thus, for all their differences, which are surely serious enough, the two sides to this familiar controversy not only believe in deterrence, they also believe broadly in the strategic status quo and are hostile to apocalyptic visions. By contrast, such visions are a hallmark of the anti-nuclear movement that has arisen in recent years. The view that nuclear war has become ever more likely, and that if we continue along our present course we will transform a possibility into a probability, is given frequent expression. Jonathan Schell has attributed the "collapse of deterrence" to nothing other than the buildup of nuclear stockpiles. "Possession inevitably implied use," he declares, "and use was irremediably senseless."[4] The crisis in deterrence stems, at bottom, from nothing more than the

[3] McGeorge Bundy, "The Bishops and the Bomb," *The New York Review of Books*, June 10, 1983, p. 4. In an essay written at the end of his life, Bernard Brodie declared that: "The main war goal upon the beginning of a strategic nuclear exchange would surely be to terminate it as quickly as possible and with the least amount of damage possible—on both sides." Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 1978, p. 79.

[4] Jonathan Schell, "Reflections: The Abolition," *The New Yorker*, January 2, 1984, pp. 64–5.

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"continuing reliance on nuclear arms." George Kennan reaches a similar conclusion and attaches to it similar urgency. "The clock is ticking; the remaining ticks are numbered; the end of their number is already in sight."[5]

We may call this view that of "existential disaster." Nuclear weapons have only to exist in sufficient numbers and destructiveness to render disaster likely. Time is the great nemesis. It is so if only because no social contrivance—of which deterrence is one—can go on indefinitely without a breakdown. As is true of virtually all aspects of the nuclear debate today, this conviction was articulated a generation earlier. In 1961, the novelist and scientist C.P. Snow wrote: "Within, at the most, ten years, some of these bombs are going off. . . . *That* is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have a finite risk. On the other side we have a certainty of disaster. Between a risk and a certainty, a sane man does not hesitate."[6] Snow's forecast was made in the same spirit and on behalf of the same purpose—far-reaching measures of arms control—that today move Jonathan Schell and George Kennan. But whereas Snow's message could only be directed profitably to a quite restricted audience, Schell and Kennan have a potential audience that is far larger. And while Snow's prophecy was one of limited catastrophe, Schell and Kennan entertain a vision of a nuclear exchange that would "put an end to our own species."[7]

II

In retrospect, what seems remarkable is that for virtually a generation the issue of nuclear weapons had not been of central concern in public life. Certainly, the years between the Cuban missile crisis and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan had not been without portentous developments in the spheres that provoke so much anxiety today—changes in the strategic balance, the technology of nuclear weaponry and East-West crises. Yet these developments did not begin to provoke a comparable anxiety.

In one view, a heightened sensitivity to the dangers of nuclear weapons simply reflects the heightened perils of the competition in arms or the "arms race." In the 1983 pastoral letter of the American Catholic bishops, we read that "the dynamic of the arms race has intensified" and that one compelling reason for the letter is the growing dangers this dynamic holds out.[8] The nuclear freeze move-

[5] George Kennan, *The Nuclear Delusion*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1983, p. 231.
[6] C.P. Snow, "The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science," *Science*, January 27, 1961, p. 259.
[7] Schell, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[8] "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," *Origins*, May 19, 1983, p. 1.

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ment has been largely predicated on the belief that the danger of nuclear war in the late 1980s and 1990s will be greater than ever before because of weapons systems that, in the words of a movement leader, "will increase the pressure on both sides to use their nuclear weapons in a crisis, rather than risk losing them in a first strike."[9] *The New York Times*' national security correspondent expresses the concern that: "In 10 to 15 years, new technologies now being developed and tested could, if deployed, fundamentally and irretrievably undermine the basic philosophy that has been the center of both sides' nuclear strategy—mutual deterrence."[10] These technological developments promise to lead to ever greater "crisis instability." New weapons of greater accuracy and speed will at once sharpen the fear of preemptive attack while encouraging the hope of undertaking such an attack successfully should this prove necessary. And ever more complex command and control systems will, beyond a certain level of alert, make increasingly difficult the efforts of political leaders to retain effective control over their nuclear forces.[11]

What is crucial to this view is the contention that in certain circumstances the new technologies and the systems for controlling them will prove very dangerous. These circumstances are those of severe crises. In normal circumstances, by contrast, the dangers of the arms race have markedly diminished, when compared to a generation ago. The likelihood of accidental war is substantially lower today and the prospects of a preventive war, of a nuclear strike from out of the blue, are not seen by most expert observers as measurably enhanced. For the residual uncertainties that attend the use of nuclear weapons are such that a coldly planned attack appears almost certain to remain beyond the purview of rational policy choice. To contend otherwise in the case of the Soviet Union requires the assumption that Soviet leadership today is, or tomorrow will be, quite determined to impose its will on us in circumstances that cannot reasonably be interpreted as forcing it to do so and despite having to pay a price that is so high as to be without any real precedent. There is virtually no evidence to support such assumptions.

It is, then, only in periods of severe crisis that the effects of the

[9] Randall Forsberg, "Call to Halt The Nuclear Arms Race," in Randall Forsberg *et al.*, *Seeds of Promise: The First Real Hearings on the Nuclear Arms Freeze*, Andover (Mass.): Brick House Publishing, 1983, p. 197.

[10] Leslie H. Gelb, "Is the Nuclear Threat Manageable?", *The New York Times Magazine*, March 4, 1984, p. 26.

[11] The latter danger is examined at length in Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

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arms race are properly seen as critical. The case for considering these effects profoundly destabilizing can be summarized thus: when command systems that cannot be reliably controlled are joined to weapons systems that cannot be reliably protected, the stage is set for the breakdown of deterrence. This view rests on a truism that when it seems better to strike than to hold back, deterrence will in all likelihood break down. But what are the conditions in which it will be better to strike than to hold back? The critical condition would be the emerging conviction of one or both sides during a crisis that war is inevitable, but that something—perhaps even a great deal—can be gained by striking first. Another, though less than critical, condition is the existence of weapons that are believed to enhance the promise of preemption, but because of their vulnerability increase the risks of failing to preempt. We may call these weapons destabilizing. But what has brought the crisis to a point where the "destabilizing" weapons seem almost to "take over" and to undermine deterrence is a political process, a process out of which the conviction increasingly grows that war is inevitable.

Before weapons systems can impose a necessity of their own, statesmen must have created a situation that enables them to do so. Whatever their characteristics, weapons as such cannot undermine deterrence. To believe otherwise, as many appear to do, is to dissolve politics into technology. What weapons can do is to require a change in the operation of deterrence. They may do so chiefly by changing the point or the threshold beyond which deterrence breaks down and the conviction then emerges that war is inevitable.

It is the statesman who undermines deterrence. Moreover, he undermines deterrence not so much by permitting the development of the new technologies as by refusing to recognize that these technologies may require corresponding change in the operation of deterrence. If deterrence is in substantial part a function of technology, it must change as technology changes. The contention that the kind of crisis we could have a generation ago over missiles in Cuba would prove much more dangerous today does not mean that deterrence has been partially undermined. It means that the threshold beyond which deterrence is likely to break down has shifted. One of the tasks of the statesman in the nuclear age, and perhaps his most important task, is to adjust the definition of the nuclear threshold to the conditions that determine it and to bend all efforts to ensure that this threshold is neither crossed nor closely approached.

If these considerations have merit, an apparent obsession over the arms race is for the most part an obsession over the conflict

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that drives the arms race. An anxiety over technology is in reality largely an anxiety over politics. The great worry over deterrence being undermined by the new weapons is in fact a worry over the wisdom, or lack thereof, of political leaders who are today entrusted with the operation of deterrence.

III

Is the lapse of faith in deterrence to be laid largely at the doorstep of the Reagan Administration? A legion of critics insist that this Administration must bear a major responsibility for a movement and debate that might have been avoided by a government with a less ideological and less bellicose outlook. Whereas previous presidents were sobered by their tragic power to initiate nuclear war, this President is presumably different. He is different because he is in thrall to an ideology that blinds him to the terrible dangers of nuclear war.[12]

The evidence for this blindness consists, in part, of statements made about nuclear weapons and nuclear war by Mr. Reagan as a private citizen or as a candidate for office. Although betraying no particular sophistication about nuclear matters, none of these statements can reasonably be taken as grounds for coming to an apocalyptic view of the future. In the most quoted of his statements, the President responded to a question about whether he believed in the possibility of a limited nuclear war between this country and the Soviet Union in these words: ". . .I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button."[13] Whatever one may think of this response, it scarcely demonstrates the power of ideology in blinding men to the dangers of nuclear war. No doubt, it must arouse those who take as an article of faith that any use of nuclear weapons can only lead to an unlimited nuclear exchange. But there are many people who share Mr. Reagan's skepticism in this matter and who are not, by any reasonable definition, blind ideologues. Whether or not limited nuclear war in Europe is possible is not a matter to be settled by faith or ideology. Nor did the President in his reply indicate otherwise. If anything, his response was far less dogmatic than the vast majority of utterances on the subject.

One lesson to be drawn from the Reagan experience is simply

[12] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, p. 13.

[13] Bernard Gwertzman, "President Says U.S. Should Not Waver In Backing Saudis," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1981, p.1.

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the rising sensitivity to any statements about the possible use of nuclear weapons by high public officials, and particularly by the President. Such statements about nuclear weapons or strategy are likely to prove an invitation to trouble. For the public and its elites do not want to be reminded of the basis on which their security ultimately rests. The Reagan Administration badly erred by not taking this aversion sufficiently to heart. Instead of glossing over a subject that could only be dealt with at considerable risk, it responded to inquiries that were put to it, and occasionally even offered some gratuitous elaboration. The responses were neither startling for their novelty nor unreasonable in their substance. On balance, they preserved a striking continuity with positions taken by preceding administrations. Still, in the circumstances of the early 1980s, dominated as they have been by growing Soviet-American tension, responses that might otherwise have gone largely unremarked provoked a series of minor political storms.

The Reagan Administration not only tended to talk too much about nuclear matters, but to use an idiom that seemed to confirm the dark suspicions held by many about its intentions. Thus the dismayed and accusatory reaction to the 1982 Defense Guidance statement with its concept of "prevailing" in a protracted nuclear war. American nuclear forces, a critical passage reportedly read, "must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest possible termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States."[14]

This document did not break new ground. Its essential features added up to little more than a refinement of the Carter Administration's 1980 Presidential Directive 59, which in turn built on strategic concepts that may be traced back a generation. From Kennedy to Reagan, no administration has been able to disavow the prospect, however skeptically it may have viewed that prospect, of the controlled use of nuclear weapons. Equally, no administration has been able to disavow the prospect of emerging from a nuclear conflict with some kind of meaningful victory. Unable to disavow these prospects, no administration has been able to disavow the force structure that might make possible fighting a limited nuclear war. It was our least bellicose and most skeptical of recent presidents who declared during his first year in office that the American strategic arsenal "should be strong enough that a possible nuclear

[14] Cited in Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a Long Nuclear War," *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982, p. 1.

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war would end on the most favorable terms possible to the U.S."[15] At the time, 1977, these words of Jimmy Carter did not provoke noticeable criticism. It is true that they do not go quite as far as the 1982 Defense Guidance paper. Still, the difference between ending a nuclear war "on terms favorable to the U.S." rather than "on the most favorable terms possible to the U.S." is scarcely great enough to account for the very different receptions given them.

The Reagan Administration has been repeatedly accused of breaking radically from its predecessors in being intent on recapturing the Golden Grail of strategic superiority. This is presumably the meaning of "prevailing," that is, of "concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the U.S.," just as it is the meaning of having a capability that "will insure that the Soviet leadership, by their own calculations, will determine that the price of aggression outweighs any potential benefits." These words of the Reagan-Weinberger Defense Guidance document do indeed suggest a kind of strategic superiority. But then so did the Carter-Brown PD59 "countervailing" strategy. The former secretary of defense, Harold Brown, has defined the countervailing strategy in these terms: ". . .to convince the Soviets that they will be successfully opposed at any level of aggression they choose, and that no plausible outcome at any level of conflict could represent 'success' for them by any reasonable definition of success."[16] The countervailing strategy does not posit an American victory. Instead, it promises a Soviet defeat. For it "seeks a situation in which the Soviets would always lose more than they could reasonably expect to gain from either beginning or escalating a military conflict."[17] Is this not, however, a definition of sorts of victory? Unless it is assumed that our losses, too, are always disproportionate to our gains, in which case there would scarcely be grounds for recommending it, the countervailing strategy does come close to a promise of victory.

The distinction between "countervailing" and "prevailing" is, accordingly, a very thin one. So too, is the difference with respect to the forces required to implement strategy. In fact, neither the Carter nor the Reagan Administration has pursued a procurement policy designed to achieve strategic superiority. Yet each has articulated a strategic doctrine that implies a kind of superiority. In part, this apparent anomaly is explained by the need to retain, if

[15] Charles Mohr, "Carter Orders Steps To Increase Ability To Meet War Threats," *The New York Times*, August 26, 1977, p. A8.

[16] Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1982*, U.S. Department of Defense, January 19, 1981, Washington: GPO, 1981, p. 40.

[17] Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, p. 81.

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only for reasons of morale, some semblance of a claim to a theory of victory. In part, however, the explanation must be sought in the American strategic predicament. The root of that predicament is an asymmetry of interests that imposes more difficult and exacting deterrence requirements on the United States than on the Soviet Union. While in the Soviet case these requirements extend no further than to Eastern Europe, in the American case they extend, beyond this hemisphere, to Western Europe, Japan and the Persian Gulf. To an extent far greater than for the Soviet Union, deterrence for the United States has always been, and remains today, the extension of deterrence to others than the self. By its very nature, extended deterrence must have much less credibility than self deterrence. This liability of extended deterrence, moreover, cannot be fully compensated for by greater conventional forces. Greater conventional forces will raise the threshold of nuclear conflict but they cannot preclude nuclear conflict. Ultimately, compensation must be found either at the strategic nuclear level or nowhere. But it can only be found at the strategic level by forces that are more than simply the equivalent of the Soviet Union's forces. As we are now painfully aware, equivalence *and no more* must subject extended deterrence to pervasive and increasingly corrosive doubt.

Since the late 1960s, strategic doctrines have increasingly assumed the function of bridging the growing gap between the forces for extended deterrence and the forces in being. If the gap can no longer be bridged in fact, it can still be bridged in word. Without claiming strategic superiority—indeed, even while disavowing an interest in seeking superiority—the benefits of superiority are nevertheless salvaged in some measure. Thus the claim that we may still ensure that the Soviets would always lose more than they could expect to gain from resorting to any kind of armed aggression. Or the claim that in a nuclear conflict our forces will have the capability of imposing an early termination of the conflict on terms favorable to this country.

In proclaiming the strategy of prevailing, the Reagan Administration simply followed an established practice, though perhaps it did so too exuberantly. What is important is that it did so at a time when détente had clearly broken down and tension between the superpowers was rising to a level that had not been experienced since the years of the classic cold war. In these circumstances, the doctrine of prevailing was subject to a scrutiny it might not and probably would not have otherwise received. In these same circumstances, the earlier doctrine of countervailing power was subject to

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a criticism considerably harsher than the criticism that marked its appearance in 1980.

IV

The real indictment made of the Reagan Administration is not of its military strategy but of its politics. It is not so much what Mr. Reagan has said about nuclear weapons and their possible use that has aroused opponents, but what he has said about the Soviet Union. In word and in spirit, though as yet much less so in action, this Administration has largely returned to the period of the classic cold war. It has done so, however, in strategic circumstances which are bleak by comparison with those of this earlier period.

The classic cold war began with an American monopoly of nuclear weapons. It ended, if we take the period immediately following the Cuban missile crisis as marking its end, with this country still enjoying a position of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. A nuclear revisionism now contends that, contrary to what has been the conventional wisdom, strategic superiority is useless, in that it cannot be translated into diplomatic power or political advantage, and that this inutility was dramatically demonstrated at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. In turn, this view of strategic superiority is part of a larger assessment of the significance of nuclear weapons, an assessment in which these weapons are found to be "totally useless—except only to deter one's opponent from using them."[18]

If nuclear weapons are useful only for deterring the use of nuclear weapons, if strategic superiority cannot be employed to any meaningful advantage, then clearly a good deal of the conventional wisdom respecting the history of the postwar period must be discounted. Neither the American monopoly of nuclear weapons at the start of this period, nor the subsequent American strategic superiority conferred any advantage on us. Indeed, if the revisionist view is to be literally credited, the existence of nuclear weapons and the fear of nuclear war had little to do with the maintenance of peace in Europe.

The consequences of nuclear revisionism, if once pursued to their logical conclusion, are quite startling. We are well advised to be skeptical of these efforts to recast our understanding of the history of the recent past, particularly when it is apparent that they are motivated by and put in the service of the disputes of the present.

[18] Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, p. 79.

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Now that many have concluded that, in present circumstances, nuclear weapons are "useless," they apparently must persuade themselves, and others, that this has always been the case. But even if this were the case today, it was not the case in the past. Strategic superiority did confer advantages, even critical advantages, so long as we clearly enjoyed it. It did make extended deterrence quite credible, and it is on the credibility of extended deterrence that the structure of American interests and commitments ultimately rested yesterday and, in far more difficult circumstances, continues to rest today. The strategic superiority we once enjoyed also made it much easier for us to sustain a faith in deterrence.

In the decade or so following the Cuban missile crisis, the loss of strategic superiority had no more than a marginal impact on this nation's faith in deterrence. Although the Soviet achievement of strategic parity was an event of first-order importance, requiring a rethinking of the entire American security position, its effects on the structure of extended deterrence attracted only moderate attention and caused even less anxiety. In contrast to the early 1960s, the early 1970s gave rise to almost no agitation in the body politic over the nuclear issue, despite the momentous changes that had occurred.

Vietnam apart, the reason for this extraordinary unconcern was that we were in the floodtide of détente. Having developed slowly and unevenly in the course of the 1960s, by the early 1970s détente had become the centerpiece of the Nixon policy reformulation. In the context of détente, the loss of strategic superiority was generally seen as an event without great significance. Instead, far more attention was directed to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), though in retrospect the results of these negotiations, embodied in the 1972 Moscow accords, appear almost inconsequential in comparison with the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity. But the arms control negotiations were considered almost from the outset a litmus test of the overall relationship of the superpowers. If this relationship was relatively good, the possible consequences of the Soviet Union having achieved strategic parity might be taken in stride. Besides, the Soviet achievement did not challenge the regnant view that the preservation of mutual deterrence was best guaranteed by both sides maintaining a retaliatory force with the capability of assured destruction. The Moscow agreements were successfully defended as preserving mutual deterrence while stabilizing it by limiting the buildup of nuclear forces.

It was in this manner that public faith in deterrence was sustained during the 1970s, despite the continuing buildup of Sovet strategic

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forces. While détente lasted, faith in deterrence went largely unquestioned. It is in the fall of détente and the rise of a new cold war that we must find the simple but critical explanation for the prominence now given to nuclear weapons and the prospect of nuclear war.

The nuclear anxiety we have seen arise in recent years is not a response to mere atmospherics and cannot be exorcized by reassuring words. To argue otherwise is to trivialize the nuclear issue. While the Reagan Administration could have moderated public reaction to the nuclear arms issue had it shown greater receptivity to arms control and greater discretion in its statements about nuclear war, it could not have escaped a substantial reaction. The Administration has learned a great deal about guarding its tongue, making pious gestures, and even playing the role of true believer in arms control. Still, the anti-nuclear arms movement and the nuclear debate persist. They persist because they are a response essentially to the breakdown of détente and to the dangers of war this breakdown is thought to raise.

V

What is immediately apparent in considering the present nuclear debate is its continuity with the past. Although a generation has elapsed since the last major debate over nuclear weapons, the questions raised today are largely the same questions that were raised then. What are the requirements of deterrence? Can these requirements be met indefinitely and, even if they can, at what political and moral cost? Are they compatible in the long run with the political institutions and moral foundations of a liberal-democratic society? What happens if deterrence fails? Can nuclear weapons be employed to achieve any of the traditional objectives of war? If they can, why has a plausible scenario of a nuclear conflict not been devised? If they cannot, must not the breakdown of deterrence be attended by the determination to stop the ensuing conflict and to do so without regard to considerations of relative advantage? But quite apart from the intrinsic difficulty of crediting a strategy—deterrence—that has only this response to the contingency of its breakdown, does not the quick termination of the conflict depend on the parallel behavior, if not the agreement, of both sides? If only one side moves to terminate the conflict, however, may it not be placed at a great and perhaps even fatal disadvantage?

It is not only the questions that have remained by and large the same. The answers, too, have remained the same and they seem no

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more satisfactory than they did on an earlier occasion. None of this should prove surprising. All of our political and moral thought is predicated on the assumption of limits. Nuclear weapons challenge this assumption by virtue of their destructiveness and, of course, their rate of destruction. By introducing a new quantitative dimension into the conduct of war, by holding out the prospect of a war that might escape any meaningful limitation, nuclear weapons take the standards heretofore applied to force and threaten to make a hollow mockery of them.

Deterrence escapes these considerations only so long as the possibility of its breakdown is either denied or simply ignored. If the reliability of deterrence arrangements is believed to approach certainty, the only issues that can arise will concern deterrence and not nuclear war. These issues will not challenge the foundations of faith.

Even the champions of pure and simple deterrence have seldom been so indiscreet as to endow deterrent strategies with certainty. No social contrivance can be invested with certainty. All are flawed. All may fail, including deterrence. But once this is acknowledged, the difficulties that a faith in deterrence had managed to exorcize reappear, and in acute form. If a deterrent strategy may fail, it is absurd to refuse to consider seriously the possible consequences of failure beyond saying that all effort must be directed to bringing the conflict to an end as quickly as possible and without regard to any other considerations. Equally, if a deterrent strategy may fail, it is absurd to insist upon using and justifying the threat of nuclear war as an instrument of policy but to deny that any meaningful or just purpose could be served by such a war.

Yet, what are the alternatives to these absurdities? One, we have long been told, is frankly to acknowledge nuclear war as a distinct historical possibility. Having done so, though, what is the character of this possibility? We still cannot say with any real assurance. The actual character of nuclear war remains as obscure today as in the 1950s. It may well be, as Lawrence Freedman concludes in his history of nuclear strategy, that: "The question of what happens if deterrence fails is vital for the intellectual cohesion and credibility of nuclear strategy." Yet Freedman also concludes: "It now seems unlikely that such an answer can be found."[19]

[19] Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 395. Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 391, reaches the same conclusion: "The nuclear strategists had come to impose order—but in the end chaos prevailed." See also Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 127.

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Do any recent developments, however, promise to alter fundamemtally the now familiar dimensions of the nuclear dilemma? Since the essence of that dilemma is one of limits, a basic change might be effected by the conclusive demonstration either of no limits at all to the destructiveness of nuclear war or, conversely, of quite clear limits. In the one case the threat would arise of a nation's, if not humanity's, utter extinction. A global climatic catastrophe resulting from nuclear war has been offered in evidence of this position. In another case, the promise would be of a return to a warfare that could effectively distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. New weapons which are revolutionary in their accuracy have been offered in evidence of this position.

The prospect of a global climatic catastrophe consequent upon a nuclear war—a nuclear winter—recalls to mind Herman Kahn's Doomsday Machine. The Doomsday Machine was programmed to set off the Doomsday Bombs, thereby destroying civilization, should the Soviet Union commit an act of nuclear aggression that went above a certain threshold. Once set up, it was to be independent of human control. The Soviet Union was to be duly informed of its existence. The purpose of the machine was to perfect deterrence.

"Nuclear winter," as it is described, may be regarded as nature's equivalent of the Doomsday Machine. A nuclear war that goes beyond a certain threshold would result in a climatic catastrophe.[20] This prospect would at last compel men to do what their political and oral inventiveness have never been able to do. Once war holds out the certainty of mutual—indeed, of universal—destruction, it will be abandoned. Nuclear winter appears as the final confirmation of the very old idea that the institution of war contains within itself the means for achieving its own disappearance. All it needs do is become sufficiently destructive.

Provided that the nuclear winter findings are scientifically sound, they reinforce rather than transcend the familiar dimensions of the nuclear dilemma. We are unlikely, however, to find a reliable way by which the hypothesis of a climatic catastrophe might be tested other than by a way that risks the catastrophic event itself. As such, the nuclear winter danger seems likely to become another of the great unknowns surrounding nuclear weapons, and may yet fall victim to the politicization that claims almost any issue bearing on these weapons. Nuclear winter is an indication of how little we may yet know about the consequences of nuclear war. It points to the

[20] For a review of these findings and possible policy implications, see Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, pp. 257–92.

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limited control, if control at all, we may have over those consequences.

The development of ever more accurate weapons appears to point in quite the opposite direction. It does so by promising a radical decrease in collateral damage, by permitting conventional weapons to replace nuclear weapons in many tasks, by dramatically raising the nuclear threshold and by markedly diminishing the prospect of escalation.[21] The advances in our ability to reduce collateral damage and to rely much more on conventional weapons is not found to blur the vital distinction between nuclear and conventional force. On the contrary, they make that distinction far more meaningful and effective. Most of all, the new weaponry, according to its champions, will give us choices we did not have before. Provided they live up to advance expectations, the new weapons indeed give us choices we did not have before. They will extend the spectrum of violence. They will add a number of intermediate levels between the upper and lower extremes of this spectrum . But they will not solve the great dilemma created by nuclear weapons of finding reasonably clear and effective limits to force. The distinctive danger presented by nuclear weapons will persist, though now it may well be mitigated by the existence of weapons that afford a markedly greater opportunity to act in a restrained and discriminate manner.

The view that finds a salvation of sorts in the new weapons assumes that men have been indiscriminate in the conduct of war because they lacked the means to be discriminate—or, at any rate, more discriminate. This is a partial truth that, in the manner of all partial truths, becomes dangerous when taken as the whole truth. Indiscriminate or immoderate means decree immoderate ends. Yet discriminate or moderate means may also be used in the pursuit of immoderate ends. Men have been indiscriminate in the conduct of war, in part, because they have sought immoderate or unlimited ends. Should they continue to seek those ends, the threat of indiscriminate warfare must persist, new smart weapons notwithstanding.

It will not do, then, to assume that the advent of smart weapons

[21] Albert Wohlstetter has written of this revolution in precision that it is "in some ways more revolutionary than the transition from conventional to fission explosives or even fusion weapons." The reason is that an improvement in accuracy "by a factor of 100 improves blast effectiveness against a small, hard military target about as much as multiplying the energy released a million times." Once we can, in Wohlstetter's words, hit what we aim at and only what we aim at, we can also limit collateral damage. "It is the lack of technology smart enough, rather than the availability of large brute-force single weapons, that lies at the root of the problem of collateral damage." Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," *Commentary*, June 1983, pp.15–35.

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will permit us to combine discriminating means with any of a wide variety of ends. That side against which the most accurate weapons are used in pursuit of immoderate ends may still be driven to threaten and to employ indiscriminate weapons. The new technology does not resolve the issue of limits. Nor could it be expected to do so.

VI

The element of continuity in the present debate can be overdone. If from one perspective today's debate looks like nothing so much as a rerun of yesterday, from yet another perspective it appears quite different. Although the framework and essential terms of the present debate are the same as those of the past, its tenor has changed. In the course of a generation, there has been a considerable shift of position with respect to the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

The significance of this shift cannot be found in the questions that are asked today; they are similar to a generation ago. Instead, it is in the choice of answers increasingly given to familiar questions. Thus, when the American Catholic bishops declare in their now famous pastoral letter on war and peace that "nuclear weapons particularly and nuclear warfare as it is planned today raise new moral questions," the referent point can only be the world of pre-nuclear weapons. The fashionably banal phrase that the world is now "wired for destruction" might just as truthfully have been uttered in the 1960s. It is not the essential predicament nuclear weapons have created for us that is novel but the new evaluations of that predicament. The bishops emphasize that: "What previously had been defined as a safe and stable system of deterrence is today viewed with political and moral skepticism." A predicament, they justly observe, that once had been widely accepted with little question, "is now being subjected to the sharpest criticism" and "evaluated with a new perspective."

The bishops' letter, with its criticism of American nuclear strategy, is a significant part of this new perspective. A generation ago, in 1965, the Second Vatican Council expressed a quite different perspective.[22] It did so, in the first place, with respect to the possible use of nuclear weapons. The Council left the implication that the use of nuclear weapons in a war of legitimate defense would also be legitimate provided such weapons were used in a reasonably

[22] Cf. Second Vatican Council, *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, December 7, 1965*, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1966. The statement on war appears in Part II, Chap. V.

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discriminating manner. What the Vatican Council condemned was "total war" and any acts of war "aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or extensive areas along with their population." What the American Catholic bishops condemn is nuclear war. The use of nuclear weapons is rejected, whether these weapons are used against military targets or against civilian centers of population, whether in a first strike or in a retaliatory second strike, whether in a strategic or theater nuclear war. The rejection is complete. Nor does it matter that the bishops' position is based on the conviction that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be controlled and that the effects cannot be limited, considerations that are not, after all, very different from those emphasized by Vatican Council II. What does matter is that the bishops invoke these considerations to condemn nuclear war unqualifiedly, while Vatican II invoked them to form only a carefully qualified statement about the circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons would be illegitimate.

This is an interpretation of the bishops' letter, let it be emphasized. Nowhere do the bishops expressly condemn any and all use of nuclear weapons. What they do expressly and unequivocably condemn is indiscriminate warfare. But that is all. On the first use of nuclear weapons, they "do not perceive any situation" in which initiation "can be morally justified." On limited nuclear war, they want to be assured that a series of conditions can be satisfied before condoning the limited use of nuclear weapons. Unless these conditions can be satisfied, and clearly they cannot, the bishops remain "highly skeptical" about the real meaning of "limited." Does all this amount to the complete rejection of nuclear weapons? Some argue that it does not, that it permits the bare possibility of the most restricted use of nuclear weapons.[23] But even if this view is credited and, in Father Bryan Hehir's words, the letter leaves "a centimeter of ambiguity" on use, we have come very close to total rejection. There is no way by which American nuclear policy—past, present or probable future—can be reconciled with the bishops' position.

The position taken by the Catholic bishops toward nuclear war is quite close to the position of many who make up the deterrence faithful. "Of course," Leon Wieseltier writes, "there can be no nuclear war that is just. There is no moral standard that can sanction it."[24] Of course, there can never be a just nuclear war, if it is

[23] Cf. Bruce M. Russett, "Ethical Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence," *International Security*, Spring 1984, pp. 52–3.

[24] Wieseltier, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

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assumed that no meaningful limits can or will be set to the conduct of such war. Given that assumption, nuclear war must either destroy the ends for which it is presumably fought or result in destruction that is disproportionate to those ends. In either case—or, what is generally held as more likely, in both cases—nuclear war must prove unjust.

This absolute condemnation of any and every nuclear war cannot but have a bearing on the moral assessment of deterrence. As long as nuclear war is not condemned without qualification, as long as the prospect is held out that a nuclear conflict may satisfy the minimal standards of justice, deterrence structures may be maintained without corrosive moral anxiety and defensiveness. Once this prospect is excluded, however, deterrence must become more difficult to sustain. If nuclear weapons are by their very nature illegitimate, because their use cannot be controlled or their effects limited, deterrence structures that rest on the threat to use these weapons are also likely to be seen as illegitimate. What gives these structures their one and only saving grace is the promise that they will never have to be put to active use. Even then, the justification of deterrence will largely rest on the grounds of necessity. Yet the plea of necessity, taken alone, can never prove very satisfactory. If deterrent structures are to be given the requisite support for sustained periods, they must be seen as responding to something more than necessity. That plea might alone suffice if these structures were securely endowed with the quality of certainty. Since they cannot be so endowed, the slightest lapse of faith in the reliability of deterrence must give rise to a growing sense of despair—moral and otherwise.

It must also give rise to a growing disposition to refuse to endow deterrence with moral legitimacy. This disposition, in the view of some critics, is already apparent in the position taken by the Catholic bishops. Despite their "strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence," these critics argue that the logic of the bishops' position is to undermine deterrence. By insisting on the doctrine of "no use—ever," the bishops would strip deterrence of one of the elements indispensible to its effectiveness. "Deterrence," one critic notes, "is not inherent in the weapons. It results from a combination of possession and the will to use them. If one side renounces, for moral or other reasons, the intent of ever actually using nuclear weapons, deterrence ceases to exist."[25]

Does it? If one possesses nuclear weapons and foreswears using

[25] Charles Krauthammer, "On Nuclear Morality," *Commentary*, October 1983, p. 49.

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them, is it reasonable to conclude that their deterrent role "ceases to exist"? It would not seem so. In some measure deterrence *is* inherent in the weapon and its possession. This is true even of far less awesome weapons. It is certainly true of weapons that are as destructive as those on which deterrence rests today, weapons that have been used only twice, and about which there is happily little hard evidence on the will to use them. There is, after all, some merit in doctrines of existential deterrence. The bishops, it is true, would put these doctrines to a rather exacting test by a policy of retaining possession of nuclear weapons while renouncing any use of them. But it was only in this manner that the bishops could counsel a course of action that in their judgment conforms to just-war criteria while also managing to retain political relevance.[26]

A less severe though far more persuasive criticism is that the bishops' effort serves to weaken deterrence. It does so not only by insisting on "no use—ever" but by undermining the legitimacy of deterrence even while giving deterrence a "strictly conditioned moral acceptance." Yet it is not only bishops' letters and the like that undermine deterrence. In a way that is less apparent, though perhaps no less effective, so do the champions of minimum deterrence. For their position, too, comes very close to one of "no use—ever"; certainly it does so in spirit. What else can be the meaning of their counsel that in the event deterrence fails, the overriding duty of the statesman is to try to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible and without regard to other considerations? If this is the great goal of the statesman, to which all else must be subordinated, the question arises: why should the side made the object of a preemptive strike—presumably this country—respond at all? To do nothing in response to a nuclear attack would likely hold out the best prospect of bringing the conflict to an end in the quickest and least destructive way.

The combination of renouncing a preemptive attack and of committing oneself to terminating a nuclear war "as quickly as possible" is very close to the bishops' "no use—ever." The threat of a second strike may serve a deterrent purpose. But even that purpose may be substantially negated by the commitment, if it is generally known, to war termination as quickly as possible. Indeed, as between the bishops' commitment to "no use—ever" and a minimum deterrence plus quick termination, the difference appears quite negligible. Given the assumptions of minimum deterrence, a

[26] For the argument that the bishops successfully combined moral purity and political relevance, cf. Frances X. Winters, S.J., "The American Bishops on Deterrence—'Wise as Serpents: Innocent as Doves'," *Science, Technology, and Human Values*, Summer 1983, pp. 23–29.

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second strike must in all likelihood prove strategically pointless and morally perverse.

The bishops' position, then, is the moral analogue of the strategic position of minimum deterrence. What to the former is morally proscribed, to the latter is strategically absurd. To both, deterrence is justified only if it need never be "acted out." Given this similarity, it is less important that what the bishops may not "intend" doing, the supporters of minimum deterrence may intend to their hearts' content. Far more important is the agreement on the illegitimacy of any and all nuclear war.

VII

How may we account for the change that has occurred with respect to the legitimacy of nuclear weapons? Is it that the public has simply awakened at last to the dangers, has become aware of the nature of the catastrophe that would ensue if these weapons were ever to be used? If so, all that needs explaining is why the public took so long to awaken to the dangers. But once it had done so, it was only to be expected that the condemnation of nuclear weapons would follow. Thus George Ball, writing of the "long overdue" awakening of public interest in, and concern for the military use of, the atom, takes it as self-evident that this interest must lead, as in Ball's judgment it already has led, to enveloping nuclear weapons in a "rigid taboo."[27] To understand these weapons—to know that they cannot be controlled in use and effect, and therefore cannot in fact be employed to achieve a political objective—is to condemn them. The sense that nuclear weapons are illegitimate is synonymous with a growing awareness of them.

It is an appealing view if only because of the role and motive it imputes to the great public. Until quite recently, we are asked to believe, the public regarded the esoteric realm of nuclear weapons and strategy with a detachment bordering on indifference. It did so presumably because it largely dismissed the prospect of nuclear war. "So long as Americans regarded the danger of nuclear war as remote and unreal," George Ball notes, "most were content to leave nuclear weapons to academic experts, military theorists, and science fiction writers." But once the Soviet-American relationship began to deteriorate badly at the end of the 1970s, the veil was suddenly torn from before the public's eyes. The danger of nuclear war was no longer seen as remote and unreal. The sudden appreciation of the danger led to the anti-nuclear weapons movement

[27] George Ball, "The Cosmic Bluff," *The New York Review of Books*, July 21, 1983, p. 37.

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and, synonymous with the movement, to the growing sense that nuclear weapons are illegitimate.

In part a plausible account, it nevertheless distorts the history of the past few decades. The development of nuclear weapons and strategy is seen as taking place almost on a different planet as far as the public is concerned. One would never know from this account that America's nuclear monopoly in the late 1940s was widely credited, whether rightly or wrongly, with deterring a Soviet attack on Western Europe; that a strategy of massive retaliation formed a mainstay of American policy in the 1950s; that the great crisis of the early 1960s over Cuba was provoked by placing nuclear missiles on the island and was resolved only at the risk of a war between the superpowers that might have led in turn to the use of nuclear weapons; and that a decade of much publicized arms control negotiations had occurred during the 1970s, which at the least maintained public awareness of the nuclear weapons issue, and at the most, by constant repetition of the need to control the dangers of the arms race, prepared the ground for the movement that sprang up once these negotiations—and the superpower relationship so closely identified with them—began to collapse.

It is scarcely credible to picture the past several years as the period of a great awakening of the public to the physical and moral perils of nuclear weapons. No one was oblivious to the perils of nuclear war. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons has long been an integral part of the informal educational curriculum of this society. The change in attitude that has undoubtedly occurred in the past generation toward nuclear weapons is not so much the result of a heightened understanding of the characteristics of these weapons and the dangers of nuclear war as it is of a heightened appreciation of the increasing power at the disposal of the Soviet Union. There are, of course, other reasons for this change. Nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as illegitimate, in part because force in general is increasingly seen as illegitimate. In turn, a changed attitude toward the use of armed force must be attributed in part to the continuing impact of Vietnam. In part it also reflects deeper changes occurring in American society that militate against this most ancient activity of collectives. In time, the deeper explanation of the reaction to Vietnam may well be found in the transformation of American society in directions prophesied long ago by some of the great nineteenth-century sociologists. Derided earlier in this century, the view that liberal-capitalist societies are inherently pacific—and even pacifist—is one that can no longer be readily dismissed.

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These considerations are necessarily speculative, but the significance of the increased power of the Soviet Union in effecting a changed attitude toward nuclear weapons in this country seems much less so. The visible ability of the Soviet Union effectively to match any threat of nuclear force on our part clearly has played a considerable role in prompting the reevaluation, moral and otherwise, of nuclear weapons. It is not the first time that the fear of retaliation in kind has led to a display of heightened moral sensitivity. Moralists are understandably reluctant to acknowledge the effect that considerations of reciprocity have in these matters. Their reluctance does not diminish the significance of reciprocity in placing restraints on behavior, and particularly collective behavior.

Unless we are to assume a moral transformation of sorts, never a very promising assumption, an altered view of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons reflects an altered distribution of this form of power. The marked growth of Soviet strategic power in the past generation accounts for the hardening of the conviction that nuclear weapons, any and all nuclear weapons, must prove indiscriminate in their effects, when in practice weapons developments for the first time hold out the solid promise of introducing an appreciable element of discrimination. From a broader perspective, the growth of Soviet military power is reflected in the widespread disposition to minimize, if not almost dismiss, the importance of other differences in accounting for the persistence of the conflict between the Soviet Union and this country. A generation ago, differences in ideology, values and political structures were still accorded a prime importance. Today, their role in explaining the persistence of the conflict is much reduced. Yet an image of the Soviet Union that has changed substantially for the better since the mid-1960s contrasts strikingly with the reality of the Soviet government's conduct at home and abroad—a reality that scarcely bears out this optimistic image.

Whatever the precise explanation of the change in attitude toward nuclear weapons, it seems very likely that the change will persist. For the circumstances that must roughly account for it are not of a transient character. The unrest and disaffection that is the result of this change can only be kept at tolerable levels by a restoration of faith in deterrence. How such restoration may be effected is the issue around which the nuclear debate has increasingly centered.

VIII

There are, in principle, three ways by which a faith in deterrence might be restored. In one, restoration would take the path of

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attempting to re-create the circumstances that once conditioned the operation of faith. The critical circumstance, of course, was strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. In retrospect, there is now a tendency to discount the view that strategic superiority once conferred real and significant advantages. The increasingly fashionable theme of the inherent inutility of nuclear weapons is applied to a recent past in order to correct the presumably mistaken view that our strategic position ever operated to our advantage. If it did not, then the attempt today to recapture some semblance of strategic advantage must be regarded as at best a vain enterprise, and this even if there were a reasonable prospect that the effort might one day succeed.

Today's nuclear revisionism notwithstanding, the strategic superiority of yesterday did confer advantages. Not the least of these advantages was a degree of faith in the operation of deterrence that has since declined. Whether this faith might be restored to a former level, even if a measure of strategic superiority were once regained, is surely a legitimate question. But it cannot be answered simply by tendentious readings of the past that are sharply at variance with common-sense interpretations. Nor can it be fairly responded to by intimations to the effect that the very attempt to regain a measure of strategic advantage over the Soviet Union must be regarded as inherently undesirable and even illegitimate. The attempt may prove impossible of achievement, but that is another matter. To judge it as inherently undesirable and even as illegitimate, largely for the reason that the Soviet Union might consider the effort synonymous with a policy of confrontation, is to sanction the disadvantages under which our position of extended deterrence must operate in conditions approximating strategic parity.

The promise of technology has once again stimulated hopes of regaining some semblance of strategic advantage. It has done so with respect to the precision-guided munitions. To a still greater extent, it has done so with respect to weapons of defense against ballistic missiles.

The advent of offensive weapons of great accuracy would evidently confer a substantial measure of strategic advantage if, being largely in the possession of one side, they had a highly effective counterforce capability. But the history of the past three decades does not afford much reason for assuming that the lead we may presently enjoy in "smart" weapons will be kept for more than a brief period. Nor is there much reason to assume that the effectiveness of these weapons as a counterforce system will be greater in our hands than in Soviet hands. If anything, it is the contrary assumption that seems more reasonable. For the differences be-

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tween the two societies must make the concealment of targets appropriate to the new weapons far more difficult for the United States than for the Soviet Union. The openness of American society almost ensures that, as between the two, we would be the disadvantaged party.

In the case of the precision-guided munitions, we are considering weapons that are either operational today or close to becoming so. By contrast, in the case of weapons to defend against ballistic missiles, we are dealing for the most part with technological prospects that cannot be transformed into operational weapons systems for at least 20 years, if indeed these prospects can ever be realized.

It is only with respect to a certain type of ground-based defense—terminal-phase defense of point targets—that an effective operational system might be put in place by the end of the 1980s. A terminal-phase defense would proceed on the basis of a technology that goes back to the 1960s. Forbidden by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, except for one limited site, terminal defense is restricted to the most accessible or vulnerable phase of an attacking missile's trajectory. To be successful in the defense of missile emplacements, the effectiveness of terminal defense need be no more than modest, since all that is required is that a substantial portion of the missiles be saved. This is in sharp contrast to the requirement of a defense of cities.

A comprehensive system of defense against ballistic missiles—a Star Wars system that would extend its reach into space—could become a reality in the next century. But the problem of restoring faith in deterrence is one for today, not for the next century. It cannot be met by a prospect that is so far removed and so attended by uncertainty. A Star Wars defense is not only a very complex and difficult undertaking; even if once constructed its operational effectiveness would remain quite uncertain, assuming that any of the present schemes were implemented.

The central difficulty in devising a comprehensive system of defense against ballistic missiles is rooted in the very great destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the very great speed of ballistic missiles. These characteristics have given the offense a predominance that it has never before achieved. That predominance, moreover, seems assured by the relative ease with which simple and cheap countermeasures may be taken to defeat defensive efforts. Then, too, the requirements for success in the case of defensive systems are far more exacting than those for offensive systems. Once again, this striking disproportionality is due to the very great destructiveness of nuclear weapons.

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Whatever the prospects of strategic defense, we can gain advantage from them only if we can remain well ahead of the Soviet Union in the competition to develop a missile defense. The assumption that we can remain well ahead is rooted in the belief that is as old as the postwar competition in arms between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this view, the Soviet Union is, and will remain, the technological inferior of this country. Yet our superiority has not prevented the inferior party from duplicating our technological achievements in weapons, often within a very brief period. On more than one occasion, this duplication has also been carried out with a vengeance. There is no apparent reason to conclude that on this occasion the Soviet Union would prove unable to do what it has done with regularity in the past. Having sacrificed so much to reach its present position of strategic eminence, it may be expected to remain willing to make the necessary effort and sacrifice to keep this position.

It would be ironic if the principal consequence of Star Wars efforts, rather than to confer a measure of strategic advantage, was instead to subject our principal alliance to new and serious strain. The layered defense that might just possibly work one day for the United States either would not work at all for Western Europe or would work only imperfectly. The time that is the vital ingredient for such defense is too compressed in the case of Western Europe. The view has been expressed that, in these circumstances of a two-class system of defense, Europe would intensify its perennial fear of the United States decoupling from its allies. But surely it would not be our growing invulnerability to Soviet missile attack that heightened this fear. A growing invulnerability, however modest, should instead reassure our allies, on the reasoning that what promotes American strategic invulnerability strengthens extended deterrence. On this reasoning, the Europeans should welcome America's growing invulnerability. Admittedly, a growing Soviet invulnerability as well must partly offset this reassurance to Western Europe. Still, the net result, one might think, would still point to West European reassurance.

In all likelihood, though, the reality would be otherwise and would result from Western Europe's perception that it was now more exposed than ever. The fact that the two great nuclear adversaries were increasingly protected, while Europe was not, would heighten fears that the risks of nuclear war *in Europe* had increased, that in the words of a former mayor of West Berlin, Heinrich Albertz, Europe was now being turned into a "shooting gallery of the superpowers." However unfounded the perception,

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it might nevertheless be broadly shared. For it would reflect the familiar "logic" of the protected that their security consists in there being no sanctuaries.

IX

The preceding considerations suggest that the disadvantages attending our position of extended deterrence are unlikely to be compensated for by technological advances. Those disadvantages may one day create sufficient support for prompting a general withdrawal from our major postwar commitments. A policy of withdrawal represents the second way by which a faith in deterrence might be restored. If the interests in defense of which we were prepared to risk not only nuclear war but any serious use of force did not extend beyond the North American continent, the prospect of our future involvement in a nuclear conflict would sharply decline. It would sharply decline because deterrence, having now become synonymous with the prevention of a direct attack by the Soviet Union upon the United States, would possess maximum credibility. It would do so even assuming that the Soviet Union's strategic forces enjoyed a substantial advantage over our own forces. For the Soviet Union would still have to incur terrible risks in attacking this country. In a world where we would no longer contest them, what incentive would the Soviets have to take such risks? An America, then, that defined its vital interests in terms that did not extend beyond this continent would be an America that placed its physical security in least jeopardy. By the same token, it would also be an America that provided a favorable context for the restoration of faith in deterrence.

This, at least, is the principal thrust the argument on behalf of a policy of withdrawal must take. It remains the case, however, that the argument on behalf of withdrawal is one that has yet to receive much open support. Even among those who are most adamant about the dangers of our present nuclear strategy and most insistent upon changing that strategy, there is an unwillingness to draw the connection, or even to acknowledge a connection, between a policy of withdrawal and a radical change in nuclear strategy. It may be that withdrawal is nevertheless the unavowed agenda of much of the anti-nuclear weapons movement. Certainly this is the conclusion one is almost driven to make in the case of some of its most articulate supporters. It may also be, however, that in the case of many—perhaps the majority—we have the not unfamiliar situation of a movement that entertains contradictory goals, that seeks to change substantially, and in time even radically, the nation's nuclear strat-

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egy, while not changing in any significant way the nation's interests and commitments. In this instance, moreover, the ground for entertaining goals all too likely to prove incompatible has been well prepared by arguments on behalf of the compatibility between radical change in nuclear strategy and continuity in major interests of postwar policy.

The infrequency with which a policy of withdrawal is given serious consideration today must no doubt be found in the legacy of our interwar experience. Then, a policy of withdrawal—of isolation, principally from Europe—threatened in the end to lead to the worst of outcomes. The persisting fear that it would do so again must in large measure account for the near unanimity with which the undesirability of withdrawal is still considered to keep it beyond the pale of serious discussion.

If withdrawal is unthinkable, though, the reasons for this ought at least to be made clear. Certainly, it will not do to respond that the unthinkable may not be thought else it become thinkable. Walter Lippmann once pointed out that this reasoning was part of the case made against alliances and he argued that an objection which men would not examine and debate was a mere prejudice. In part, the case against withdrawal is also little more than a prejudice.

In part, however, this case rests on the assumption that even if we were once to decide upon a policy of withdrawal, we would do so only subsequently to find ourselves forced to try to retrace our steps in circumstances more dangerous to our security than ever. Suppose, it may be argued, that we were to withdraw from Europe only to attempt to return in circumstances of great instability, brought on by Soviet threats to forestall nuclear arming by West Germany. Clearly, this would be a very dangerous situation and it would have been largely brought on by our withdrawal.

It may well be objected that this argument succeeds by juxtaposing very nearly the worst of possible worlds, resulting from our decision to withdraw, with something resembling if not the best then a very tolerable world, resulting from our determination to retain the present policy. Still, it is not unreasonable to put a greater burden on those moving for radical change in policy. An American withdrawal, however staged, would be a momentous event. The uncertainties that it would open up are considerably greater than the uncertainties attendant upon a policy of the status quo.

The relevant question here, however, is whether the instability arising from our withdrawal would represent a greater threat to our core security than the continued pursuit of the policy of

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extended deterrence. The argument that withdrawal would represent a greater threat rests on the assumption that we would not—indeed, could not—accept the consequences of withdrawal. This unwillingness—and inability—to accept the consequences of our decision, it is argued, could easily result in something near the worst of possible worlds. And well it could. But this world would threaten our physical security only if, having decided for other reasons that we could not live with the consequences, we determined to retrace our steps.

What are these other reasons what would presumably drive us to retrace our steps? One, many would insist, is the very prospect of a war again occurring in Europe, a war we could not escape involvement in, just as we could not escape involvement in World Wars I and II. But one compelling reason why we could not avoid intervening in previous wars was because of balance-of-power considerations. A hostile power in control of Europe, we calculated, might ultimately pose a threat to our physical security. The calculation may have involved an element of exaggeration. Still, it was not unreasonable, resting as it did on the assumption that the power of this nation might prove insufficient to deter attack by a hostile power in control of Europe or, even worse, Eurasia.

This reasoning, though, seems no longer relevant. It applied to a pre-nuclear world and to a balance-of-power system. In such a system a surfeit of defensive and deterrent power was practically unachievable. This being so, a great object of diplomacy was to avoid isolation. In this respect, as in so many others, nuclear-missile weapons have effected a revolution in international politics. A great nuclear state, able to destroy any other state or combination of states, is no longer dependent on balance-of-power considerations for its core security. It possesses what was heretofore considered unachievable: a surfeit of deterrent power. And although in the extreme situation it is absolutely vulnerable with respect to its great nuclear adversary, this vulnerability cannot be significantly affected by alliances and allies. On the contrary, while allies cannot improve one's core security, they may threaten it, since the prospect of using nuclear weapons is most likely to arise as a result of threats to their security.

These considerations do not address the argument that a nuclear peace is indivisible and that we cannot escape our present involvement in Europe, if only for the simple yet compelling reason that a nuclear conflict in Europe would inevitably become a global nuclear conflict. This argument is of a piece with the view, also put forth with utter assurance, that any use of nuclear weapons between the

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great powers must result in the unlimited use of nuclear weapons between them. Still, the latter view has at least something more to support it than mere assertion, although ultimately it too is necessarily speculative. The former view, however, seems no more than mere assertion. Far from being of necessity indivisible, a nuclear peace may be more divisible than any peace we have known for a very long time.

Why must a policy of involvement that requires extended deterrence be defended by arguments that no longer carry persuasion? It is as though those making them fear that if the truth were known about why we persist in such a policy it might prove insufficient to command the necessary support. The truth is scarcely startling. If we refuse to equate our vital interests simply with our physical security, it is because great nations have almost always refused to make this equation. They have always insisted that their identity consists of more than physical attributes and that it encompasses the preservation of certain values and of the institutions—political, economic, and social—that embody these values. Nations require allies and friends not only for reasons of physical security but in order to ensure an environment that will be receptive to these values. In the end, this is why we have refused to entertain a policy of withdrawal, even though this continued refusal may one day exact a terrible price.

X

The effort to regain strategic superiority, or some semblance thereof, and a policy of withdrawal are two radically different ways to attempt a restoration of faith in deterrence. Either way may be pursued largely independent of the will and desire of the Soviet Union. This is one of their undoubted attractions and is to be sharply contrasted with the third course, détente, which is evidently dependent on the cooperation of the Soviet government. The attraction of détente, on the other hand, is that it is easier to pursue than strategic superiority while less likely to result in the sacrifice that withdrawal probably entails.

There is little that needs here to be said in a general vein about the third way of restoring faith in deterrence. If the view taken in previous pages is correct, the immediate and decisive reason for the lapse of faith in deterrence was the breakdown of détente.

Unquestionably, the loss of strategic superiority affords the deeper explanation of this lapse. Yet it is remarkable that the passing of our strategic superiority had so limited an effect on both the general public and, more impressively, on the bulk of the foreign

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policy elites. The fact that it did not shake the faith that had been formed in an earlier period must be attributed largely to the relationship of détente that arose in the course of the middle to late 1960s, reached a high point in the early 1970s, and was already in marked decline by the middle 1970s.

In retrospect, what must also impress the observer is how so modest an improvement in the Soviet-American relationship had so reassuring an effect on the public and elites alike. Whatever one's appreciation of the détente of the early 1970s, the tangible achievements of that relationship were on almost any reckoning modest. This is as true of the arms control measures, the centerpiece of the détente, as it is of the other achievements attributed to the relationship. The earlier experience suggests that it may take surprisingly little in the way of an improved Soviet-American relationship in order to still present anxiety and unrest and to restore a lapsed faith.

An improved relationship between the two great nuclear powers is the precondition of virtually any significant measures of arms control. More than this, there is a rough proportionality that may be expected to obtain between the state of this relationship and the prospects for arms control measures. A modestly improved relationship may create the prospect for modest measures of arms control. This being the case, ambitious arms control schemes are either purely imaginary undertakings or they are predicated on a relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that goes far beyond even a rather loose definition of détente. Thus proposals for very deep cuts in nuclear arms—let alone for the abolition of these weapons—are idle unless they assume a relationship that has in all likelihood passed beyond the stage of a mere détente and has become something more intimate and promising. The prospects for this are such that they seem scarcely worth pausing over.

It may seem quixotic at this time even to speculate on the prospects of détente. Yet unless we are to assume that the future of the Soviet-American relationship holds no place for any real improvement and that we can only look forward to unrelievedly grim years, such speculation does not seem out of place. One thing is clear. If it is out of place, not only will the attempt to restore faith in deterrence likely prove a futile enterprise but the nuclear anxiety we have recently experienced can be expected to persist.

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Daniel Yankelovich *John Doble*

THE PUBLIC MOOD: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE U.S.S.R.

Presidential campaigns do more than choose individuals for high office: our history shows many instances where elections have moved the country closer to a decisive resolution of long-standing issues. The 1984 presidential campaign gives the candidates a historic opportunity to build public support for reducing the risk of nuclear war. The American electorate is now psychologically prepared to take a giant step toward real arms reductions.

For several years now a great change, largely unnoted, has transformed the outlook of the American electorate toward nuclear arms. There is a dawning realization among the majority of voters that the growth in nuclear arsenals on both sides has made the old "rules of the game" dangerously obsolete. The traditional response of nations to provocations and challenges to their interest has been the threat of force and, in the event of a breakdown of relations, resort to war. However much suffering war may have created in the past, the old rules permitted winners as well as losers.

But an all-out nuclear war, at present levels of weaponry, would wipe out the distinction between winners and losers. All would be losers and the loss irredeemable. This grim truth is now vividly alive for the American electorate. Moreover, for the average voter the danger is real and immediate—far more so than among elites and experts. Americans are not clear about the policy implications of this new reality. They do not know how it should be translated into day-to-day transactions with the Soviet Union to reduce the danger. But there is an impatient awareness that the old responses are not good enough, and a sense of urgency about finding new responses.

—By an overwhelming 96 percent to 3 percent, Americans assert that "picking a fight with the Soviet Union is too dangerous in a nuclear world. . . ."

—By 89 percent to 9 percent, Americans subscribe to the view that "there can be no winner in an all-out nuclear war; both

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Daniel Yankelovich is Chairman of the national attitude research firm Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., and President of the Public Agenda Foundation.
John Doble is a Senior Research Associate at the Public Agenda Foundation.

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the United States and the Soviet Union would be completely destroyed."

—By 83 percent to 14 percent, Americans say that while in past wars we knew that no matter what happened some life would continue, "we cannot be certain that life on earth will continue after a nuclear war."

—And, by 68 percent to 20 percent, the majority *rejects* the concept that "if we had no alternative we could fight and win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union."

These findings are from a new national study conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation to probe attitudes toward nuclear arms. The picture of the electorate's state of mind that follows has been pieced together from a number of excellent national surveys of public attitudes conducted over the past several years by a variety of organizations. These include: Gallup, Harris, *New York Times*/CBS, *Time* Soundings (conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White), ABC News/*Washington Post*, NBC News/Associated Press, *Los Angeles Times*, Research and Forecasts, and the Public Agenda study, the most recent.

The Public Agenda survey underscores what many others have discovered: Americans have come to believe that nuclear war is unwinnable, unsurvivable.

II

In the postwar period, U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union have oscillated between policies of containment (drawing lines against overt Soviet involvement), and policies of détente that depended on "managing" a carrot/stick relationship between the superpowers. Our shifts from one policy to the other have depended more on internal American politics than on Soviet actions. In the early 1970s, détente enjoyed immense popularity with the public. As the decade moved toward its close, however, differing Soviet and American interpretations of détente had begun to create tensions (for example, in Angola). The watershed event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the reaction of the Carter Administration. This event marked the public start of the present "down phase" of disillusionment in the United States with the policies of détente, and of deeply troubled relations with the Soviets.

President Carter characterized the Afghanistan invasion as "the worst threat to world peace since World War II." The public, which had momentarily set aside its mistrust of the Soviet Union in the early and middle 1970s, now responded with renewed mistrust and

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frustration over our apparent impotence to counter Soviet aggression. (The frustration was aggravated, coincidentally, by this country's inability to free the hostages in Iran.) This combination of events led to a steep increase in public support for strengthening our defenses, and a mood of deep disillusionment with détente.[1] The Public Agenda survey shows that two-thirds of the public (67 percent) endorse the view that the "Soviet Union used détente as an opportunity to build up their armed forces while lulling us into a sense of false security."

In 1980 and 1981 the backlash against détente reached a high peak of intensity. The public mood was characterized by injured national pride, unqualified support for increasing the defense budget, and a general desire to see American power become more assertive.

The public is now having second thoughts about the dangers of such an assertive posture at a time when the United States is no longer seen to maintain nuclear supremacy. The electorate is still wary, still mistrustful, and still convinced that the Soviets will seize every possible advantage they can; yet, at the same time, Americans are determined to stop what they see as a drift toward nuclear confrontation which, in the electorate's view, neither we nor the Soviets desire. The stage is being set for a new phase in our relationship with the Soviets.

For the United States, "normal relations" between the two superpowers are clearly not the "friendly relations" the American people associated with the 1970s policy of détente. At the same time, Americans are skeptical about the kind of containment policy that prevailed so often in the past. From our Vietnam experience, voters draw the lesson that we must keep uppermost in mind the limits of American power. And from the present standoff on nuclear arms they draw the lesson that we must avoid being provocative and confrontational.

Large majorities now support a relatively nonideological, pragmatic live-and-let-live attitude that potentially can provide the political support for a new approach to normalizing relations between the two superpowers.

In shaping new policy proposals it will be useful for candidates to hold clearly in view two major findings that emerge from the many studies of public attitudes toward nuclear arms. The first is that Americans have experienced a serious change of heart about the impact of nuclear weapons on our national security. The second is

[1] See Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagan, "Assertive America," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1980*, pp.696–713.

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that voter perceptions of the Soviets are not as black-and-white as they once were; there are many shades of gray—nuances and subtleties that have an important bearing on policy. An inference follows from these findings: voters are psychologically prepared to consider much more dramatic and far-reaching arms-control policies than existing ones, because existing policies are rooted in the old rules of the game when there was a chance of winning if war broke out.

III

At the very start of the nuclear age in August 1945, a Gallup poll found that the overwhelming majority of citizens approved the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. America was war-weary, and the new weapon held the promise of ending the conflict and saving American lives. Yet, when asked in the same survey whether the United States should use poison gas against Japanese cities if it would shorten the war and save American lives, most Americans answered no. In the summer of 1945, then, in spite of the suffering the war had caused, Americans clearly understood the ideas of deterrence and retaliation, and the need to weigh concerns other than that of simply ending the war.

In 1954, Gallup reported that 54 percent of the public felt that the invention of the hydrogen bomb made another world war less likely. By 1982, however, the Gallup survey revealed that American thinking had undergone a radical change. In that year, responding to the same question posed a generation earlier, nearly two in three (65 percent) now said the development of the bomb was a bad thing.

The reasons for this change are clear-cut. Twenty-nine years ago, Gallup had found that only 27 percent of the public agreed that "mankind would be destroyed in an all-out atomic or hydrogen bomb war." The Public Agenda asked those they interviewed in 1984 if they agreed or disagreed with this statement: "There can be no winner in an all-out nuclear war; both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be completely destroyed." An overwhelming 89 percent concurred. This and other responses reflect a dramatic shift in people's thinking about what nuclear war would be like. Nuclear war is no longer seen as a rational policy for the U.S. government to consider.

In part, this extraordinary change reflects Americans' revised understanding of the relative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union. When the United States alone had the bomb, most Americans had few doubts about our safety. Even after the

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Soviets achieved nuclear status, and even after the advent of the hydrogen bomb, American confidence in our nuclear superiority gave most people a feeling of security. In 1955, for example, when only 27 percent said an all-out nuclear war would destroy mankind, Americans were nearly unanimous (78 percent) in believing that the United States had more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union. Today, only ten percent believe we have nuclear superiority; a majority now feels that the two sides are roughly equal in destructive capability, and at a level felt to be terrifying.

Concern about the issue has also increased, especially among the young. Only five percent of the public say they find themselves thinking about the possibility of nuclear war *less* than they did five years ago. A majority—and nearly three in four young adults between the ages of 18 and 30—say they think about the issue more often than they did five years ago. There is also majority agreement, 68 percent (rising to 78 percent among adults under 30), that if both sides keep building missiles instead of negotiating to get rid of them, it is only a matter of time before they are used. A sizable number expects that day to come soon: 38 percent of the American people, and 50 percent of those under 30, say that all-out nuclear war is likely to occur within the next ten years. This is a vision of the future that is far different from that held in the mid-1950s when most people said the development of the bomb was a good thing, deserving of a central role in our military strategy.

Americans have also arrived at an astonishingly high level of agreement that we must adapt our future policies to these "facts of life":

—That nuclear weapons are here to stay. They cannot simply be abolished, and because mankind will maintain its knowledge of how to make them, there can be no turning back to a less threatening time (85 percent).

—That both we and the Soviets now have an "overkill" capability, more destructive capability than we could ever need, and the ability to blow each other up several times over (90 percent).

—That there can be no such thing as a limited nuclear war: if either side were to use nuclear weapons, the conflict would inevitably escalate into all-out war (83 percent).

—That the United States no longer has nuclear superiority (84 percent), and that we can never hope to regain it; that the arms race can never be won, for if we did have a bigger nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up (92 percent); and that building new weapons

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to use as "bargaining chips" doesn't work because the Soviets would build similar weapons to match us (84 percent).

It is this fundamental sense that our own lives may be at risk that accounts for another startling change in public opinion. A consensus level of 77 percent says that by the end of the decade it should be U.S. policy *not* to use nuclear weapons to respond to a conventional Soviet attack. Nearly the same number (74 percent) say it should be *current* policy never to use small nuclear weapons in a battlefield situation.

IV

Public attitudes toward the Soviet Union are highly complex. Americans believe that the Soviet Union is an aggressive nation, both militarily and ideologically, which presses every advantage, probes constantly for vulnerabilities, interprets every gesture of conciliation and friendship as weakness, fails to keep its promises, cheats on treaties, and, in general, gets the better of us in negotiations by hanging tough.

At the same time, however, there is less concern than in the past about communist subversion from within or about the political appeal of communist ideology to our closest allies. Americans hold the Russian people in high esteem, believe that America is able to live in peace with a variety of communist countries, see the Russians caught in the same plight as ourselves in seeking to avert a suicidal nuclear arms race, credit the Soviets with legitimate security concerns, and believe they are genuinely interested in negotiation. Huge majorities feel that America has been less forthcoming in working things out with the Russians than it might be and that we have to share some of the blame for the deterioration in the relationship.

This ambivalent attitude represents a change in outlook from the last presidential election in 1980 to the present one. In 1980, Americans were in an assertive anticommunist, anti-Soviet mood, ready to support cold-war kinds of initiatives. But in politics, timing is all. Surveys show that Americans feel that the power imbalance that prevailed in 1980 has now been partly or wholly corrected and that more constructive negotiations are possible.

Today, the majority of Americans have reached a conclusion about communism that can best be described as pragmatic rejection. As they have in the past, Americans today firmly reject the social values of communism, and see them as opposed to all our fundamental beliefs. But there is little fear today that communist subversion threatens the United States, that communists will engage in

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sabotage, form a fifth column, or convert millions of Americans to their cause. Americans today are confident that communism holds little appeal in this country. They differentiate among communist countries, too, and the threat they pose to our security. For example, in the Public Agenda survey, people concur with near unanimity that "our experience with communist China proves that our mortal enemies can quickly turn into countries we can get along with" (83 percent). This sense that communism is something we can tolerate without accepting, something with which we can coexist without endorsing, represents another and perhaps fundamental shift in the public's thinking since the beginning of the nuclear age.

Admittedly, public attitudes toward dealing with the threat of communism often seem contradictory and confused. In recent years computer-based statistical methods have permitted some very subtle and powerful analyses which divide the public into like-minded subgroups. At the Public Agenda, analyst Harvey Lauer performed such an analysis on their survey findings, with some revealing and important results.

Lauer's "cluster analysis" showed that public attitudes are most sharply divided by four variables: (1) the presence or absence of ideological animosity toward the Soviet Union; (2) the inclination to see the conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in religious terms or pragmatic terms; (3) the tendency to minimize or to stress the threat of nuclear war; and (4) the favoring of an assertive or a conciliatory policy toward the Soviets.

The four groups that Lauer's cluster analysis reveals can be characterized as follows. One group he calls the "threat minimizers." They constitute 23 percent of the Public Agenda's national cross-section. Like virtually everyone else, they believe that nuclear war is unwinnable. But unlike most other Americans, they do not think there is any real chance that it will happen. Consequently, they are prepared to take far greater risks than the rest of the public. They are less interested in negotiation than in building up our military strength. They reject conciliatory gestures in favor of weakening the Soviet Union in every way possible. Demographically, this group is predominantly male (69 percent), older than other groups, and fairly well educated, with good incomes. Politically, they tend to be conservative and Republican.

At the opposite extreme is to be found the youngest and best educated of the four groups. Constituting 21 percent of the sample, this group believes the possibility of nuclear disaster is real and urgent, they have faith in conciliation over confrontation, they want to see the United States take the initiative in reducing our nuclear

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arms, and most strikingly, they are almost totally free of the ideological hostility that the majority of Americans feel toward the Soviet Union. They see the Soviet threat almost completely in military terms. Like the first group, it, too, is more male than female (56 percent to 44 percent), but unlike the first group it tends to be liberal rather than conservative.

What about the two middle groups where the majority of Americans are to be found? The single largest of the four groups—31 percent—is made up of Americans who are ideologically opposed to communism and the Soviets but are peaceful and non-assertive in their strategic thinking about how to deal with the Soviet threat. They see communism as an ideological threat, but they also think a lot about the possiblity of nuclear war. They believe the Soviet Union takes advantage of us and cheats on our treaties with it, but they also believe that the United States has not done enough to reach serious arms control agreements with the Soviets. They urge that we reach an accommodation with the Soviets on a peaceful coexistence, "live-and-let-live" basis, and not attempt to reform or change them. Demographically, this is the most female of the four groups (60 percent); they are fairly young, of average education, and middle-of-the-road in their political orientation.

The fourth group, representing one quarter of the population (25 percent) tends to see the conflict between us and the Soviets in religious terms. They see the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" threatening our moral and religious values. A majority of them believe that in the event of a nuclear holocaust their faith in God would ensure their survival. Unlike all the other groups, they believe that some day the United States is going to have to fight the Russians to stop communism.

In many respects, the religious anticommunism of this group predisposes it to endorse the utmost in nuclear military strength for the United States. But, paradoxically, it is the most apprehensive about the imminent threat of a nuclear holocaust. Consequently, it sees great danger to the United States in efforts to weaken the Soviets too much, lest they respond "like cornered rats." A majority among them believe the United States has not done enough in negotiations with the Soviets, and a large minority would even opt for unilateral reductions in our nuclear stockpile.

Most of the contradictions in public responses are concentrated in this subgroup. There is, however, an emotional logic underlying their seeming inconsistency: they fear communism as an ideology and would smite it with the sword—but they fear the threat of nuclear war more than they fear communism and therefore they

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are more willing than most Americans to sheathe the sword. They want the United States to be as strong militarily as possible, but they also fear the consequences of our using our military strength aggressively. Their activism derives from the fact that the likelihood of nuclear war is a living reality for them. They are concerned to do everything they can to avert catastrophe. Of all the four groups, they most yearn for strong leadership and authority to set down a policy that will allay their anxieties. They are the only one of the four groups where a majority believes that the subject of nuclear weapons is too complex for them to think about and should therefore be left "to the President and to the experts." Demographically, they are the least well educated of the four groups, disproportionately Democratic but not liberal.

A profile of ambivalent American attitudes toward the Soviet Union can be seen graphically in the following table. It summarizes both the positive and negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union and toward communism as an ideology.

AMBIVALENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM*

Negative Views	*% Agree*	*% Disagree*
"During the 1970s, when we were trying to improve relations, the Soviets secretly built up their military strength"**	90	6
"The Soviets are constantly testing us, probing for weaknesses, and they're quick to take advantage whenever they find any"**	82	14
"The Soviets treat our friendly gestures as weaknesses"**	73	23
"The Soviets used détente as an opportunity to build up their armed forces while lulling us into a false sense of security"***	67	20
"If we are weak, the Soviet Union, at the right moment, will attack us or our allies in Europe and Japan"***	65	27
"The Soviets only respond to military strength"***	61	34
"The Soviets lie, cheat and steal—do anything to further the cause of communism"***	61	28
"The Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty and agreement they've ever signed"***	61	24

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Negative Views (con't)	*% Agree*	*% Disagree*
"In past agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Soviets almost always got the better part of the bargain"***	58	31
"Whenever there's trouble in the world—in the Middle East, Central America, or anywhere else—chances are the Soviets are behind it"***	56	38
More Accepting Views		
"The Russian people are not nearly as hostile to the U.S. as their leaders are and, in fact, the Russians could be our friends if their leaders had a different attitude"**	88	6
"The U.S. has to accept some of the blame for the tension that has plagued U.S.–Soviet relations in recent years"***	76	16
"You can't understand how the Russians behave without realizing that their homeland has been invaded many, many times. They are obsessed with their own military security"***	75	19
"The idea that the Soviets are the cause of all the world's troubles is a dangerous oversimplification"***	70	26
"The U.S. often blames the Soviets for troubles in other countries that are really caused by poverty, hunger, political corruption and repression"***	68	26
"Just 40 years ago, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union and killed millions of Russian citizens. It's perfectly understandable why they oppose our putting nuclear missiles on German soil"***	58	35
"The Soviet leaders believe that President Reagan is trying to humiliate them, and this is not a good climate for negotiating on matters of life and death"***	51	40
"The degree to which the Soviets cheat on arms control is overstated by Americans who oppose negotiating with them in the first place"***	44	41

* Totals do not add to 100% because "Not Sure" responses are omitted.
** *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, 1983
*** Public Agenda, 1984

There is somewhat of a generation gap on attitudes toward the Soviets, with older Americans expressing more suspicion of and hostility toward Soviet motives and actions than younger Ameri-

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cans. For example, 76 percent of those over 60 agree that the Soviets lie, cheat and steal—do anything to further the cause of communism—compared to 52 percent among those under 30. More older than younger Americans also believe that the Soviets cheat on treaties and agreements (76 percent to 49 percent). On the other hand, young Americans, perhaps more skeptical of authority to begin with, believe the degree of Soviet cheating is overstated by those who oppose negotiating with them in the first place. (Fifty-nine percent of those under 30 express such a view, compared to only 32 percent among those over 60.)

V

Such is the nature of public ambivalence toward the Soviet Union that it dooms to failure any one-dimensional policy that appeals exclusively to one side of public attitudes. A policy of undiluted anticommunism that emphasizes only the negatives cannot hope to win solid majority support. The time is past when successful candidates can simply run against the Politburo. Similarly, a one-dimensional policy of détente—if détente is interpreted as it was in the 1970s, as "making friends" with the Russians—cannot win solid majority support either.

No amount of public opinion analysis can fashion the correct policy. What opinion polls can reveal, however, and what we propose to describe are the boundaries or constraints which the public's thinking impose on policy. To sustain a complex and difficult policy, one that may call for public sacrifice, restraint and understanding, it is prudent to seek to win solid and lasting support from the electorate. Our analysis of opinion data suggests that to achieve such support in today's climate, such a policy would have to be conceived within the following guidelines:

1. *The United States must not adopt any policy that the majority of Americans will perceive as "losing the arms race."*

Most Americans believe that the United States cannot regain nuclear superiority, that the arms race cannot be won, and that we can never return to a time when our nuclear monopoly gave us a sense of nearly total security. People are nearly unanimous in the view that if we had a bigger nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up (92 percent). By nearly eight to one (84 percent), the public opposes the idea of building new weapons to use as "bargaining chips" to get concessions in negotiations.

But, in spite of the feeling that we can never "win" the arms race, Americans are afraid we could "lose" it. Nearly six in ten (57

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percent) say we must continue to develop new and better nuclear weapons so as not to lose the arms race. A particular concern fueling this sentiment is the fear that "technological breakthroughs" could make the weapons we now have obsolete (71 percent).

2. *Americans are convinced that it is time for negotiations, not confrontations, with the Soviets.*

Following from the view that nuclear weapons can never be abolished and that the arms race cannot be won, Americans see only one way to reduce the risk of nuclear war—through negotiations. Americans overwhelmingly concur that "picking a fight" with the Soviet Union is too dangerous in a nuclear world, that we should be thinking of peaceful solutions (96 percent). Americans feel that the Soviets are as afraid of nuclear war as we are (94 percent) and that it is in our mutual interest to find ways to negotiate to reduce the risk of war.

Some people see a most ominous trend: that we and the Soviets are drifting toward catastrophe. Sixty-eight percent of Americans feel that if we and the Soviets keep building nuclear weapons instead of negotiating to get rid of them, "it's only a matter of time before they are used." This concern is especially pronounced among women (75 percent) and those under 30 (78 percent). By 50 percent to 22 percent, people say the United States would be safer if we spent less time and effort building up our military forces and more on negotiating with the Soviets. Again, women and the younger Americans agree even more strongly. The idea of building more dangerous nuclear weapons to get the Soviets to make concessions on arms control is rejected by a margin of 62 percent to 31 percent. Half the public fears that President Reagan is playing nuclear "chicken" with the Soviets (50 percent).

3. *The dominant attitude of Americans is that of "live-and-let-live" pragmatism, not an anticommunist crusade, nor a strong desire to reform the Russians.*

Americans say that peacefully coexisting with communist countries is something we do all the time (71 percent). And by a margin of 67 percent to 28 percent, people agree that we should let the communists have their system while we have ours, that "there's room in the world for both."

A solid majority also feels no strong desire to involve the United States in reforming the Soviet Union. Nearly six in ten (58 percent) agree that we've been trying to change Soviet behavior for 60 years, and that it is time we stopped trying to do so. By a margin of 59 percent to 19 percent, Americans also say we would be better off

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if we stopped treating the Soviets as enemies and tried to hammer out our differences in a live-and-let-live spirit. And, by a margin of 53 percent to 22 percent, Americans feel that the United States would be safer if we stopped trying to prevent the spread of communism to other countries, and learned to live with them the way we live with China and Yugoslavia.

4. *A national reconsideration of the strategic role for nuclear weapons is badly needed.*

Our present policies are almost universally misunderstood. More than eight out of ten Americans (81 percent) believe it is our *current* policy to use nuclear weapons "if and only if" our adversaries use them against us first. Almost the same massive majority believes that this is what our national policy *should* be. Only 18 percent agree that we should use nuclear weapons against a conventional Soviet attack in Europe or Japan; and more than three out of four (76 percent) agree that we should use nuclear weapons if, and only if, the Soviets use them against our allies first.

At the same time, however, the public holds many other attitudes that are actually or potentially in conflict with this majority position. Only a third of all Americans (33 percent) know that nuclear weapons are less expensive than conventional forces. At the same time, substantial majorities (66 percent) say that they would be willing to pay higher taxes for defense if we and the Soviets reduced our nuclear weapons and replaced them with non-nuclear forces.

More important than economic arguments is the concern of the majority, summarized above, that we not "lose" the arms race by falling behind the Soviets in technology or weapons. There is also great reluctance to appear "weak" in Soviet eyes, since the public is persuaded that the Soviets interpret conciliatory gestures on our part as signs of weakness.

In brief, Americans fear that the danger of nuclear war has seriously weakened our security. They also realize that the present standoff between us and the Soviets excludes the use of nuclear weapons as an option for achieving policy goals. But they have not yet thought through the strategic and policy implications of this awesome change in the rules. Their present preferences are clear: to move toward less rather than greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

5. *Finally, Americans are prepared—somewhat nervously—to take certain risks for peace.*

So dangerous is the present situation, and so gravely does it threaten our security, that the public feels it is time to change

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course and, in doing so, to take some initiatives in the cause of peace.

The idea of a bilateral and verifiable nuclear freeze has been supported by upwards of 75 percent of the public for several years. But beyond a freeze, majorities also endorse other strategies containing an explicit element of risk. For example, a 61-percent majority favors the idea of declaring a *unilateral* six-month freeze on nuclear weapons development to see if the Soviets will follow suit, even if they might take advantage of it; 56 percent favor signing an arms control agreement with the Soviets, even if foolproof verification cannot be guaranteed. Finally, 55 percent favor expanding trade with the Soviets and making other cooperative gestures, even if that makes them stronger and more secure.

In sum, a fair conclusion from the variety of surveys and interviews is that the American electorate wants to reverse the present trend toward relying ever more heavily on nuclear weapons to achieve the nation's military and political objectives. The public finds the long-term risks of continuing the way we are going to be simply unacceptable.

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Richard Pipes

CAN THE SOVIET UNION REFORM?

American-Soviet relations can be approached in two ways. One approach avails itself of the techniques of meteorology, in that it concentrates on taking regular readings of the East-West climate as manifested in the level of rhetoric emanating from Washington and Moscow, the prevalence or absence of dialogues and negotiations, and the intensity of their competition in regions outside their immediate control. This approach is favored by journalists because it focuses on concrete events which they can report as news and subject to instant analysis. It also prevails in liberal circles whose adherents believe that there exist no genuine differences of either values or interests among nations and that such conflicts as do occur derive from mutual misunderstanding or lack of conciliatory spirit, mainly on the part of U.S. administrations.

The alternative approach has more in common with the science of geology. It perceives the East-West conflict as rooted in fundamental differences dividing the two societies, differences which are imbedded, as it were, in their respective ideological substances and political structures. Firm diplomacy and military preparedness may prevent these disagreements from erupting into overt hostility, but they cannot alter the reality of an inherent antagonism. This second approach, dominant among Western conservatives, happens also to be shared by the Soviet leadership.

Neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. Surely, relations among sovereign states involve more than atmospherics; there unquestionably exist significant differences in the nature and operations of democratic and communist societies that neither enhanced human contacts, nor good will, nor proper negotiating techniques can eliminate. These differences affect relations of the two societies because of the close and direct relationship that exists between a country's internal condition and its external conduct: foreign policy, after all, is driven mainly by domestic interests and

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Richard Pipes is Baird Professor of History at Harvard. In 1981–82 he served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council. His books include *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, *Russia Under the Old Regime* and *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente*. He is presently working on a history of the Russian Revolution. This article is an expanded version of a section in the author's forthcoming book, *Survival Is Not Enough*, to be published by Simon & Schuster. Copyright © 1984 by Richard Pipes.

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shaped by a society's political culture. If this is the case, then the decisive factors influencing the course of East-West relations must be sought elsewhere than in the day-to-day decisions of the leaders of the respective blocs, and an understanding of the drift in their relations requires a greater effort than that involved in readings of the political barometer with its fluctuations between the extremes of sunny détente and bleak cold war. These factors reside in the political, social, and economic systems and cultures prevailing in Eastern and Western societies.

This point conceded, it must be said in criticism of the conservative view that nothing in nature is permanent and immutable: after all, even geological formations undergo evolution, slow and imperceptible as it may appear to the human eye. If continents shift, so do man-made institutions. If one postulates, therefore, that foreign policy is a function of domestic politics, then one has some assurance that as internal conditions in the blocs change, so too will their external conduct. The leadership of the Soviet Union is extremely anxious to create the impression that all changes occurring within its realm are the result of its own conscious and deliberate decisions; it is quite obvious, however, that it, too, must respond to the pressure of changing conditions brought about by such independent factors as the emergence of a large, well-educated technical intelligentsia, demographic developments, and the change in mood of the young generation.

II

Western commentators on East-West relations, however, persistently ignore the relationship between internal conditions in the U.S.S.R. and Soviet foreign policy. The level of analysis in the existing literature on the subject, including many academic monographs, rarely rises above that of journalism in that it concentrates attention on actions and events rather than on structures and processes, treating foreign conduct as if it were an entirely discretionary activity. This practice disregards the insights of the most outstanding dissidents from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe—e.g., Andrei Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Milovan Djilas and Adam Michnik—who see the root of Soviet aggressiveness and the threat to international peace that it represents in the internal conditions prevailing in the Communist bloc. These writers argue that the manner in which the self-appointed and self-perpetuating elites of these countries treat their own citizens has critical bearing on the way they behave toward other states. From this premise they deduce that the West ought to concern itself with political and

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economic conditions inside communist societies, not only from philanthropic and idealistic motives but also from those of the most narrow self-interest. In an appeal issued recently to Western "peace" movements, which act on the premise that peace is endangered by the existence of weapons, a group of Polish Solidarity intellectuals sought to make this connection explicit:

> States with totalitarian political systems are a threat to world peace; the necessity for aggressive expansion arises wherever authority is based on force and lies, wherever societies are deprived of the possibility of influencing government policy, wherever governments fear those over whom they rule and against whom they conduct wars. . . . The sole ideology of the adherents of totalitarianism is the maintenance of power by any means. In the present crisis, even war can be considered an acceptable price for this aim.[1]

In response it can be argued that even if this thesis is correct, it is irrelevant since totalitarian regimes are by definition incapable of evolution from within and impervious to change from without; hence Western attempts to attenuate Soviet aggressiveness must limit themselves to modest efforts at removing points of friction through treaties and "dialogues." This rejoinder is unconvincing. A deeper insight into internal conditions of communist societies, the Soviet Union included, indicates that they are in the throes of a serious systemic crisis which sooner or later will require action of a decisive kind—action which, in turn, will exert the most profound influence on Soviet external policy. It is much less clear whether this change of course at home will lead to heightened or to lessened truculence abroad, whether it will express itself in a turning inward toward peaceful reform, or seek outlets abroad in enhanced military aggression as a surrogate for reform.

III

The current crisis of the Soviet system has two aspects, a political one and an economic one. Speaking in the broadest terms, both arise from a growing discrepancy between the responsibilities assumed by the communist elites at home and abroad, and the human and material resources with which to carry them out. The political crisis is, first and foremost, the crisis of the Communist Party establishment. The Party was originally designed as an infinitely pliable instrument in the hands of its leadership with which to force a reluctant population toward the vision of a utopian society conceived by a band of radical intellectuals. Over the years, however,

[1] Cited in *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1983.

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it has evolved into a self-serving, privileged class that in its highest echelons, the so-called *nomenklatura*, has turned into a completely parasitic stratum. Corrupted by privilege and peculation, it has lost, since Stalin's death, any sense of service or obligation, whether to the ideal of communism or to the nation: it so dreads any change in the Stalinist system, from which its power and privilege largely derive, that it chooses ever weaker general secretaries as Party leaders. A Party thus self-serving and estranged from the population, and weakened by lack of decisive leadership, is in grave danger of losing control. This was demonstrated in Poland in 1980–81, where the Communist establishment found itself pushed aside by a discontented populace and forced to hand power over to the military. The political crisis also afflicts the Soviet empire, which is overexpanded and whose inhabitants make political and other demands that Moscow is ever less capable of either satisfying or beating back.

The economic crisis is due to inadequate productivity; this, in turn, is caused by two factors: excessive centralization of economic decision-making in the hands of Party organs, and inadequate incentives offered to workers and farmers, who are essentially paid not in proportion to output but according to the time spent working. Declining rates of economic growth adversely affect the ability of Moscow to engage in its ambitious military and imperial ventures. For more than a decade now, Soviet planners have been forced to transfer resources from the capital investments sector into the military sector, which ensures in the long run further declines in industrial growth. The country's productive resources are stifled by an economic system that is designed primarily to ensure the security and power of the nomenklatura. The government theoretically could, but in reality does not dare to, decrease further the impoverished consumer sector for fear of strikes and riots in industrial centers, preferring instead to risk undermining the country's industrial future. One of the by-products of the economic crisis is declining birth-rates, caused in good part by fantastic abortion rates (estimated at ten per Russian female): for the first time in recorded history, the Russian population, once with the highest reproduction rate in Europe, is not replacing itself, as each year more Russians die than are born.

IV

A crisis of such dimensions, camouflaged by massive disinformation and saber-rattling, fits very well the concept of a "revolutionary situation" as defined by Lenin. The term meant to him a condition

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of stalemate between the ruling elite of a country and its population: the former could no longer rule, and the latter would no longer let themselves be ruled in the old way. Once a society reached this stage it was objectively ready for revolution. But for revolution to break out, another element, subjective in nature, was required as well, and that was the ability and the will of the people to act—"it being a rule," in Lenin's words, that "the old government . . . never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls,' if it is not toppled over."[2] When this subjective element is missing, as, according to Lenin, it was at certain critical moments in nineteenth-century Germany and Russia, then the "revolutionary situation" dissipates without issue.

Were Lenin alive today, he would very likely conclude that conditions in his country and its empire meet the criteria which he had established for "revolutionary situations." Certainly, the Soviet bloc is currently in the throes of a much graver economic and political crisis than either Russia or Germany had experienced a century ago. What is lacking today, as it was then, however, is the subjective element, the ability and the will of social groups and political parties to transform the "revolutionary situation" into a revolution. The ability to revolt is frustrated by the apparatus of repression which communist regimes have developed to a degree never before known; having come to power by revolution, they are determined to prevent being overthrown in the same way.

But a way could be found around even this obstacle, as events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland have shown, if the revolutionary will were there. In Russia, at least, it is missing. Historical experience since 1917 has caused Russians of every political orientation to fear the collapse of authority even more than despotism and to reject violence as an instrument of change. Before 1917, the Russian intelligentsia had unbounded faith in the innate goodness and democratic spirit of its people. It was convinced that as soon as Tsarism fell democracy would emerge and triumph all along the line. These Rousseauean illusions were shattered by the experiences of the revolution. The present generation of the educated in the Soviet Union has been cured of all revolutionary romanticism. It believes that if the Soviet government were to collapse, the result would be a political vacuum that would only give license to the quarter of a billion inhabitants to settle old scores: village would move against city, nationalist against communist, Russian against Jew, Muslim against Russian, Armenian against Muslim, in a mur-

[2] "The Collapse of the Second International," V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1963, p. 214.

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derous Hobbesian war of all against all. But even the few who might be prepared to pay this price if it would rid the country of communist tyranny no longer believe that it will purchase anything worthwhile. Having experienced revolution in all its fury, Russians have learned not only its terrible costs but also its futility: no matter how many eggs it breaks, it somehow never produces an omelette.

Thus, there is universal disillusionment with political violence in the Soviet Union—at any rate, no prominent dissident of either the democratic or the nationalist opposition is known to advocate it. The two camps are in agreement that if Russia is to emerge from its crisis it must do so by means of gradual and peaceful changes; if this requires the Politburo and the rest of the nomenklatura to stay in power, so be it—at any rate, for the time being. The following passage from a recent *samizdat* tract, strongly anti-communist in content, is typical in this respect:

> In its mass, the population of the U.S.S.R. is far from ready for direct democracy. And we will assert that a new revolution in the U.S.S.R. would be a genuine misfortune for the country. Solzhenitsyn believes that the moral level of the people today is even lower than it was in 1917. I do not know. Perhaps. In any event, it is entirely clear that without sufficiently prolonged experience of *consistent democratization of the existing sociopolitical order* one cannot take the risk of involving millions of politically uneducated people in the immensely complex task of sociopolitical transformation of the country. . . . The structural improvement of the country is preferable to its destruction. A reformed system has many advantages over one newly brought into being. The experience of Western democracies is for us a guarantee of this. Where the principle of continuity between the old and the new is strictly observed . . . there the result is a stable system of representative democracy of the English or Swedish type.[3]

Widespread conservatism of this kind among the educated classes provides no assurance, of course, that a revolution will not break out on its own, uncalled for and unwanted, from a collapse of authority. Lenin's insistence that if governments are to fall they must be toppled is too rigid, considering that the Tsarist regime did fall under its own weight when it proved unable to cope with the strains of war. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a revolutionary explosion in the Soviet Union is certainly much reduced by virtue of the fact that the nomenklatura has public opinion on its side on this issue. Essentially, its opponents do not want to overthrow it and take power, but prefer to circumscribe its authority by expanding the private sphere; this desire may be dangerous to a totalitarian regime, but it does not threaten it with uncontrollable violence.

[3] Iu.K. Petrov, pseud., "Metamorfozy russkogo liberalizma" (Metamorphoses of Russian Liberalism), pp. 109–110; manuscript in the author's possession.

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V

If revolution is excluded, the Soviet regime faces three alternatives: reversion to Stalinism, intensified external aggression leading to a world war, and internal reform.

Among the nomenklatura and the less educated public there is much nostalgia for the days of Stalin—not, of course, for his genocidal savagery, but for an idealized regime of order and discipline, when everyone did his duty and corruption was pitilessly punished. Such glorified Stalinism seems to offer a way out of the difficulties that Soviet society faces, without resort to dangerous reforms. But this is an idle fantasy.

Stalinism cannot be restored for any number of reasons, the most weighty of which is the impossibility of running the country's present-day sophisticated industrial plant and military establishment by brute force and in isolation from the rest of the world. Nor can the nomenklatura have forgotten how insecure and hard its life under Stalin was and how many of its people perished in his wholesale massacres. In any event, after 30 years of gradual dismantling and decay of Stalinism, it is senseless to speak of its restoration; it would have to be recreated and reimposed anew. One suspects that those who recall it so wistfully realize this, and Stalinism is the last thing they want or would put up with if it really returned. The current nostalgia for Stalinism is very reminiscent of the longing of Russian bureaucratic and conservative circles during the "revolutionary situation" of the 1870s and 1880s for the "good old days" of Nicholas I (1825–1855), when the peasants had been kept in their place by serfdom and the government suppressed all dissent. Then, as now, this habit of looking backward was symptomatic of the unwillingness of the ruling apparatus to face up to changed realities and to venture on painful but unavoidable reforms.

In some ways the easiest, if most dangerous, way out of a crisis is to keep raising the level of international tension. War scares, one of the major products of the Soviet propaganda industry since the 1920s, divert the masses' attention from their own condition and make it possible to demand extraordinary sacrifices from labor as well as to silence the opposition in the name of patriotism. The constant harping on memories of World War II in the Soviet Union and the linking of "fascism" with American "imperialism" serve this purpose. But war scares are risky, because they have a way of getting out of hand: the logical outcome of war scares is war. The possibility of the nomenklatura taking a chance on war as a way of

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avoiding internal reforms cannot be precluded; in the opinion of some East European observers it is a risk that the nomenklatura would take if it felt sufficiently endangered internally. The greater the likelihood of quick and cheap victory, the greater the temptation to use this avenue of escape from an intolerable internal predicament. Clearly, the more the West forecloses this option with its own military counterpreparations, the less attractive will it appear.

VI

If revolution is set aside because it lacks social support, a return to Stalinism because it is unrealistic, and recourse to war because of its uncertain outcome, reform looms as the only viable way out of the "revolutionary situation" which the Soviet Union faces. The vital question for Russia, its subjugated nations, and the rest of the world is whether the nomenklatura will come to see its predicament in this light, whether a dispassionate analysis of the facts will prevail over bluster and the "after us the deluge" mentality. The nomenklatura is not the first ruling elite to face the choice between holding on to all its power and privilege at the risk of losing it all, or surrendering some of both in the hope of holding on to the rest. History knows both outcomes. England has avoided revolution for three centuries because its monarchy, aristocracy and middle classes have always seen in time the inevitability of change and made the necessary concessions. In Imperial Russia, die-hard sentiment was much stronger, and so it is today in Latin America.

The behavior of the Soviet nomenklatura under these circumstances is a subject on which expert opinion is divided.

A rather pessimistic assessment is provided by Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav author of a pioneering study of the nomenklatura under the title *The New Class*, and a person who, as a close associate of Tito, has had much opportunity to learn at first hand how the Soviet elite thinks. "In my opinion," he writes,

> changes in the Soviet system are least likely. One reason is that this system is more than the other systems permeated, one might say, with imperialist class privileges. I believe that the Soviet system has no internal potential for change, just as Soviet imperialism cannot stop of its own will. In theory, the only possibility of change in the Soviet Union lies in the creation of some kind of enlightened absolutism which could initiate reforms, but even then bureaucratic repression can strangle the process of democratization. Even for such an enlightened autocrat to emerge, it is imperative that there be some sort of a *national crisis*: a military crisis or a revolutionary crisis, or both at the same time. Such a perspective, it must be noted, is in accord with Russian history.[4]

[4] *Sintaksis*, Paris, No. 6, 1980, pp. 112–113.

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Djilas's conviction that nothing short of a catastrophe will induce the apparatus to undertake reforms is shared by many dissenters as well as loyal but apprehensive Communists in the Soviet Union.

Others maintain that the nomenklatura will soon have no choice in the matter, that life will push it onto the path of reform whether it likes it or not. An articulate spokesman for the more optimistic school of thought is Valerii Chalidze, a pioneer fighter for human rights in the U.S.S.R.:

> Russia is filled with the sharpest contradictions. They are so numerous that sometimes it seems as if this were done on purpose, so that one contradiction would eclipse all the others. But should all these contradictions speak up, then the government will not be able to confine itself to promises and repressions, as it is doing now, because the entire people will be pulled into this mass of internal contradictions. The government will have to disentangle these contradictions: it will have to busy itself improving internal conditions and organizing economic as well as social relations. And then, for a time, all the imperial dreams will fade, compared with the importance of internal problems.
>
> One may object that the authorities will not bother to improve social relations, and instead resort to mass repressions. I think this will not happen. The country is ruled by a class of professionals who are interested in the Empire's stability and grandeur. Any outburst of dissatisfaction can be suppressed by force: no need to consider the morality of the rulers. But the growing social tension in the whole country, the sharpening of the many contradictions will cause these professionals to react in a manner that endangers the stability neither of their position nor that of the empire; this will compel them to carry out social reforms, and these reforms will mark a piecemeal, gradual transition to a more democratic system of government. The authorities are ready for such reforms as long as they do not threaten stability: being gradual, they will not do so.[5]

The difference between the two schools of thought, the one more optimistic, the other less so, is really one of degree: Mr. Chalidze believes the conditions for an acute crisis to be much closer at hand than does Mr. Djilas. They agree, however—and this is of essential importance to Western policy—that reforms are conceivable only as a result of major internal and external setbacks, that they will come about only when the nomenklatura concludes that they are the price it must pay for its survival.

The intimate link between crises and reforms to which Mr. Djilas refers is corroborated by the record of Russian history. Russia is an extremely conservative country, so much so that even its socialism has acquired a thoroughly reactionary character. It is so vast and complex and so loosely held together that its leaders have always

[5] "O politicheskom prosveshchenii naseleniia Sovetskogo Soiuza" (The Political Enlightenment of the Population of the Soviet Union), *Problemy Vostochnoi Evropy*, New York, No. 2, 1981, pp. 133–134.

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feared and rarely volunteered changes. They have consented to make changes only under duress caused either by humiliations abroad or upheavals at home. Tsarism finally screwed up its courage to abolish serfdom and introduce both an independent judiciary and local self-government when the defeat in the Crimean War demonstrated Russia's backwardness. Nicholas II was determined to preserve the autocratic system that endowed him with a monopoly on legislative authority until Russia's drubbing at the hands of Japan, and the internal disorders which followed, compelled him to grant the country a constitution and a parliament. Even Lenin had to veer sharply toward more liberal economic practices in 1921, when social unrest and the near collapse of the economy placed his regime in jeopardy.

Russian history thus strongly suggests, and informed Russian opinion corroborates, that such *changes for the better that one can expect in the nature of the Soviet government and in its conduct of foreign relations will come about only from failures, instabilities, and fears of collapse and not from growing confidence and sense of security.* This assessment is antithetical to the one that underpinned détente and that continues to dominate thinking in the foreign services and liberal circles in Europe and the United States—that the more confident and secure the Soviet elite feels, the more restrained its conduct will be. The latter thesis cannot be supported by any evidence from the past and can only derive from ignorance of the mentality of the Soviet elite and the record of Russia's past.

VII

Clearly, it makes a profound difference for U.S. foreign policy which of these two interpretations is correct. Assuming that the crisis-reform thesis is correct and the "revolutionary situation" will ripen to the point where something must be done, what kind of reform can one reasonably expect from the Soviet leadership?

Speaking very generally, the trouble with the Soviet system as presently constituted is that it has the worst of both worlds: it suffers from all the drawbacks of a regime based on the command principle, but it no longer enjoys many of the benefits that this principle has to offer. Man can be motivated either by fear or by hope, either by threats or by inducements. Communists have always preferred to rely on the first of these methods. This practice has not given them the stability and productivity of democratic and free-market societies, but it has enabled them to concentrate the limited resources at their disposal on whatever goals to which they chose to assign high priority. What they lacked in quantity, quality, and diversity

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of resources, they made up for with the ability to mobilize resources for crash programs.

This ability has been eroding for some time. In a sense, the current crisis of communism is due to its vegetating in a kind of limbo between compulsion and freedom, unable to profit from either. The all-pervasive fear that Stalin's regime had instilled in the people is gone beyond recall, and one can no longer rely on the faint memory it evokes to exact hard work and unthinking obedience: for Communist bloc citizens under 40—that is, the majority of them—Stalinism is ancient history. But fear has not been replaced with hope and inducements. As a result, the creative energies of the people living under regimes of the Soviet type are directed into private and opposition channels that not only bring those regimes no benefit but in many ways do them positive harm. The normal and healthy spirit of economic entrepreneurship, deprived of legitimate channels, seeks outlets in semilegal or illegal activity connected with the "second economy," bribery and the black market. Citizens concerned with public affairs take to overt or concealed dissent, which the regime is unable to wipe out and can only try to keep within safe bounds. In other words, everything dynamic and creative, whether in economic or intellectual activity, is driven by the system into criminal channels; forces which should strengthen the regime are made to undermine it.

This, in a nutshell, is the problem that post-Stalinist regimes have had to face and with which sooner or later they must come to terms. A way has to be found of reconciling the interests of the state and its ruling elite with the creative energies of its citizens. This cannot be accomplished unless the elite is prepared to sacrifice some of its authority and bring society into partnership, if only of a limited kind.

There is no need to spell out possible reform programs for the Soviet Union and its colonies in any detail. It is more useful to indicate the principles on which reforms must rest if they are to be of any benefit. The basic task is to harness the creative forces of the country in public service, to bridge the gap between the pursuit of private goals—presently the sole objective of the vast majority of citizens in communist countries, their leaders included—and the interests of the whole. To this end, three reforms appear essential.

One is legality. The citizen of communist society need not necessarily participate in the making of laws—this is a right which the nomenklatura would certainly not concede of its own will—but he must be assured that those laws that are on the books are binding on all, representatives of state authority included. For the citizen

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to know what he can and cannot do is a sine qua non of any properly functioning society. This requirement entails, among other things, strict judiciary control over the Party bureaucracy—that is, an end to the tradition inherited from Tsarism that servants of the government are above the law. Since legality is compatible with authoritarian methods of government, this innovation should not prove unacceptable, once reforms are decided upon.

The other is wider scope for private enterprise. The economy directly controlled by the regime must link up with the second, private sector, and draw on its dynamism. This calls for the decentralization of industrial decision-making, the dismantling of collective farms, the adoption in industry and agriculture of the contractual principle as the rule rather than the exception, and the turning over of a good part of the consumer and service sectors to private enterprise.[6] The consequence of such reforms would be a mixed economy, in which the state and the Party establishment would continue to wield immense power but no longer stifle productive forces. That which the nomenklatura would give up in managerial authority it would gain many times over in increased productivity.

The third is administrative decentralization of the U.S.S.R. The nomenklatura will have to acknowledge that the days of colonialism are over, that it will never succeed in creating a synthetic "Soviet" nation by having the ethnic minorities dissolve tracelessly among the Russians. There is no likelihood that the Soviet government will voluntarily dissolve the Soviet Union into its constituent republics, but genuine federalism of some sort, with broad self-rule for the minorities, is not inconceivable; it calls only for making constitutional fiction constitutional reality. Such a step would go a long way toward reducing the ethnic tensions that now exist.

Viewed superficially, the fate of reforms in communist societies may appear to hold merely academic interest for citizens of other societies. After all, it is not for them to tell Russians how to manage their affairs; all that matters to them is that the Soviet Union respect international standards of conduct and cease its aggression. But because of the intimate relationship between a country's internal system and its conduct abroad, the issue is exceedingly relevant. Soviet militarism and aggressiveness are not, as widely believed, the product of a mythical paranoia brought about by centuries of foreign aggression: it requires only a slightly deeper acquaintance

[6] Under the contractual system of work, which is practiced here and there in Soviet agriculture and industry, groups of farmers and workers enter into agreements with state enterprises which allow them to be compensated by the product they turn out rather than draw standard wages for the fulfillment of norms.

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with the history of Russia to realize that that country has engaged in aggression against its neighbors far more often and more persistently than its neighbors have ever acted against it.[7] Imperialism is endemic to the Soviet system in part because its ruling elite has no other justification for maintaining its power and privilege than to create the phantom of an ever-present external threat to the country's survival, and in part because it seeks to compensate its citizens for deprivations at home by manifestations of its might abroad. The root of the problem—and the principal threat to world peace today—is the political and economic system of Stalinism which the successors of Stalin have retained even as they turned its originator into a virtual non-person. As long as the nomenklatura remains what it is, as long as the Soviet Union lives in a state of lawlessness, as long as the energies of its peoples are not allowed to express themselves creatively, so long there can be no security for anyone else in the world.

VIII

The key to peace, therefore, lies in an internal transformation of the Soviet system in the direction of legality, economic decentralization, greater scope for contractual work and free enterprise, and national self-determination. The obstacles to such reforms are formidable. The nomenklatura will resist changes of this nature as long as it can, and that means, in effect, as long as it is able to compensate for internal failures with triumphs abroad. It will always find the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy preferable to coping with internal problems, because in the former case it can buy time with tactical maneuvers of all sorts, whereas internal problems call for structural changes which are far more difficult to undo.

The point is that the majority of inhabitants of any country, the U.S.S.R. included, are not deeply concerned with foreign policy. They may be disgusted with their country's humiliations and elated by its triumphs, but they experience the effects of such events only indirectly. What happens at home, however, is to them of immediate and direct relevance; here, every citizen is an expert. Competing against democracies, which only want to be left in peace to pursue their commercial interests, a government like the Soviet one can always stay on the offensive. At home, by contrast, it is forever

[7] In 1898 the Russian Imperial General Staff completed a study of Russian warfare through the ages. The editor, in the concluding volume, assured readers that they could be proud of their past and face the uncertain future with confidence: of the 38 military campaigns that Russia had waged in the preceding 200 years, 36 had been "offensive" and only two defensive. N.N. Sukhotin, *Voina v istorii russkogo mira* (War in the History of the Russian World), St. Petersburg, 1898, pp. 13–14.

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waging a defensive campaign against its own people, who are ready to exploit every opportunity, every sign of weakness, to arrogate for themselves more economic and political power. Once they have seized a position, they are difficult to dislodge.

These difficulties conceded, it is nevertheless true that the Stalinist system now prevailing in the Soviet Union has outlived its usefulness and that the forces making for change are becoming well-nigh irresistible.

A Soviet Union that will turn its energies inward will of necessity become less militaristic and expansionist. It is a precondition of all Soviet reforms that the nomenklatura surrender some of its authority to the people over whom it rules, that it restrain the arbitrary powers of its members, that it allow law and contractual relations to replace bureaucratic whim. Anything that occurs in this direction has to act as a brake on the regime's hitherto unbridled appetite for conquests because, much as they may be flattered by the might of Russia, its citizens have other concerns closer to home. The immense task of internal reconstruction that confronts the country cannot be undertaken as long as military expenditures remain at their present levels. Cutbacks in military budgets, however, demand a more pacific foreign policy. In other words, the greater the pressures on the Soviet regime to deal with genuine crises at home instead of artificially created crises abroad, the greater its dependence on its citizens, and the greater, in consequence, the ability of these citizens to deflect their governments from foreign adventures. This point was already made by Friedrich Engels a century ago:

> This entire danger of a world war will vanish on the day when a change of affairs in Russia will permit the Russian people to put an end to its tsars' traditional policy of conquest and attend to its own vital domestic interests—interests which are endangered in the extreme—instead of fantasies of world conquest.[8]

Anyone who doubts this prospect has only to consider the evolution of China since Mao's death. As long as Mao ruled China, that country conducted an exceedingly truculent foreign policy, threatening to set the Third World afire with campaigns of "national liberation" and even making light of nuclear war. Washington took these threats so much to heart that it sent hundreds of thousands of men halfway around the world to prove its ability to cope with them. Mao's successors, however, decided that their first priority had to be economic modernization; once this decision had

[8] Friedrich Engels, "Die auswaertige Politik des russischen Zarenthums" (The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism), in *Die Neue Zeit*, Stuttgart, Vol. VIII, 1890, p. 202.

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fallen, aggressive actions and words miraculously ceased. Economic modernization entailed a series of reforms, including decentralization of decision-making, the gradual dismantling of the collective-farm system, and greater latitude for the private sector. Concurrently, attempts have been made to introduce greater legality into relations between state and citizenry. The entrenched bureaucracy has been sabotaging these measures in its own quiet way, but even so their effect on foreign policy has been startling. Realizing that better relations with the West were essential to the modernization program, China has cautiously moved to establish with it closer economic, political and military relations.

Thus, it was not success but failure that caused Communist China to turn from a mortal enemy of the "capitalist" countries into their quasi-partner—not promises of assistance from the West, but the desperate need for such assistance. And even after due allowance is made for the fact that Russia is not China, it is difficult to see why the experience of the one Stalinist state is not of immediate relevance to the other.

The implications which these observations hold for Western policy should not be difficult to draw. The West would be well advised to do all in its power to assist the indigenous forces making for change in the U.S.S.R. and its client states, forces that are eating away at the Stalinist foundations of communist regimes. This end it can partly promote by staunch resistance to Soviet expansion and military blackmail: such resistance will have the effect of foreclosing for the nomenklatura the opportunity of compensating for internal failures with triumphs abroad. Secondly, by denying to the Soviet bloc various forms of economic aid, it can help intensify the formidable pressures which are being exerted on their creaky economies. This will push them in the direction of general liberalization as well as accommodation with the West, since this is the only way of reducing military expenditures and gaining access to Western help in modernization.

Experience has repeatedly shown that attempts to restrain Soviet aggressiveness by a mixture of punishments and rewards fail in their purpose because they address the symptoms of the problem, namely aggression, rather than the cause, which is a political and economic system that induces aggressive behavior. The West, therefore, should in its own interest encourage anti-Stalinist forces and processes active inside the Soviet bloc. Such a policy calls not for subverting communism but for letting communism subvert itself.

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Miguel de la Madrid H.

MEXICO: THE NEW CHALLENGES

In 1985, Mexico will commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of its revolution. A new political system and social order was founded after 1910, which modernized our nation within a climate of democratic freedom and political stability. Now, toward the end of the century, Mexico faces harsh new challenges. Our economic development has brought structural imbalances which must be corrected, and we face the immediate impacts of external pressures, the international economic situation, and conflicts afflicting the international system in Central America, the Middle East and other regions of the world.

Contrary to predictions made two years ago, at the height of our crisis, when some said Mexico's capacity to maintain political stability and an adequate functioning economy was in doubt, the progress attained in overcoming our most critical difficulties is widely recognized today.

My government and the Mexican people have confronted severe tests of endurance. We have had to respond with drastic economic adjustment measures to resume a sustained recovery. We instituted reforms to strengthen the honesty and efficiency of the government. We are conducting a responsible foreign policy and, most important, we have drawn strength from the exemplary solidarity of our different social groups. Our citizens' participation has been decisive in overcoming the crisis.

Mexico is reaffirming its fundamental values. To the extent that we are able to maintain our nationalism, the commitment to satisfy the basic needs of our population, and our respect for law and democratic freedoms, our society will remain united. The greatest challenge we face at present is to translate these essential principles into new forms of public and social action.

II

Our country's achievements and basic strengths can be understood only through an appreciation of the way our major social movements and unique political institutions developed over time.

After three centuries of colonial domination, Mexico was a predominantly agrarian and mineral-exporting country which had

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Miguel de la Madrid H. is the President of Mexico.

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provided the largest single source of income for the Spanish Crown. The first struggle to inspire a broad-based movement of the Mexican people was the War of Independence that started in 1810. The national government was recognized in 1824, but the task of creating a sovereign and united nation persisted.

The governments that followed had to confront semi-autonomous regional centers of power, a traditional church and army, linguistic and cultural differences, and the extreme poverty of more than 90 percent of the population. Internal difficulties and external intervention led to the loss of half of Mexico's territory to the United States in 1847. Over the next two decades, liberal and democratic reforms were taken to overcome the remnants of the colonial order and guarantee the sovereignty of the new nation-state, unifying the Mexican people to victory over the French expeditionary force and its conservative supporters in 1867.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the economic infrastructure for development began to take shape. The three decades of General Porfirio Díaz's dictatorship (1876–1910), however, brought extreme concentration of wealth, land and political power, eroding the legitimacy and viability of the regime and its capacity to promote further internal growth. The regime was unable to transfer political power peacefully to a new government. This, combined with adverse internal and international economic conditions, led to social unrest and increased demands for political democracy. It accentuated national outrage over the foreign control of our national resources.

Mexico's revolution started in 1910. It sought to recover the ideals of the nineteenth-century liberal-democratic movement and to carry out land reform, labor rights, and national control of our resources. Over one million lives were lost. Only the establishment of a new social covenant, the 1917 Constitution, ended the violence.

This Constitution governs Mexico today. It is based on nationalism, the nation's will to become a vigorous and independent community. Mexican nationalism implies a deep awareness of our cultural identity, enriched by our own diversity, and the commitment to defend our country from any threat to its independence. In contrast to European nationalism, which was essentially conservative, ours mobilizes the social forces of the country in a common purpose of protecting our democracy—not only in strictly political terms but also as a way of carrying out significant improvements in the social and cultural conditions of our population.

The revolutionary leadership after 1917 set out to resume economic development, and institutionalized the political framework

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by unifying contending forces in the revolution's political party in 1929. In the 1930s, Mexico achieved peaceful and orderly transfers of power. We also recovered sovereignty over our oil resources, carried out an extensive land reform and furthered the goals of free public education and progressive labor relations. Since then, the labor movement, peasant organizations, the middle class and the private sector have had effective institutional channels to promote their interests; their orderly participation has helped to consolidate the political regime.

The basic institutions and rules of the political system were established with the founding of the party of the revolution, now the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), and have been strengthened since: a strong one-term presidency; guarantee of democratic freedoms for all citizens; respect and loyalty of the armed forces for the Constitution and the political system; mechanisms for reaching policy agreements by negotiation; and a permanent process of strengthening social rights through legal reforms and increasing the social benefits of public education, health and municipal services.

We have not achieved all we set out to do. The political system is still developing. We have made significant progress in implementing democratic reforms. The social changes created by industrialization, education, urbanization, a growing middle class and media coverage are being translated into political life, in the form of a more active congressional and judicial role, a greater pluralism of public opinion, and new political parties which represent diverse minority groups.

Our political system is increasingly competitive. During the 1982 presidential elections seven different parties took part fully, contributing to a significant increase in electoral participation. With a 70 percent turnout, in which the majority party obtained more than two-thirds of the votes, the new government received a clear and strong mandate for orderly change.

At the start of my administration, I sent several measures to Congress which, enriched and approved, have led to important reforms in our economic and political organization. We strengthened the mixed nature of our economy by specifying the responsibilities of the state in guiding development and guaranteeing the security and freedom of the private and social sectors, which are responsible for 80 percent of domestic output.

My reforms were inspired by and depend on public participation. We are establishing new mechanisms to assure a widespread participation in governmental decisions and have increased the role and

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resources of local governments so as to enlarge their responsibility in regional development and facilitate community involvement.

In order to overcome serious problems of inefficiency and corruption, we have undertaken measures for a moral renewal. Legislation has been passed to ensure the honest conduct of public officials, to improve the efficiency of our judicial system and the professionalism of the police forces, and to establish precise rules in contracting and carrying out public works. Despite the economic crisis, these strong measures and structural changes have helped to reduce the climate of tension and uncertainty that existed at the beginning of my presidential term.

Maintaining social peace in a difficult process of economic reordering requires that every sector be informed honestly about the country's situation; it requires constant national and regional political negotiations, a consistent follow-up on the guidelines set during the campaign, and perseverance in carrying out our initial strategy. Thus, the system has worked out the essential agreements for undertaking our economic reordering program.

III

During these last few years, not only Mexico's political institutions, but its social fabric as well, have had to face new challenges. The urgent task has been to meet the basic needs of a population which has grown from 20 to 76 million in scarcely four decades. Mexico is now the eleventh largest nation in the world. Once an agrarian society, we now have two-thirds of our population living in urban areas. Rapid economic growth and urbanization have generated additional demands and created new problems.

Mexico stands as one of the world's most successful cases of economic growth. Over four decades it maintained an annual growth rate of more than six percent. Its productive capacity is now the ninth largest in the world, excluding the East European socialist countries. Its natural resources are diverse and abundant; its hydrocarbon reserves are the fourth largest in the world, and it is one of the main producers of metallic and non-metallic minerals. Its agriculture is diversified and its industry bigger than that of some developed countries, such as Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Spain, and developing countries such as South Korea and India. We have built an extensive and modern transport infrastructure, and our tourist and commercial services can compete with the best in the world. The quality of our human resources has also been significantly improved through the creation of important research centers and extensive higher education and technical facilities.

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Overall, the gains made in production, employment and basic services are significant.

Improvements in health care made us one of the fastest growing populations in the world. The population of Mexico City and the metropolitan zone is equal to that of all Central America. A way had to be found to reduce this growth without infringing upon individual rights. The solution was to promote family planning, which allowed us to reduce the annual rate of growth from an average of 3.2 percent during the decade 1970–80 to 2.4 percent in 1984.

Despite the population increase in the last decade, the number of people having access to higher education and training facilities tripled and over 70 percent of all housing now has water and electricity. Illiteracy has dropped from 26 percent of the population to 17 percent. Every child is now guaranteed access to elementary school. Education is clearly the key to the major changes that have taken place in Mexico over the past 50 years.

Yet, extreme social inequalities persist and the country has had to overcome an acute economic crisis. Our economy was not structured to withstand external shocks. The heavy reliance on internal industrial growth had not been accompanied by commercial modernization and increases in agricultural productivity. Internal financing was insufficient to meet the demographic pressures as they were translated into growing social demands for public expenditure and investment. An overvalued exchange rate inhibited industrial integration and competitiveness and made capital exports and foreign purchases very profitable. High oil prices and corresponding credit availability allowed us to survive such imbalances, but when the price of oil fell, expectations were modified, our disequilibriums became apparent and a chain of reactions occurred which deepened the crisis.

During 1982 the gross domestic product fell for the first time since the Great Crash of 1929. Inflation, which was 30 percent during the first months of 1982, soared to 150 percent by year-end. The peso was devalued 600 percent, the public sector's deficit reached almost 18 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), and the foreign debt stood at $77 billion.

By December 1982 our economy was in a state of emergency. Upon taking office, I proposed a ten-point economic program establishing basic guidelines and actions to reduce inflation, resume growth, restore sound public finances, strengthen our external sector, and at the same time maintain employment levels.

It was our responsibility to provide a realistic solution that would

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create the basis for continued development. We preferred the risks of basic change and reform to those of defensive actions, which would have left us incapable of facing the problems to come. We could have opted for a more gradual adjustment. That would have required indexing salaries and prices and would have prolonged the crisis and its increased social costs, as demonstrated by the experiences of other countries. We considered that Mexico could not be exposed to prolonged risks.

Our people have understood that there was no choice but austerity. They supported the government's economic reordering program. Through concerted efforts, economic activity has been renewed. Despite the sacrifices imposed by the crisis, an open and frank dialogue has been maintained between the government and the society. The clearest proof of this is that we have been able to face our difficulties and solve our differences without social unrest. With the strength of this domestic consensus, the economic program was implanted immediately, thus reducing the time of the adjustment and correcting the most serious structural imbalances.

Despite a five-percent fall in the GDP in 1983, the programs for maintaining basic social services, protecting jobs and the nation's productive plant helped avoid a greater deterioration of the situation. Our manufacturing industries have already shown positive signs of recovery. These measures—combined with a good agricultural year in which output increased four percent, with the emergency employment programs which generated 400,000 jobs in 1983, and with the additional absorption capacity of the informal sectors of the economy—avoided increases in the levels of unemployment.

The stabilization policy permitted a reduction of the public sector's deficit as a percentage of GDP from 18 to 8.7 percent in 1983. This was accomplished by clearly defining priorities while maintaining basic social expenditures and labor-intensive programs, reducing waste and eliminating subsidies, increasing revenue and ensuring the efficient and honest execution of the government's programs. Previous investment projects are being reevaluated according to present costs and priorities. We are limiting the growth of public spending and increasing its efficiency.

The stabilization of the economy is being accomplished without a drastic fall in productive capacity. A hyperinflationary process was avoided by reducing the rate of inflation, which in the period December 1981-December 1982 reached 99 percent, to a yearly average of 80 percent by 1983. At the same time, in our foreign sector the balance of payments achieved an unprecedented surplus,

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allowing us to replenish the central bank's international reserves. Our international debt obligations were met. Along with all this, we were able to restore essential imports and are starting to increase our non-oil exports.

The efforts we have made to adjust our internal imbalances have prepared us to face worldwide uncertainty and the insecurity of the mid-1980s from a stronger position than many other nations with similar problems.

These achievements are certainly promising, but there has been a fall in our population's standard of living as a result of the crisis. We are deeply concerned with the additional social costs imposed by the rise in U.S. interest rates and by trade restrictions. These reduce foreign exchange, limit the resources available for development and make recovery all the more difficult. In no way has Mexico become complacent.

IV

Just as Mexico's nationalism guides the country's internal development, it is also the core of our foreign policy. Our nationalism has been shaped by the defense of our sovereignty in the face of foreign interventions. The principles of self-determination and nonintervention in the affairs of other countries are of deep significance to Mexico. They are a product of our own historical experience—one that led us to place a high value on principles, the force of reason, political negotiation and compliance with international law. This philosophy defines Mexico's foreign policy.

We coexist with the richest nation in the world along our northern border. Our proximity to the United States provides important opportunities for economic development, and at the same time, poses possible dislocations. Beyond our southern border, we share the ideals and interests of Latin America, from large nations such as Brazil and Argentina to smaller countries like Cuba, with whom we have a relationship based on the mutual respect of internal sovereignty. We also face, in Central America, one of the most contentious regions in the world—a region whose internal dynamics are being placed in the context of East-West rivalry.

We have increased our communication, enriched our exchanges and strengthened our solidarity with Latin America. The severity of our crisis makes it imperative that we coordinate political actions and search for new forms of economic and cultural cooperation. South America's newly strengthened democracies have made that dialogue and cooperation easier.

In our relations with the United States and with other developed

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economies, the crucial issue is to increase the competitiveness of our non-oil exports and to reestablish net capital flows that will accelerate the recovery of the Mexican economy. Long-term economic development which benefits both Mexico and the United States is the best way of maintaining a friendly, respectful and open relationship along one of the world's most important borders. Hard lines and fortress walls are not feasible alternatives. Movements in these directions could create conflicts which would affect the well-being of both of our countries and oppose the fundamental principles of our democracies.

Mexico recognizes the progress the United States has achieved in the sciences, in research, in agriculture and in technology. We respect the internal values of its federal system, the freedom of its press and the diversity which immigrants have brought to its national fabric.

In a similar vein, for decades now, distinguished United States leaders and the American people have learned to respect Mexico's sovereign interests; its determination to reduce social inequality while maintaining freedom; its capacity to transform an agrarian economy into a modern and increasingly diversified organization; its unique and flexible political system and its complex social reality; as well as its firm and independent foreign policy. This is a well-grounded basis from which to continue building a respectful, long-term mutually beneficial relationship between Mexico and the United States.

While our bilateral relations are basically sound, differences remain in trade, finance and foreign policy which can be solved through negotiation and which should never lead to short-term power politics that would endanger creative and long-term relationships. In bilateral trade, the growing protectionist measures adopted by the United States have limited the possiblities for increasing our exports. This has hurt agricultural and manufacturing sectors of our economy in which a great many workers and peasants labor. At the same time, it has cut our earnings which are necessary to cover our foreign debts abroad and to stimulate our recovery. On the other hand, the reduction of Mexican imports from the United States has had its effects on the levels of U.S. employment and economic activity. In order to maintain adequate levels of exchange between both nations and for us to remain the fourth largest purchaser of U.S. products, we must continue increasing our exports of goods and services.

Labor relations are also a matter of concern. The situation of Mexican migrant workers in the United States has been, and

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continues to be, of special interest. We have reiterated our support for the rights and interests of Mexican nationals abroad. We have no intention of meddling in the legislative processes of the United States. But we express our concern over measures such as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill which could affect the social, labor and human rights of numerous Mexicans, whose daily work and efforts represent considerable benefit to the U.S. economy.

In our relations with Central America, Mexico will always strive to coexist peacefully and fruitfully with its neighbors. This means respecting them and aiding them in those efforts that contribute to their development and integration. For us to ignore the conflict in Central America or neglect efforts to solve the conflict would mean abandoning Mexico's historic responsibility and tacitly renouncing the defense of our own national interests and security.

An all-out war in Central America, moreover, would have adverse effects inside Mexico, even though our sound principles, institutions and level of development would together strengthen our nationalism and guarantee our internal peace. Our main concern, however, is that such a process would have serious consequences for the continent—an arms build-up, the disruption of international trade, greater foreign intervention, and a stagnation of economic and social development in the region. Mexico cannot remain indifferent to a human drama with such vast economic, social and political consequences.

We shall remain steadfast in our principle of nonintervention in other countries' internal affairs. And we shall promote a peaceful solution of the conflict on the basis of freedom of choice and self-determination by the governments and people of Central America.

Nonintervention is a fundamental principle of our foreign policy. It took shape over the last century and during our revolution, when foreign nations sought to interfere in our internal conflicts and impose political or economic systems that were alien to us. In every case, the battles were bloody and costly but they brought about national unification in the face of an external threat and in the end resulted in the downfall of the groups supported from abroad. Indeed, the internal differences and battles of Latin American nations have never been resolved by the direct interference of other nations; on the contrary, we believe that foreign interference has always complicated the conflicts it intended to solve.

Unilateral actions, based on short-run strategies, do not coincide with the principles and interests of Mexico or of the nations of Central America. Simplistic analyses lead to cold-war visions and strategies, and end up placing the region's conflicts in the context

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of a confrontation between the superpowers. This stereotyping ignores the reality of complex social and political processes in the area, national and internal differences, the variety of political programs and ideologies of different groups and the unique situation of each country. To avoid turning regional conflicts into arenas of a new cold war is the responsibility of the Central American nations, of each Latin American country, and certainly of the superpowers themselves. It is a challenge to each of our capacities to negotiate in accordance with our principles and with the wishes for peaceful coexistence of the great majority of our populations. We do not agree to or support any intervention in Central America, whatever the origin, be it American, Soviet, Cuban or any other.

These are the reasons why Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama—the Contadora group—have proposed a program which provides, in addition to strict observance of the essential principles that govern all international relations, a series of agreements and political commitments that will, on a regional basis, control the arms race; eliminate foreign military advisers; create demilitarized zones; avoid the use of any nation's territories to undertake political or military actions to destabilize other nations; eliminate arms traffic; and prohibit any other means of aggression or intervention in the internal affairs of any country in the area.

The negotiations stimulated by Contadora reject war and violence. To accept the use of force would allow a policy of intervention in the internal affairs of the people of Central America and ignore the true causes of social tension. Force would cancel out the efforts being made to pacify the region, to support democracy, and to overcome the region's social inequalities.

Contadora has received broad support in the international community, not only among Latin American nations, which look upon the group's actions with a natural sympathy (Latin Americans trying to solve Latin American problems), but also in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the European Economic Community, the U.S. Congress and the socialist bloc countries. Recently, we have managed to set up negotiations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica to deal with their border conflicts. The Contadora group was called on by both nations, a dialogue was established, and an agreement was reached for the reciprocal supervision of their common borders.

Only by allowing the Central American nations to reach secure and dignified agreements, based on a full respect for national sovereignty and on a concern for social justice, will the United

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States be able to avoid an escalation of the conflict. The alternative is a protracted and violent involvement.

Only by establishing legitimate institutions based on national forces that will lead to social changes can the conditions be created for lasting regional stability. Imposing force from outside, and the consequent internal reactions, will only lead to a predominance of militaristic and highly radicalized factions. The solution to the Central American conflict calls for peaceful negotiations, economic development and a gradual strengthening of institutions that reflect sovereign interest and thus guarantee a lasting peace.

During my visit to Washington in May 1984, President Reagan and I talked, among other things, about the conflicts in Central America. I insisted then upon the need to start negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua that could contribute to a peaceful outcome in Central America. With Nicaragua we expressed the same concern. Despite the existent difficulties to reach a rapprochement, Secretary of State George P. Shultz' subsequent visit to Managua and the talks that have been carried out between the representatives of the U.S. and Nicaraguan governments in the city of Manzanillo, Mexico, may represent a significant step toward reducing the climate of tensions in the area.

Regarding Cuba, there is a long history of conflicts and differences between this nation and the United States. But we must also remember that in other international situations that appeared to have no possibilities of agreement whatsoever, rapprochement that was beneficial for both sides was achieved through creative diplomacy, as occurred with the establishment of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States. Since Mexico has friendly relations with both the United States and Cuba, we would be sympathetic with those decisions that could contribute to a relaxation of tensions and to the eventual establishment of relations based on respect and moderation between the two countries' foreign policies. This is a real possibility that would require complex decisions, but one that, if carried out, could have great political potential.

Our concerns for creating a lasting peace extend beyond our hemisphere. We are multiplying our ties with Europe, Canada, Japan and East Asia. We are also firm in our desire to maintain friendly relationships with socialist nations and to extend cooperative exchanges with Asia and Africa.

Our main concern in a global context is peace. I do not believe that the superpowers want a war of extinction. Mexico will continue urging nuclear powers to reach serious agreements to reduce the

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risk of nuclear war, establish commitments to slow the arms race and, further on, reach a general arms control agreement.

V

The international economic situation strongly influences the problems of Mexico and Latin America. Our countries are suffering from an unprecedented financial and economic crisis. The rise in interest rates, the contraction of international trade and the protectionist measures adopted by industrialized nations constitute obstacles to our recovery. These factors also aggravate the social inequalities in the region and threaten the political stability of several Latin American nations.

In the face of such conditions, it is increasingly recognized that unilateral decisions in developed countries, which fail to take into account the real possibilities for placing the economies of developing nations on a sound footing, are counterproductive. The costs are too high to be carried by one side alone. Further delays in Latin America's and Europe's recoveries would bring about global economic stagnation.

It is Mexico's conviction, more and more generalized throughout the world, that in order to overcome the international crisis, the present framework of international economic relations must be modified toward a more cooperative structure in which national economic policies will be in tune with a global need to expand trade and reduce interest rates.

For Mexico and the other Latin American countries, the rise of interest rates severely restricts spending on essential social programs, reduces new investments in the private sector, drastically increases the cost of internal credit and upsets the balance of payments. This situation, together with the international trade restrictions, has exerted extreme pressure on our ability to repay foreign debts and threatens to perpetuate the situation by making financing of economic development practically inaccessible.

Now more than ever, increased exports from developing countries mean not only added capacity to import goods and to service the foreign debt, but also higher levels of economic activity and employment in developed nations. Simultaneously, net flows of resources to developing nations must be reestablished in order to secure the partial economic recovery begun in 1983.

Unilateral increases in interest rates nullify a large part of the difficult adjustment process that has been implemented at a high social cost in many Latin American nations. For this reason, there is a growing consensus on the need for debtors to participate on an

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equal basis with creditors in the process of reordering the international economy and promoting the new operative mechanisms necessary to permit debtor countries to restructure their debts under conditions that allow a lasting recovery.

The current crisis should alert the international community to the need for joint action based on regional cooperation and respect for the interests of both debtors and creditors. Efforts should be directed toward strengthening the international economic recovery as well as the capacity of individual developing countries to meet their obligations. Otherwise, the accumulation of unilateral increases in interest rates could lead to unilateral reactions which would abruptly cut off any possibility for less costly solutions for either the nations involved or the international economy as a whole.

For Mexico, the affairs of war or peace in Central America and the course of our economic and financial relations with the United States are necessarily defined by the perspective of our relationship with Latin America. Because of historical identity, cultural unity and common economic interests, our destiny is intimately linked to that of all Latin American countries.

Worsening economic pressures on the debt and international trade, together with the political tensions existing in Central America, have strengthened, more than ever, our conviction that only by fully cooperating with other Latin American nations, Canada and the United States can a better future be built for Mexico and the continent.

We are realistically facing the necessary internal reordering of our economies. What is required is that industrialized nations carry out coherent economic policies that avoid the transfer of the costs of recovery to developing nations, and which set the basis for a more equal world economic order.

VI

Mexico faces its challenges in a world undergoing complex changes. The nature of international relations has been modified because of the development and high standards of living reached by the Europeans and Japanese, the strength of the Soviet Union, the vitality of the United States, together with the social transformation taking place in developing countries. The role of large corporations, the organizational structuring of modern armies, the impact of mass communications, the abuse in the exploitation of nonrenewable resources and the great social needs still to be fulfilled all create an international setting with new opportunities as well as difficulties.

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Latin America has multiple needs, vast resources and little time. It is ensnared between the harsh requirements of modernization and the essential need to strengthen its identity. Neither the U.S. nor the European experience of national development can be repeated in our countries. Ours will necessarily be a path of our own. It cannot be any other way.

Many Latin American countries have suffered from rapid industrialization policies heavily dependent on imports without the ability to generate sufficient exports, the mismanagement and lavish spending of populist governments, the lack of respect for human rights and the inefficiency of social processes conducted by dictatorships. We have both won and lost in our external economic relations, and we have been witnesses to world confrontations in our own territories. Latin America has achieved important progress in economic growth but enormous social needs still persist.

Today, Latin America's economic relationship with the world is going through one of its darkest moments. In Mexico we have a clear idea of what we face and where we are going. We have a national project based on a strong nationalism which is committed to furthering social justice and to perfecting our democracy. We have an institutional setting that has shown its capacity to carry out reforms, to adapt to new circumstances and promote national development.

Faced with the enormous social needs and difficult internal and external economic conditions, the values around which Mexico's consensus has been created and maintained help us define the strategic decisions we are taking in this uncertain world.

To defend our sovereignty effectively we will continue strengthening our economy, the democratic basis of our political regime, the autonomy of our foreign policy and our commitment to increasing social equality while protecting individual rights. We have no alternative but that of an efficient conduct of our economy in order to satisfy the most urgent needs of our population, instead of wasting the scarce resources that we will have in this decade on non-viable projects, scattered investments or superfluous expenditures. We will continue reordering our productive structures and processes in order to be able to compete in the international economy instead of locking ourselves inside structures that are, if not archaic, poorly adapted to the changes in international trade. We must maintain our freedom and perfect democratic practices that are the product of our historical experience. To promote social justice we will maintain the social priorities of our budget while continuing to reduce inflation, increase our productive investment

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in the rural areas, guarantee collective bargaining rights, keep expanding public infrastructure and urban services, and carry out extensive conservation efforts to protect the supply of water and nonrenewable resources.

I believe there is no other way to secure and preserve our national and Latin American identities than by acting in correspondence with the best of each of our histories; by negotiating our differences in order to unite our efforts and strategies; by reducing excessive waste and luxuries so as to enlarge and strengthen the middle class and better protect workers; by respecting all ideologies and beliefs without losing our national consensus; and, certainly, by recognizing our deficiencies and acting to remedy those in areas which are crucial for our development.

The world is undergoing a process of transition, and no one can anticipate the results yet. Grand interpretations have been replaced by reality, while dogmas have been overturned by pragmatism. In this process, so inclined to power politics and intransigent attitudes, our transitional relations must be reconstructed with realism as well as with sound principles, with audacity and imagination, but also with responsibility and, most important, through the combined contributions of all nations. There is no longer a country, no matter how small, that cannot endanger international order; nor is there a country, no matter how powerful, which does not depend significantly on its relations with other nations.

There is a wide potential for development in Mexico. With work, perseverance and adherence to our principles, we are better prepared to carry out the necessary changes. In these times of uncertainty, Mexico is meeting its new challenges.

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Gershom Schocken

ISRAEL IN ELECTION YEAR 1984

Through the workings of a multitude of causes—external and internal, spiritual and material—Israel has survived, not without unease, for a considerable time. Problems abound in all spheres: Israel's position in the Middle East, its economic survival and the coexistence of the various discordant components of Israeli society. Yet, strange as it may seem, no effective force in Israel today feels the urgent need for radical change in policy or direction. On the contrary, one can sense a widespread suspicion that any change would be a change for the worse.

We have just passed the eleventh parliamentary election in our 36-year history. The inconclusive war in Lebanon has taken a heavy toll on Israel. Hundreds of soldiers were killed and thousands became invalids. The financial burden of the war is one of the important causes of the government deficit and the continuing rise of Israel's foreign debt, which has more than doubled in the seven years of Likud administration.

Curiously, the only Israeli who has drawn a far-reaching personal conclusion from the tragic miscarriage of Israeli plans in Lebanon and the deteriorating economic situation is Menachem Begin, prime minister from 1977 to his abrupt resignation in September 1983. All through his life he suffered from bouts of depression. Last summer he withdrew into his private apartment and disappeared from the public eye. Begin has never come forward to explain the reasons for his political demise to the people of Israel, whom he served as elected leader for six years, or to the party whose unchallenged head he had been since the foundation of the state.

The elections of July 23, 1984, were forced upon the government of Begin's successor, Yitzhak Shamir, a full year before the constitutional expiration of the Likud coalition's mandate in office. A small splinter party, representing predominantly Sephardi Jews, and two individual members of the legislature (Knesset) sided with the Labor opposition to cut away Shamir's parliamentary majority.

The Labor alignment emerged as the largest single party in the new Knesset, but Likud and its ideological allies scored an unexpectedly strong showing.

In light of these results, the splinter factions and Labor itself

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Gershom Schocken is Publisher and Editor-in-chief of the leading Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz*. He has held those positions since 1939. Copyright © 1984 by Gershom Schocken.

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probably did Shamir and Likud a favor by forcing the premature elections. Likud's economic policies since 1977 have sapped the resources of the state, but until the autumn of 1983 the general public had only seen the benefits. Real income of wage earners and overall living standards rose considerably in the Likud years, and only when a bubble of speculation in bank stocks burst in October did the public begin to feel the brunt of Likud's wasteful policies. Apparently nine months is too short a time for the electorate to grasp the severe harm to the foundations of our society brought about by Likud's superficially attractive economics. By the summer of 1985, political analysts now argue, the message would have come through loud and clear, and Likud's share of the vote would have been much lower.

Nobody can know how the vote would have gone in July 1985, if Likud had been allowed to serve out its mandate; but there can be no doubt that in July 1984, Likud still enjoyed the returns of the goodies it had spread among the people in the years previous.

Overall, the elections just completed have brought about a weakening of Israel's two leading parties. The Labor alignment may have a parliamentary edge over Likud, but both have suffered as the smaller parties on both ideological extremes gained in strength. Both Labor and Likud will find it very difficult to form a government, either separately or in an uneasy coalition of national unity.

II

The collapse of Begin's second administration, his eclipse as a political leader, and the premature elections that ensued can be traced to two steps taken—or at least acquiesced to—by the prime minister himself. Both involved entrusting heavy responsibilities to controversial associates: Finance Minister Yoram Aridor was permitted to pursue an inflationary economic policy, and Ariel Sharon was named minister of defense.

When Begin took office in the summer of 1977, inflation in Israel was running at a rate of 25 percent per year and the tendency was downward. The last Labor government had succeeded in lowering the rate from more than 50 percent in 1974, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Economists had forecast an inflation of only 15 percent for 1978.

Then came Likud. Unrestrained public spending and a continuous rise in real wages and salaries marked Likud economic policy under its first finance minister, the late Simcha Ehrlich, and inflation rose to over 100 percent. Ehrlich was replaced by Yigal Hurwitz, who tried to switch to an austerity policy, but he had to

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resign in January 1981, after being overruled by the Cabinet in his objection to an increase in teacher's salaries.

After Hurwitz came Yoram Aridor, comparatively young, intelligent and endowed with a lighthearted recklessness. Aridor reverted to the permissive policy of the early Likud years, keeping prices of essential commodities low through ever-increasing subsidies, even as real income continued to rise. The rate of exchange of the shekel lagged behind the rate of inflation; foreign money became inexpensive for Israelis. Imported goods could be had at attractive prices and travel abroad cost Israelis less than vacations at home. No wonder that these measures kept people content. Likud's economics proved most beneficial—and possibly decisive—for Begin at the elections in July 1981.

Cash-rich Israelis began speculating on the Tel Aviv stock exchange, triggering an unprecedented and madly exaggerated boom: within just a few months in 1982, stock prices multiplied several times. Wage earners and cab drivers joined the frenzy. People sold their apartments and automobiles in order to make quick gains through speculation. Businessmen and corporations (including kibbutzim) neglected their legitimate work and employed their resources on the stock exchange. Work suffered in many firms as employees kept phoning their brokers for the latest quotations. Even serving soldiers called in from their army bases in the Golan Heights and in Lebanon.

In 1983 the overheated market collapsed. Industrial shares went down first, often by 50, 70 or 90 percent. Then, in October, came pressure on the bank stocks, the favorite form of investment for small and medium savers. Through mass publicity campaigns, Israeli banks had convinced the public that their stocks were a safe hedge against inflation, providing at the same time a high income—20–30 percent per annum in real terms. All the while the banks assiduously propped up the prices of their shares, which rose day by day more than the rate of inflation. Big new issues of bank shares were eagerly snapped up by the public. With the collapse of the industrials, people got restless and offered even bank shares for sale. To prevent their decline in value, the banks had to buy up their own stock. They imported close to a billion dollars from their subsidiaries abroad, mainly in the United States, to raise supportive funds. Eventually they could not keep it up. The shares fell by about 30 percent and would have fallen further had the government not intervened to prevent a panic. In October 1983, Aridor resigned from office under a storm of criticism.

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III

Ariel Sharon became Israel's minister of defense on August 5, 1981. All through his military and political career, Sharon has generated controversy. He had made a name for himself from the early 1950s as a ruthless fighter against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) partisans, and as a dashing field commander in the wars of Israel. Always popular with soldiers who served under him, his popularity carried over into politics, to the crowds in the marketplace and at mass meetings. Less popular with his fellow army commanders, he was known for a lack of discipline and for disregarding orders from superiors. He is a man of great energy and perseverance in pursuing his plans.

Another of Sharon's striking traits is his ability to project a favorable and attractive image of himself to the people at large. Somehow the setbacks in his military career, which have not been lacking, and which sometimes caused heavy casualties, did not sink into the consciousness of the public. People who have close contact with him know his aggressiveness and rudeness, and many fear his vicious tongue. To outsiders he can be a great charmer. I know of no American Jew conducted by Ariel Sharon on a tour of the West Bank who did not become a confirmed supporter of Sharon's settlement policy.

One of the weaknesses of Israeli society is the tendency to assume that high officers who have an outstanding military career behind them can be relied on for the soundness of their political judgment. Sometimes, of course, a former general can turn into a useful politician or statesman. In the case of Ariel Sharon, his great reputation as a general enabled him to win over the government, and especially Begin himself, to a policy which brought the country close to disaster.

Not for nothing had David Ben-Gurion given the military arm of the state the name Israel Defense Force. The army was to be ordered into action only when vital interests of the state or its very existence were threatened by enemy forces. It was to be used only when there was no other way out.

Ariel Sharon thought differently. For him the army was an instrument to be used at will by the Israeli government in order to achieve given political objects, for instance, a change of the political map around Israel.

From the day of his appointment, Sharon planned war in Lebanon and against Syria. His plans were not limited to securing the

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safety of the Israeli settlements in the Galilee by driving PLO forces out of the southern belt of Lebanon. Sharon had a bigger political goal: he wanted to achieve a peace treaty with Lebanon. For that he needed a friendly government in Beirut. Such a government could not come into being as long as the PLO, with its political and military establishment, and the Syrian army were entrenched in the capital and in control of most of the country. The war in Lebanon and against Syria was only the first stage of Sharon's Grand Design. The second stage was to be the conquest of Jordan and the resettling there of the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

After the war started on June 6, 1982, Begin deceived the Knesset about Israel's real intentions (possibly he himself had been deceived by Sharon). The prime minister said Israel sought only to establish a security belt 40 kilometers deep along its northern border.

Very soon it became apparent that the so-called Operation Peace for Galilee, which was to have been concluded within two or three days, had become a war. Even now, after two years, it is not at an end. The one object achieved has been the expulsion of Yassir Arafat and his PLO headquarters from Beirut. But terrorism has not disappeared, and Israeli soldiers are harrassed daily in southern Lebanon.

Sharon's other aim, the dislodgement of the Syrians from their positions in the Bekaa Valley, proved to be quite difficult. The Syrians fought stubbornly for every inch and inflicted considerable losses on the Israelis. In the end the Israeli army could, possibly, have achieved its goal, but at heavy cost. Yet the fighting came to an end on June 11, at the request of President Reagan. Perhaps Mr. Begin was not too sorry about this American interference. Now, two years later, the Syrians are as much in control of Lebanon as they ever were. The new Lebanese government is headed by a Syrian appointee.

In November 1982, Begin brought himself to oust Sharon as minister of defense in the uproar following a judicial inquiry commission presided over by the Chief Justice of Israel, which found Sharon indirectly responsible for the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila, in the suburbs of Beirut. But Sharon was retained in the government as minister without portfolio, and was a popular campaigner for Likud in the elections.

IV

The 1984 election campaign was far more restrained and placid than the one before. The last time Israelis chose their Knesset, in

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1981, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres had been shouted down when he tried to address meetings in new towns predominantly inhabited by Israelis who, themselves or their parents, had come from Islamic countries in North Africa or the Middle East, so-called Oriental Jews.

The 1981 campaign had been marked by highly effective demagoguery which appealed to basic instincts; Begin succeeded in conveying to the masses of voters of non-European origin the conviction that he understood their desires and represented their interests. By contrast, Peres became a hate-figure, personification of the myth that for decades the masses of Oriental Israelis had been exploited and discriminated against by the Labor establishment, largely of European, or Ashkenazi, origin.

In 1984 Begin's pyrotechnics were absent. The mood of the masses was less angry. Two or three former ringleaders of noisy anti-Ashkenazi protests were induced to move into the Labor camp and apologize in public for the insults inflicted on Peres three years before. This time Peres was given a polite hearing, more or less, in the new towns—all of which, incidentally, had been founded and developed by Labor administrations. The Labor leaders succumbed to a rash sense of security that the voting habits of the Oriental majority had changed from its pro-Likud orientation.

There was a more profound reason for the relative tameness of the election campaign: both Likud and Labor, for their own reasons, found it wiser not to sharpen the issues that divided them, but rather to blur them.

Likud knew very well that the war in Lebanon was the result of a political miscalculation. It was certainly no electoral asset. But nor could Labor make too much of it, for opposition leaders had actually supported the war in its initial stage. Likud and Labor agreed that the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon should be brought to an end as soon as satisfactory security arrangements for the Galilee could be worked out. Both knew that Lebanese and Syrian cooperation would be necessary to bring this about. As long as such cooperation was not forthcoming, the Israeli presence in Lebanon, costly as it might be in terms of risk to human lives as well as in material resources, could not be easily relinquished.

As to the occupied territories on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza strip, Likud stressed its commitment to keep the whole of the Land of Israel. Labor did not disavow its readiness for a territorial compromise with Jordan as a partner, but neither did they make a strong issue of this stand. They stressed the portions they intend to retain rather than those they would give up. After

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17 years of Israeli occupation, talk of readiness to abandon territory does not help win votes.

On the economy, again both Likud and Labor knew that quite radical and unpopular steps would have to be taken, yet neither wanted to get too specific. One prominent economist close to Likud said, unlike King Lear, that he knew what had to be done but preferred not to say it, in order not to spread despondency among the citizenry.

Practical political calculation was the most important reason why Labor did not hit hard on the themes of Likud chauvinism and intransigence, the irresponsibility of spattering the West Bank with tiny Jewish settlements, and the reckless and wasteful Likud economics. Labor's election technicians had come to the conclusion that the outcome would hang on some 300,000 voters—15 percent of the electorate—who had voted Likud in 1981 but who by now, facing an annual inflation rate of 400 percent, had become doubtful about their choice. They could be induced to vote for another party—but not for one that appeared to be defeatist. In order to attract those shaky Likud voters, Labor chose to present an image both solid and patriotic.

The election results proved out the theory—but not the way Labor had hoped. Likud did indeed lose votes, which were apparently divided quite evenly between the more extreme nationalist lists, such as Tehiya and the candidacy of the fanatic American rabbi Meir Kahane, and the more moderate list of Ezer Weizman. They did not go to Labor.

V

The result of the election is frustrating and disappointing for Labor. The newly elected Knesset is nearly evenly split into two camps, making coalition-building difficult. Fifteen party lists are represented. The two big parties—Labor and Likud—control among themselves over 70 percent of the seats. But both are weaker than they were in 1981. Likud has gone down from 48 to 41 seats (a loss of 14.5 percent). Labor lost six percent, from 47 to 44 seats. Most preelection polls had forecast a Labor lead of 10 to 15 seats over Likud; Peres had been confident that he would obtain more than 50 seats.

Although Likud lost more than twice as much as Labor, Shamir has reason for satisfaction with the result. These were the first elections without the commanding presence of Begin, for many years the only universally admired and acknowledged leader of Herut (the main component of Likud). Conversely, Shamir had

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been quite unknown among the general public until only a few months ago. The economic situation, especially after the crash of the bank stocks last fall, and the unending, nagging and costly involvement in Lebanon, hardly increased Likud's popularity. Against these liabilities, Likud's showing is not unimpressive.

ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS

BLOC AND PARTY	1984		1981	
	VOTES	SEATS	VOTES	SEATS
Nationalist-Religious				
Likud (Nationalist)	661,302	41	718,762	48
Tehiya (Ultra-Nationalist)	83,037	5	44,559	3
N.R.P. (Religious-Zionist)	73,530	4	94,930	6
Shass (Orthodox-Sephardi)	63,605	4	—	–
Agudah (Orthodox-Non-Zionist)	36,079	2	71,682	4
Morasha (Orthodox-Nationalist)	33,287	2	—	–
Kach (Kahane-Religious-Ultra-Nationalist)	25,907	1	—	–
Labor-Liberal				
Labor Alignment	724,074	44	709,075	47
Shinui (Rubinstein-Liberal)	54,747	3	29,060	2
Ratz (Aloni-Liberal)	49,698	3	27,123	1
Transient				
Yahad (Weizman)	46,302	3	—	–
Yigal Hurwitz	23,845	1	30,997	2
Tami (AbuHatzera)	31,103	1	44,559	3
Predominantly Arab Lists				
Communist	69,815	4	65,870	4
Progressive/Democratic Change (Arab-Nationalist)	38,012	2	—	–
Others	58,978	0	100,741	0
TOTAL	2,073,321	120	1,937,358	120

It is now fashionable to blame the system of rigorously proportional representation for the indecisive results, and a change of the electoral system is being recommended as a remedy. Yet this is a moot point. It may be worthwhile to raise the minimum percentage necessary to qualify for election from one percent to three percent or four percent of the vote. Instead of 13 small lists there would, perhaps, be only six or seven lists. But nothing would change basically. On the other hand, the split of the religious vote into four small lists may actually help in forming a viable coalition. The

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election results show that various parts of the Israeli electorate believe very strongly in different causes that are often conflicting and belong to different universes of discourse, such as nationalism, religion, civil rights and material well-being.

The new Knesset includes two predominantly Arab lists, the Communists (four members) and a new Nationalist list (two members). Both favor a Palestinian state in the occupied territories which would be led by Yassir Arafat. Although probably 90 percent of the voters for these two lists are Arabs, two of the Communist and one of the Nationalist members are Jews. The representatives of the two lists are expected to support Labor in a coalition against Likud. Three more Arabs were elected on the lists of Likud, Labor and Shinui.

The table opposite breaks down the newly elected eleventh Knesset into major blocs: Nationalist-Religious, Labor-Liberal, Transients, and the predominantly Arab lists. The Transients are so in a double sense: they may join either of the two big blocs, and they are characterized solely by the persons who lead them. Therefore, they will probably prove ephemeral over the long term, but may be crucial in the immediate coalition-building.

So-called ethnic questions—the cultural and social divide between Ashkenazi Jews of European origin and the Sephardi, or Oriental, Jews—did not play an important role in this year's election campaign. In 1981, Begin had played up this problem effectively by claiming that, since the beginning of mass immigration from the Islamic countries in 1949, the Jews from those countries had been systematically kept down by the Ashkenazi Labor establishment, from which the power elite was recruited both in government bodies and in the General Federation of Labor (Histadrut).

The largest group of that immigration—but not the majority—had come from Morocco, where many had belonged to a socially and educationally underprivileged stratum. (Well-to-do and educated Moroccan Jews went mostly to France rather than Israel.)

Today, 30 years later, the large majority of these immigrants are productively employed—preponderantly, it must be admitted, but by no means exclusively, in the lower income brackets. An educational gap still exists, but it is narrowing from decade to decade.

Likud spokesmen, who in 1981 had loudly complained of alleged injustices inflicted on the defenseless Moroccans by the Ashkenazi apparatchiks, claimed in 1984 that the problem no longer existed. It had been solved, they claimed, by the Likud government.

The integration of the Jews from North Africa has been, on the whole, a genuine success story. Long before Begin became prime

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minister, many North Africans served as town councillors and mayors in the development towns. Some of them moved from there to the Knesset. In 1977, 22 Knesset members originated from Islamic countries; in 1981 their number was 27. The newly elected Knesset—according to a recent press story—consists of seven Arabs, 82 Ashkenazim and 31 Sephardim (though the terms are open to debate). Labor and Likud each have ten Sephardi members.

Official statistics do not specifically break down the voting habits of the different ethnic groups. It is generally supposed that two-thirds of Likud voters (or their parents) originated from Islamic countries. In Labor the proportion may be inverse. Yet with over half of the Jewish electorate of non-European origin, Labor could not be the largest party if non-Europeans did not vote for it in considerable numbers.

A somewhat more precise measure comes from comparison of the returns from districts heavily populated by Oriental Jews as against immigrant districts of more mixed population. According to figures recently published in the Israeli press, eight representative towns of predominantly Oriental populations gave Likud a margin of more than 2.5 to 1. In eight equivalent towns of mixed populations, the Likud vote over Labor was less than 1.2 to 1.

Parties formed along specific ethnic lines have not generally had wide appeal for the Sephardi community. Before the 1981 elections, Moroccan members of the National Religious Party broke away from the Ashkenazi establishment to go it alone under the party name Tami. Three members were elected. In the new Knesset Tami dropped to only one seat.

In the 1984 elections a new ethnic split developed, this time within Agudat Israel, the non-Zionist movement long controlled by East European Orthodox bodies. The four votes of Agudah had been vital for the survival of the Likud government, and the party leaders managed to obtain substantial funds from the government, to be distributed by the party leadership without outside accountability; most of this money is presumed to go to religious colleges (*yeshivot*), the characters and needs of which are not clearly defined. Over the years many Sephardi congregations had joined Agudat Israel, but they gained no proportionate influence in the party leadership. Believing they were not receiving a fair share of the funds, they broke away and founded the party Shass (Orthodox Sephardim). Surprisingly, they won four Knesset seats while the erstwhile parent body got only two. All four Shass members elected are young rabbis of North African origin who have spent their lives studying Talmud and, consequently, have no political experience.

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They seem to have received considerable support from non-Agudah Sephardi voters who had formerly voted Likud. The future will show whether this group will become a permanent feature in Israeli politics or whether it is merely a transient phenomenon like Tami.

The former president of Israel, Yitzhak Navon, himself Sephardi, used to say that the ethnic question in Israel is wide, but not deep; it becomes shallower from generation to generation.

VI

The same cannot, unfortunately, be said of the religious problem in Israel. The gap between the largely secularized majority and the fervently religious and orthodox minority has become both wider and deeper in the last two decades. Its origins go far back in Zionist history.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the bulk of Jewish people lived in Eastern Europe and obeyed the precepts of Jewish orthodoxy. Only a small minority of tradition-bound East European Jewry joined the incipient Zionist movement, and they did so only after the Zionist organizations committed themselves to uphold certain basic tenets of Judaism, such as the observance of the Sabbath and the Jewish marriage laws, in the Zionist communities about to be established in Palestine. For all their secularism, the early Zionist leaders granted these concessions in hopes of making inroads among the millions of orthodox Jews in Eastern Europe, providing the Zionist movement with a mass base. This concordat, dating from the earliest days of Zionism, is the seed of the religious problem in modern Israel.

As it worked out, the concession had only a limited effect: only a small minority of religious Jews joined the Zionist movement. From them—by second remove—originated the present National Religious Party, which is represented by four members in the new Knesset. Most religious Jews not only shunned Zionism, they turned into active adversaries. Orthodox Jews believed that, in the end of days, the Jewish people would be led back to Zion, their original homeland. Their leaders regarded the Zionist endeavor as a blasphemous attempt to interfere with the inscrutable ways of Divine Providence, and they employed all of their considerable means—including excommunication—to prevent their flock from succumbing to Zionist blandishments.

They did not object to their faithful settling in Jerusalem and devoting themselves exclusively to the study of Talmud. But they prohibited every cooperation with political Zionism. The tragic conclusion of hindsight is that, had it not been for the fierce

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prohibitions of the leaders of Orthodox Jewry (most eventually organized in the Agudat Israel), many more Jews might have immigrated to Palestine before World War II, and would, thus, have escaped extermination by the Germans.

After the establishment of the State of Israel—and especially after the Six-Day War of 1967—everything changed. The leaders of Jewish Orthodoxy are not only great Talmudic scholars, they are also supreme pragmatists. They had lost their territorial base in Eastern Europe. Most of their faithful had been killed. But the Jewish state had become a reality and many Jews lived there. Now they came to regard it as not only legitimate but their duty to use their rights as Israeli citizens to spread true Judaism—as they understand it—and to transform Israel from a state ruled by the laws of the Knesset into a state ruled by the laws of the Talmud.

As government coalitions in Israel very often depend on a handful of votes, the power of the Agudah Knesset members became considerable. Their changed attitude did not make them or their followers Zionists, nor even Israeli patriots. They refuse, and are exempted from, otherwise universal military service. Yet they regard it as fully agreeable to God that they use every means to obtain as much money as possible from the Zionist state for the upkeep of their own institutions.

Some extreme Orthodox did become militant Israeli nationalists after the Six-Day War. The "Land of Israel," the land that God had promised, had come under Israeli rule; this war was regarded by many as a divine act of miraculous delivery from mortal danger.

Just as, a hundred years before, Orthodox leaders had regarded political Zionism as blasphemy, present-day Orthodox Nationalists regard it as religious abomination to give up any land that is part of the divine Jewish patrimony. The Orthodox of this persuasion are to be found in the Gush Emunim; they settle in Hebron and in the West Bank. In the Knesset they are part of Tehiya—even though this means cooperating with secular Nationalists like Yuval Neeman, the distinguished professor of physics, and Rafael Eytan ("Raful"), the former chief of staff in charge of the war in Lebanon. (Eytan, together with Sharon, was blamed by the judicial commission for Sabra and Shatila; like Sharon he comes in the tradition of MacArthur, Salan and Montgomery, generals best kept in political impotence by persons more controlled by reason.)

The Tehiya Party, which has increased its strength from three to five members in the new Knesset, exemplifies the well-known phenomenon that extreme nationalism often breeds more extreme nationalism. Every government in power generates disappoint-

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ments, and for all of Begin's chauvinistic somersaults, he was not spared the fate of appearing to unrelenting doctrinaires—especially to some of the young—as domesticated, staid and unduly conciliatory. Many could not forgive him for signing away the Sinai in the peace treaty with Egypt. Geula Cohen and others, who had represented Likud in the ninth Knesset, broke away and founded Tehiya as a purer and unadulterated version of Herut. They found considerable response among young people, especially after being joined by "Raful" Eytan, whose views are scarcely distinguishable from Kahane's in defining what should be done to the Arabs in Israel.

The breakdown of the military vote is particularly revealing in this connection. If the votes of the general electorate had been distributed as were the votes of the serving soldiers (most of whom are, of course, first-time voters), Tehiya would have gotten not five but 14 seats in the Knesset. Had the Knesset been elected by the serving military alone, Israel would have a Likud-led majority of 64, consisting of 47 Likud, 14 Tehiya, and three for the nationalist list headed by Rabbi Kahane. Labor would have had only 41 seats, Shinui five, Ratz four.

VII

The election results are not to be seen as an accident of circumstance. They are a fair reflection of Israel's public attitudes. The results would probably not have been very different if somebody other than Shimon Peres had led the Labor list. Although this may be the last time he leads his party in an election, Peres is the closest approximation to an authentic political leader that Labor could offer; anybody else would have looked like an imposter. Shimon Peres does not.

The following figures from three periods in Israel's history show the gradual erosion of Labor and the rise of the Nationalist-Religious bloc. (These figures refer to the average number of Knesset members in each period.)

	Labor	*Nationalist-Religious*
1949–51	61.7	42.0
1961–69	57.7	46.6
1973–84	43.5	60.7

From the first to the third period (11 elections), Labor lost an average of 18.2 members, a decline of 29 percent. In terms of actual political power the decline of Labor is even sharper, for from 1949 to 1973 the religious lists had supported Labor, actively or

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passively. In 1977 and 1981 the religious groups joined with the nationalist parties. The Nationalist-Religious bloc has gained an average of 18.7 members from the first to the last period: a rise of 44.5 percent.

In 1949, 50.4 percent of the electorate voted Labor. In October 1969, after the Six-Day War, Labor's vote stood at 46.2 percent, and it fell in December 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, to 39.6 percent. The full punishment for the military deficiencies which had become apparent in that war, and for a string of criminal cases in which leading members of the establishment were involved, was finally inflicted by the voters on May 17, 1977, when Labor went down to 24.6 percent and, for the first time, was turned out of office by Likud, led by Menachem Begin.

The Labor Party of Israel has lost its sense of identity. Early in the century it was conceived and developed as a movement of pioneering workers. Its mission had been to convince the bands of penniless Jewish youngsters, born in a Europe that did not want them and was about to kill them, to come to the wasteland that was Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s. The Zionist Labor movement imbued these young people with the belief that they could do nothing more meaningful with their lives than to lay here, under heavy personal sacrifices, the foundations of a modern agriculture and industry, of a modern society providing basic social services to all in Palestine. And when the need arose, they even built an army—as pacifist European socialists, they had not contemplated that. They also bore the main burden of providing succor for the mass immigration in the early days of the state. It was a great task, admirably performed. But it is over.

The great question is whether the people in charge of the Labor Party now will find it within themselves to rebuild their movement to answer the needs of all Israelis who value civil liberties and social justice, who object to religious coercion, and at the same time to represent the interests of the employed masses in a modern post-industrial society. The newly elected secretary general of the Histadrut, for instance, Israel Kessar, is a very intelligent and experienced man. He is not a man of yesterday, but of today, and, one can hope, of tomorrow. He is a prominent member of the Labor faction in the new Knesset.

Whichever party leadership succeeds in putting together Israel's next ruling coalition—Labor, Likud or both—will face the unwelcome task of convincing the complacent Israelis that things cannot long continue as they are, that change is not something to be feared but rather to be sought, urgently and constructively. Should Israel's

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leaders not rise to the challenge, it may be outside pressure that will bring the impetus for change.

In their economic policies, in the face of ever-repeated warnings, Israelis have continued to behave in a manner which, we were told, must lead to disaster—yet no catastrophe occurred, until now. The living standards of ordinary Israelis have improved. Israel is, even now, one of the very few free countries of the world with no significant unemployment.

Israelis tend to regard American economic aid, which has grown substantially over the last decade, as part of their natural wealth. Dependence on outside help does not cause misgivings. Indeed, Likud politicians have repeatedly said that American aid is not large enough in view of the great benefits to American interests from the very existence and functioning of Israel. As long as no dire need is perceived for basic change in economic policy, basic change is unlikely to come about.

The same logic seems to apply to the problems of the occupation, of relations with the Arabs. This is so even if Labor dominates the new government. At Camp David, despite the overwhelming historical event of the president of Egypt negotiating peace with Israel, no agreement would have been possible without unmistakable American pressure. The much-vaunted solution of the Palestinian question through a territorial compromise and an agreement with Jordan is a safe placebo for immobilism—and Shimon Peres should know it. It has been so since June 1967, when the late Moshe Dayan said that all he was waiting for was a telephone call from King Hussein.

King Hussein had no reason to make such a call. Moreover, King Hussein has every reason *not* to make the call. He cannot agree to a territorial compromise with Israel, as this would make him a traitor to the Arab cause. He has no reason to make such a compromise, because in fact he does not suffer from the situation of occupation which has existed since 1967. On the contrary, he is better off today and more respected in the world than before 1967. Were he to sign an agreement with Israel, he would inevitably become a target for an assassin's bullet. That has been the fate of every Arab ruler or leader who dared to make an agreement with Israel. The first victim was King Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah, who in 1951 was killed on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in the presence of his 15-year-old grandson, now king of the Hashemite domain.

No more than Hussein could Shimon Peres actually implement a territorial compromise. Were he the head of a coalition with Likud,

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he could not do it against Likud's will. As head of a coalition without Likud, he would need the votes of at least one religious party, and he would not get them. Besides, if it should ever come to this point, it would become apparent that there is very little enthusiasm within the Labor Party itself to give up territory. The West Bank and Gaza are not only part of the ancient Land of Israel. They were also integral parts of the territory of Palestine in which, according to the decision of the League of Nations after World War I, the Jewish National Home was to be established.

The Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories are a nuisance to Israel, but the last 17 years have shown that the situation can be kept under control. The price Israel has to pay is an increasing brutalization of life, but nobody seems to care very much. It would be different if an Algerian situation would develop in the West Bank. For the foreseeable future that does not seem very likely. But no situation is irreversible, if a compelling need for change arises.

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Kurt Waldheim

THE UNITED NATIONS: THE TARNISHED IMAGE

In my last annual report as Secretary-General, I tried to assess the United Nations' ability to measure up to the new challenges of our times. "I have to say," I concluded in 1981, "that for all our efforts and our undoubted sincerity, the Organization has not yet managed to cut through the political habits and attitudes of earlier and less hurried centuries and to come to grips decisively with [the] new factors of our existence."

Indeed it has not. As a human political organization, the United Nations is certainly flawed. Its defects limit its capacity for effective action. In a mood of widespread disenchantment, it is attacked on the grounds that it produces more rhetoric than action, that it is ineffective and often ignored, and that the one-nation, one-vote system allows the Third World to dominate decision-making—divorcing voting power from the ability to act.

The system on paper is impressive. It has frequently helped to avoid or contain international violence. Yet in recent years it has seemed to cope less and less effectively with international conflicts of various kinds, and its capabilities in other areas of international cooperation have also seemed to dwindle.

But this is not to assert, as some do, that the United Nations is no longer a useful organization. Such critics use the wrong standard of comparison. The truly meaningful question regarding the United Nations is not whether it functions perfectly, or even rather poorly. It is whether humankind, taken as a whole, is better off with it or without it. As to that, it seems to me, there can be no doubt.

II

Depending on one's point of view, many explanations can be offered for the current state of affairs. To me, one factor is fundamental. The war syndrome is an inevitable outgrowth of the doctrine of state sovereignty. As long as states insist that they are the supreme arbiters of their destinies—that as sovereign entities their decisions are subject to no higher authority—international organizations will never be able to guarantee the maintenance of peace.

Kurt Waldheim was Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1972 until January 1982.

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The statesmen who put together the United Nations at the end of World War II were quite aware of the need for some sort of supranational authority for an organization designed to prevent wars. But for understandable reasons they were unable, and indeed even unwilling, to make the radical changes needed to design a system that could be guaranteed to work. Accordingly, while the first *purpose* of the United Nations, as expressed in Article 1, paragraph 1 of its Charter, is "to maintain international peace and security. . .", the first *principle* of the Organization, as stated in Article 2, paragraph 1, is ". . .the sovereign equality of all its Members."

Limited by that constraint, the U.N. founding fathers went as far as they could to establish a system that would deter international conflict while it encouraged friendly relations among nations, and economic growth and social progress through international cooperation. Essentially, the Organization they created operates through persuasion of sovereign states, not through compulsion. No substantive action of the U.N. General Assembly binds any member against its will, and the enforcement powers of the Security Council have remained almost unused. Thus, the United Nations enjoys strictly limited powers entirely disproportionate to the all-encompassing objectives it was created to seek. It is small wonder that many of these objectives remain beyond reach. It is because people do not know, or have forgotten, how little authority the United Nations actually has that they expect so much from it. In this sense it has been, as Americans are accustomed to say, "oversold".

Perhaps those who created the United Nations are open to the criticism that they led their peoples to expect too much from it, so that their disappointment is correspondingly greater. This point may be particularly applicable to Americans. In a sense, the United Nations is their own creation and the words of the Charter are in large part derived from the terminology of American political idealism.

For many Europeans, the projection of the American dream into the international arena was a dangerous doctrine. They remembered Woodrow Wilson and the tide of emotional support for a new world order on which he arrived in Europe to make peace after the First World War. They recalled that in his noble naïveté he permitted himself to be used for the parochial interests so ably advanced by Lloyd George of Britain and Clemenceau of France. While assuring the birth of the League of Nations, he became a party to an inequitable peace treaty which helped to pave the way for the Germany of Adolf Hitler.

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Europeans wonder whether, at the end of the Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt did not fall into the same trap, prepared for the practitioners of idealism by the practitioners of realism. For a Central European like myself, there is a parallel between the punitive settlement at Versailles in 1919 and the Yalta Conference in 1945. The division of the European continent at that time into two zones of influence, Eastern and Western, just as the ground rules for the U.N. Charter were being worked out, has had far-reaching, long-term effects, and many of our problems today grew out of this division.

The Yalta Agreement is only one example proving that the superpowers have an underlying preference for settling their problems bilaterally, rather than through an international forum. Inevitably, it appears, they tend toward a spheres-of-influence policy involving the allies of both sides. In this regard they simply carry on with past history: the powers of the day have always preferred deals made bilaterally, rather than through the use of internationally available multilateral means.

No doubt this is a more direct, more simple, and more practical way for the Great Powers to do business. But these powers, under the U.N. Charter, have the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and the privileged voting position that goes with such a responsibility—the authority to block enforcement by veto. When they set such an example, who can blame other countries for pursuing the same course?

III

The 51 founding members of the United Nations consisted essentially of two groups: a preponderant (in numbers) bloc of Western-oriented states, and a tightly cohesive communist minority bloc. The set-piece dramas that took place on the U.N. stage in the early years of its life typically arrayed the majority against the minority, in highly publicized debates over cold-war matters that could have only one voting outcome.

Nevertheless, the United Nations, in this earlier configuration, was able to carry out many important tasks. It presided over the process of moving the former Italian colonies to independence. It was the midwife for the creation of the state of Israel. It spearheaded many aspects of the process of economic development. It made human rights practices a matter of international concern. There were, to be sure, regrets over its failure to do more. But on balance, the accomplishments of the Organization, limited though

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they were, were recognized and considered a basis for future progress.

Beginning in 1955, the membership of the United Nations began to grow rapidly. Sixteen countries joined the Organization in that year alone. In 1960, 17 joined. There was hardly a year without a new member. In 1984 the total membership reached 158.

The new members consisted predominantly of new states, created through the process of decolonization—a movement the United Nations itself fostered, endorsed and legitimized through the admissions process. The new arrivals were overwhelmingly non-white, non-Western, underdeveloped and unschooled in the practice of national and international governance. They brought to the U.N. corridors a burning sense of injustice done them under their former colonial masters, a chip-on-the-shoulder insistence that the West therefore owed them the wherewithal needed for economic growth, and a more or less conscious rejection of the tenets of Western liberal democracy.

The leaders of the new membership may have lacked experience, but they were politically astute. The Arab countries, for example, realized that they could forge a firm alliance with other new members by stressing the common interest in certain fundamental principles. The Arab states based their opposition to Israel on the twin Charter principles of the self-determination of peoples and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. To the new members in Africa, Asia and the smaller American republics, these principles were critically significant. Self-determination justified *their* national existence; the non-acquisition of territory by force undergirded *their* independence. Out of this common approach grew the general support for Palestinian aspirations in the United Nations and general opposition to Israel's continued occupation of all the territories it had retained after the Six-Day War.

As much as any other factor, this was the genesis of the Third World grouping. Third World leadership proved highly adept at organizing operational alliances within the United Nations, principally the Nonaligned Movement for political matters, the African-Asian regional group, and the Group of 77 (now well over 100 states) concentrating on economic problems. Egged on by the Soviet bloc, which encourages the Third World belief that "Western imperialism" is the cause of their infirmities, this new majority overwhelms the outnumbered West.

With their new agenda and their surprisingly firm political discipline, the Third World countries have radically changed the whole orientation of the United Nations. After 1960, many Westerners

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came to describe it, depending on their point of view, as an increasingly dangerous or at best a useless place. Its priorities were not their priorities. It rode roughshod over their ideas of justice and fairness. Time after time, it put the West in the dock. It ground out innumerable resolutions at once castigating the West for its malfeasance and making impossible demands for redress.

It is hard for an outsider to realize how striking the changes in tone and substance are. I recall a visit to the United Nations early in the 1960s, by the former prime minister of Belgium and former president of the General Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak. As he observed the proceedings of the Security Council, after an absence of several years, he was thunderstruck. "My God!" he said incredulously, "This is unreal. I no longer recognize the United Nations."

IV

It fell to me as Secretary-General to try to keep the Organization on an even keel during the turbulent decade of the 1970s. During this period I witnessed a high-water mark in the Third World quest for far-reaching changes in the international economic system at the stormy Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1974. This was the meeting that produced the call for a New International Economic Order, and a program of action for its implementation. It condemned the existing international economic and financial system and called for a radical restructuring of international trade, finance, the control of natural resources, and multinational corporations, as well as major increases in funding for development assistance. As rounded out by a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, proposed by Luis Echeverria, then president of Mexico, and adopted December 12, 1974, the General Assembly in that period embraced a broad doctrine of economic revisionism. The proposals of the developing countries tipped the balance of economic relationships very close to the point of absolute sovereignty of all states over their natural resources, regardless of prior agreements permitting their extraction by foreign enterprises.

This all-out attack on existing relationships between the North and the South represented an understandable reaction to past "imperialist" practices but ignored certain basic realities. Economic development requires capital and technical skills that have to be provided from the North, either through bilateral arrangements with business or governments, or through multilateral mechanisms.

Further, as seen by the Americans and some other Western countries, the Third World proposals would have legitimized the expropriation of foreign property without fair compensation, and

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they advocated producer-dominated cartels as a means of managing international trade in raw materials for the benefit of the developing countries.

This was too much for the major industrial states, and all of them either voted against or abstained on the Charter. But—a significant point—the impasse did not continue. At the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, called in 1975, both sides proved more accommodating. The tone of this session was set to a considerable degree by a remarkable statement by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger containing a wide gamut of proposals designed to help meet some of the principal problems of the developing countries. It was a landmark event. While it has been followed up to only a small degree, the new note struck at the Seventh Special Session demonstrated that it is possible for much to be done, by common consent, to redress inequities in international economic relations.

Over the years, the Third World countries have shown remarkable solidarity in pursuit of their objectives. Some might have thought that the oil shocks of 1973–74 and 1979 would cause a split between the oil-exporting countries and their less fortunate underdeveloped brethren. But this did not happen. The deep, underlying kinship of ideas and interests binding the Third World group together proved stronger than any divisive tendencies caused by envy or disappointment. There was indeed a good deal of admiration among the poorer developing countries over the way in which their more fortunate colleagues had seized the opportunity to turn the tables on the wealthy and make them pay dearly for essential imports.

The Third World was itself divided, so to speak, into rich and poor countries. Would the newly endowed states come to the assistance of their fellow underdeveloped states that had not been blessed with oil deposits under their soil? Generally speaking, they did so only to a limited degree. The new oil-rich countries did make funds available for multinational uses, but only in specific areas. Direct aid to poverty-stricken Third World nations was closely restricted to special cases.

While the U.S.S.R. supported the Third World thesis, it has generally stood outside this international economic confrontation. The Soviets have never considered participating in multilateral economic aid programs for developing countries in any substantial way. I remember quite well one of my conversations on this subject with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. I was asked to try to get the Soviet Union to attend the Cancun Conference, the 1981 summit meeting of 22 heads of state or government to discuss

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North-South economic problems. I brought up the issue with Gromyko in Moscow in June 1981. He answered at once that they were not interested and would not attend. I tried to stress how useful a Soviet contribution to the North-South dialogue could be. Gromyko responded by stating that the problems facing the Third World in the economic sphere are the result of colonialism. He insisted that the Soviet Union, never having been a colonial power, had no reason to get involved in the consequences of Western colonialism. "It is up to them to make up for what they have done to the countries of the Third World," he said. "We shall not attend because we do not wish to be placed in the same category with the Western powers. . . ." He added that as far as economic help to developing countries was concerned, the Soviet Union "will of course help them, but we shall do so on a bilateral basis." This position of the Soviet Union was confirmed by Leonid Brezhnev himself, when I met him in the Kremlin.

Supported by the Soviet bloc, the Third World countries have sought to attain their ends by seeking sweeping changes in the U.N. system as it is presently organized. Currently the levers of economic power in the U.N. system lie in the hands of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and similar agencies, where voting strength closely reflects economic power. The South would like somehow to shift the venue of decision-making in these matters into the one-nation, one-vote General Assembly. In this they have been unsuccessful, since the specialized agencies concerned were created by separate treaties and are not subordinate to the United Nations. All the exhortations contained in the General Assembly resolutions adopted on these subjects, by their ineffectiveness, have only compounded the frustrations of the developing countries and the irritation of the developed.

I have seen very little in recent years to suggest that, as a group, the West is ready for basic changes in the existing economic system. It has strongly resisted Third World efforts to begin "global negotiations" on international cooperation for economic development. I was asked by some Third World leaders to intercede with President Jimmy Carter, in the hope that he might break the stalemate by giving favorable consideration to the then current proposals of the Group of 77. The timing was hardly auspicious. It was the autumn of 1980, and the presidential election was only a few weeks away. Nevertheless, I reached Carter on the telephone and asked him to take a good look at the proposals, bearing in mind that the developing countries believed that the United States was the major

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obstacle in the way of starting the negotiations. The President said he would do so, but he reminded me that it was a delicate moment for him.

He made two points. First, he said, the United States could not accept anything that would give the U.N. General Assembly any sort of authority over the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or GATT. Second, we should not forget that the American Congress takes a jaundiced view of the United Nations—so much so that he had serious problems in getting the funds needed for the American contributions appropriated. If we were not careful, he continued, our actions could become counterproductive. It was in the interest of the United Nations not to push the United States too far.

V

The Soviets adhered to their practice of joining the Third World countries in the United Nations in their attack on colonialism. Not surprisingly, the Western powers have been anything but happy with this development. They have pointed out that Soviet domination in Eastern Europe is a form of colonialism too. But Western arguments about Soviet "colonialism" have left most of the nations of the South, particularly the Africans, unimpressed. In their experience colonialism has a racial connotation: the colonizer was white, the colonized a people of color. To the latter, oppression (real or imagined) of whites by whites is not colonialism, reprehensible as it may be on other grounds.

To the West this seems patently unjust. It betokens a glaringly inequitable double standard of judgment. The peoples of the Western democracies say that the Soviet bloc, at home and abroad, brushes aside considerations of individual rights and freedoms and makes a mockery of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants concluded to translate its general provisions into binding obligations. The same criticism is made of most of the developing countries governed by one-party regimes. Both groups of countries join to shift the U.N. human rights efforts toward collective "rights" such as economic and social benefits for whole peoples and the rights of states to control their own resources.

These are sharply conflicting approaches to the fundamental problems of freedom and welfare. They spring from very different philosophical and political premises. It does no good to ignore them; until satisfactory ways are found to give due weight to both conceptions of the U.N. human rights concerns, the Organization

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will continue to be seriously split, and seriously criticized, over the issue.

Several specific problems give rise to accusations that the United Nations practices a double standard and further undercut its standing and influence. Two stand out in particular: the opposition to apartheid in South Africa, and the controversy over Israel's policies in the Middle East.

South Africa's practice of apartheid—governmentally enforced racial segregation and discrimination—is particularly abhorrent. No voice is raised to defend apartheid in U.N. councils. It is condemned repeatedly in debates and in scores of resolutions. Yet for all the U.N. efforts, there has been little discernible effect on the South African government's race policies. Diplomats of the Third World, in their exasperation and impatience, are often driven to condemn the Western powers as the parties responsible for the failure of the Organization to produce results. They contend that if the Security Council would apply, and actually enforce, comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, the evil of apartheid could be eliminated. They are particularly critical of the United States. It has the resources, they say, to bring the South Africans around if it wishes to do so.

From the standpoint of the Western states, the situation is viewed differently, although a number of them share the Third World approach. All join in deploring the practice of apartheid and in calling for its termination and for progress toward majority rule in African territories as elsewhere. But as the West sees it, there are a number of problems involved in embarking on the kind of all-out opposition to the South African government advocated by the Third World states.

First, a number of Western countries raise the question of proportionality. Important as it is, the issue of apartheid is not the only instance of mass discrimination. The world abounds in cases of discrimination against tribal, religious and ethnic groups—not least among the African states themselves. Some reasonable limit, it is felt, must be placed on the extent to which the Organization can go in any single situation.

Second, these countries argue, the enforcement provisions of the Charter were not designed to deal with matter of this sort. Under the Charter, sanctions were to be applied in the event of threats to or breaches of international peace and security. Although the larger Western countries agree with the Third World that apartheid is a serious abuse and a clear violation of human rights, they do not generally share the view that, in itself, apartheid constitutes a threat

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to international peace and security. The African states take a contrary position. They contend that the existing situation threatens to produce a conflict involving all of southern Africa.

Finally, Western countries are concerned about the consequence of a sanctions policy. South Africa is an important player in international affairs. It has a place in the world geopolitical equation. It is a strong economic power, with significant trade and investment relationships. Measures taken against it would be costly to South Africa's trading partners, including both Western and African nations. They would endanger South Africa's weak and exposed African neighbors. And they would bear heavily on the economic welfare of South Africa's black inhabitants themselves. From the West's point of view, generally speaking, persuasion rather than attempted compulsion is the preferred method of influencing South Africa.

This line of argument is received with disdain by African and other Third World countries. For my part, I have consistently made it clear that I believed they were right to keep the problem very much alive. I must admit, however, that failure to produce results diminishes U.N. credibility, while the acrimony over who is responsible inhibits sensible cooperation for agreed purposes.

One other aspect of the South African problem deserves comment. Since 1974, the South Africans have been barred from most means of active participation in U.N. activities through a procedural device. In the General Assembly, and consequently in other organs, the majority has for some years refused to accept the credentials of the South African representatives. This, in effect, excludes South Africa from the Organization's deliberations—in a way not sanctioned by the Charter. Legally, suspension or expulsion of members requires action by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Since such action would presumably be vetoed by one or more permanent members of the Council, it is highly unlikely to take place.

The credentials of delegates to U.N. organs are attestations of the fact that they represent the governments for whom they are authorized to speak, and nothing more. To deny their validity on the ground that the government concerned follows a particular policy, however reprehensible, seems to me an improper practice.

Moreover, it is in my judgment not helpful to silence the voice of any U.N. member in the Organization's councils. However indefensible its conduct, it should be present at the discussion of the charges against it, and given the opportunity to make a considered reply. Not only is this intrinsically fair; in the long run it

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probably offers more hope for the initiation of a useful dialogue looking toward eliminating the practice of apartheid than does a policy of parliamentary ostracism. The United Nations has nothing to gain by the creation of a class of pariah states.

VI

Somewhat similar problems have arisen in relation to Arab-Israeli issues. There is a bitter irony in the fact that the United Nations, which in 1947 conceived the plan to partition Palestine and in 1949 legitimized Israel's admission to the international community through U.N. membership, is today so solidly ranged against it. The United Nations of that day recognized Israel as a new state holding out the promise of an independent national existence for a Jewish community ravaged by the Nazi holocaust. What this failed to take adequately into account was the resistance of Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states to the creation of an alien country in their midst. In no field has the Organization sought to do more for the sake of a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, as I write, such a settlement seems to be as distant as ever.

My own position in this matter has long been clear. Israel's existence and independence must be maintained. The legitimate rights of Palestinian Arabs living in the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, and of Arabs displaced from their homes in Israel, must also be recognized. I would have hoped that Israel, which has so recently achieved nationhood, would be more receptive to Arab demands for similar self-determination and a political entity for the Palestinians. I do not condone terrorism or resort to war as a means of altering the status quo. But neither can I condone creeping Israeli expansionism, through the implantation of Israeli settlements in the Arab-inhabited West Bank and the annexation of all Jerusalem.

Irrespective of the merits of the case, the form in which the subject has been considered in the United Nations must be regarded as highly unproductive. With some 20 votes of their own, the Arab members of the Organization have worked closely with other Muslim members, and indeed the entire nonaligned majority, to form a solid anti-Israeli bloc within the Organization. The Soviet bloc states have strongly supported them; at times some or all of the Western countries have joined in. A frequent voting pattern ranges almost the entire membership against Israel, with the exception of the United States and one or two others, and sometimes not even that.

To the extent that such an alignment reflects the viewpoints of

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the nations concerned, this cannot be cause for complaint. But when this bloc grouping is marshalled in behalf of extreme and unbalanced measures, the Organization inevitably suffers. One example is the General Assembly resolution of 1975 equating Zionism with racism. This act has been counterproductive and clearly harmful to the Organization. The repeated attempts to exclude Israel from meetings of U.N. organs, and from various benefits of membership, have been equally damaging.

These actions put the future of the world organization at risk because of their divisive effect. They could destroy or gravely weaken the only global organization to which the weaker states can turn for support against injustice.

Various other U.N. actions also seem to me to be counterproductive, however well intentioned they may be. Year after year, for example, the General Assembly adopts a package of resolutions supporting the cause of specific interest groups, for instance in the Middle East, southern Africa, or elsewhere. The effect of this activity is to cheapen the currency of U.N. resolutions, and thus to reduce the effectiveness of the United Nations in the peaceful resolution of disputes.

I do not question the good faith of those who sponsor such resolutions. I do question their judgment, if they really desire to avoid an unending cycle of wars in those regions. And I fear that by pressing matters to such extremes, they are weakening the fabric of the United Nations generally.

The intense preoccupation of the Organization with a few specific problems of this character, although understandable, is not healthy. This is particularly true when these issues are injected into discussions on general economic, social, or technical matters, in organs which were never intended to cope with such questions. Such tactics focus attention more often on highly political controversy than on the problem for which the meeting in question was convened. Inadequate time may be left to consider the issues on the agenda. Discussion of nonpolitical problems in permanent organs of the United Nations can be hampered and distorted in the same way.

This is what gives rise to the often-heard complaint that the United Nations has become too politicized to function effectively. As much as I understand the emotions which sometimes influence the attitude of delegates, I do not think that the procedures I have described help to solve the problems at hand. I feel they do more harm than good to the prestige and the credibility of the United Nations. Yet it is important to remember that a large number of the U.N. members are states with little experience in international

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diplomacy. While an international organization is not a government, I believe that it can be shaped with experience to improve its procedures.

VII

There are signs that attitudes and alignments are shifting in the United Nations. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces impaired Soviet credibility among the developing countries. Afghanistan is a Muslim state and a member of the nonaligned group. Most of the Third World countries supported resolutions in the General Assembly which, while not specifically mentioning the Soviet Union, have called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and for a "political solution" preserving Afghan independence. Thus, in an unprecedented way, the links between the nonaligned Third World grouping and the Soviet bloc have been weakened.

A similar voting realignment has occurred in connection with the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces. Again, without mentioning Vietnam by name, the General Assembly resolutions on this subject call for the withdrawal of these forces, the restoration of Kampuchean independence, and support for a political solution.

Furthermore, U.N. human rights agencies, which once carefully avoided any mention of the practices of Marxist regimes, have now begun to discuss problems like the human rights situation in Poland. It can no longer be said that the United Nations condemns authoritarian practices in right-wing dictatorships while turning a completely blind eye toward authoritarianism of the left.

Such incremental changes do make some slight impact, even on the superpowers. The Soviet attitude in the case of Afghanistan is interesting in this connection. At the outset, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko would never discuss with me the possibility of multilateral action. In his view the situation was exclusively a matter for the two governments directly involved to handle. Gromyko made it clear that the Soviet Union would disregard any U.N. proposals on the subject.

Eventually, however, the Soviet attitude became more flexible. The General Assembly had asked me to appoint a special representative for this question, and on that basis I undertook extensive consultation with the Soviet Union and other concerned parties. After lengthy discussions, during which I made the point that this was in their own interest, the Soviet government did not oppose the appointment of such a representative. Thus, I was able to designate Javier Pérez de Cuellar, who was once Peruvian ambas-

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sador to Moscow and had served for several years as an Under Secretary General of the United Nations, as my personal representative to explore the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the problem. Although the appointment did not solve the problem, it has certainly opened the door to a dialogue with the Soviet Union and contacts with the other parties involved.

Even the strongest powers are unwise to discard broad-based collective action as a first option in areas of tension. The sorry history of the multilateral force in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 is a case in point. The participants in the force—the Americans, British, French and Italians—were surely well enough equipped for such an operation. Yet when they established and positioned such a force, without a clear mandate or a unified command, it became involved in the internal conflicts of Lebanon and eventually had to withdraw. While I recognize that their objective was pacification, they had become part of the problem rather than a means for its solution. I do not believe that a United Nations force drawn from smaller, politically disinterested countries would have provoked the massive terrorist attacks that doomed the Western force.

VIII

I close with a statement of fact and a plea for perspective.

The fact is plain. The United Nations has fallen upon hard days. It goes through its paces in a workaday routine that is increasingly ignored or condemned and that threatens to become increasingly irrelevant in the real world. Its vitality is being sapped. To some, its future is at best obscure. It is moving into fields of operation in which clashing interests threaten to tear it apart.

Let us try for perspective, for there are brighter elements in the picture. Forty years after its founding, the United Nations is more than ever a unique and universal organization. Unlike the League of Nations, it has not lost membership through withdrawals. It has not ceased to exist. Membership remains the badge of legitimacy for every newly independent country. The Organization can fairly take credit for having contributed in some crisis situations to the prevention of general war. When countries wish to use it, it can still serve as an instrument of peace—either as a safety valve for the venting of dangerous emotions or as a peacemaking/peacekeeping instrument for the containment of national rivalries. It is a meeting place for leaders and a crucible in which opposing conceptions of world order can be reconciled. The world would be the worse for its disappearance. And as a practical matter, it is just not possible realistically to expect its replacement by a better alternative.

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To be sure, the habit of international cooperation is waning. In matters involving international security the trend is perfectly clear, but it is less evident in other fields. In large part this is because so much activity in the economic, social, human rights, and technological fields continues without attracting much notice, in spite of its utility. But in these areas, too, the United Nations is now approaching zones of sensitivity that sharply pit members of different backgrounds against one another.

The new agenda, atop the ongoing debate over the New International Economic Order, raises complex problems of equity, ideology and conflicting interests. States enjoying a technological or an economic lead tend to view U.N. intervention with suspicion. The United States, for example, has rejected the Law of the Sea Treaty, laboriously crafted over a period of many years with the concurrence of U.S. delegations representing earlier American administrations. And the U.S. perception of the threat posed by the proposed New International Information Order was, in large part, responsible for the American announcement of its intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. On its side, the Soviet Union continues to abstain from multilateral cooperation in the field of economic development.

Nonetheless, I believe the enlightened self-interest of the nations should impel them to move in the right direction. I believe that sooner or later they will recognize the need for the single great world community—the interdependent world order—that is embodied in the Charter. They will learn to live together in a single global village, adjusting their differences and settling their common problems in a spirit of mutual accommodation.

For the superpowers this means following policies of détente and peaceful coexistence. For the North and the South, it means reaching across the chasm that separates the industrial and developing worlds for arrangements that will benefit them both. For states quarreling over territorial boundaries, it means a willingness to work for and accept compromise settlements, with the assistance, where needed, of disinterested third parties. In short, nations will have to learn to live within a pluralistic world system, integrated by an overriding interest in global peace and welfare. Because of these imperatives, I have an abiding faith in the survival of the United Nations.

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James A. Bill

RESURGENT ISLAM IN THE PERSIAN GULF

A populist ferment is surging across Islam, from Yugoslavia and Morocco on the West to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines on the East. Fragmented in form, cohesive in ideology, this Islamic reassertion has been reflected in the 1978–79 Iranian revolution, the occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia in November 1979, the four-year war in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat in Egypt in October 1981, and violent resistance in Lebanon through 1983 and 1984.

Often described as "Islamic fundamentalism," this popular force cuts across geographical boundaries, transcending political ideologies and national regimes. Radical governments such as in Algeria and Syria, and traditional monarchical regimes such as in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have witnessed a growing Islamic political activism. Scattered incidents in Soviet Central Asia, the home of an estimated 60 million Muslims, as well as the Muslim guerrilla war of resistance against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan demonstrate that communist systems are no more immune to the challenge of this Populist Islam than are the pro-Western conservative states in the region.

The fundamental impulse for resurgent Islam comes from the grassroots of society. Hence the designation "Populist."[1] It is a force generated by the mass citizenry, those referred to as the downtrodden and the deprived. Sweeping upward from the angry, alienated and frustrated, Populist Islam has now penetrated the middle classes. It is called *al-Islam al-Sha'bi*, and it directly confronts the various ruling elites in the Muslim world, the Islam of Sadat, of the Al-Saud family of Saudi Arabia, and of Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and Gaafar Nimeiri of Pakistan and Sudan. These leaders represent

[1] I use the term "Populist Islam" rather than "Popular Islam" since the latter has long been used by scholars to refer to local, mystical and syncretist practices involving saint worship, tomb visitation, and other activities that sometimes border on the superstitious. While "Popular Islam" then is a form of folk Islam defined on the basis of local religious beliefs and practices, "Populist Islam" refers to a general social and political movement generated from below rather than a movement sponsored by governments and their supporting bureaucratic apparatus.

James A. Bill is Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of *The Politics of Iran*, and co-author of *Politics in the Middle East*. He made four research trips to the Gulf states in 1982–1983.

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al-Islam al-Rasmi, or Establishment Islam, which seeks to preserve the political status quo.

Even the largely secular Palestinian movement—badly battered in both regional and international politics and deeply divided against itself—is showing clear signs of interest in Islam. On the Jordan West Bank, in its 17th year of Israeli occupation, the younger generation of stateless Palestinians are forming Islamic organizations of all kinds, alongside their own nationalist associations. The formation of new mosques, kindergartens, and university associations is especially notable. Bethlehem mayor Elias Friej and former Gaza mayor Rashad Shawa have recently emphasized that "increasingly, young Palestinians in the occupied territories are turning to Islamic fundamentalism—some call it reformism—as an outlet for their frustrations."[2] The growing import of Islam within the Palestinian movement has concerned many modern secular Palestinians who hold very mixed feelings about it. In the words of one Palestinian professional in Kuwait: "This Islamic fundamentalism is affecting our people; it is bound to be a more successful ideology than any we have tried in the past. In this sense, it has a better chance of meeting the desperate needs of our people. But, when it takes control, we, the best educated, secular Palestinians will undoubtedly suffer."[3]

II

As all Muslim believers will assert, there is only one Islam. There are, however, many manifestations and interpretations. In the words of one leading scholar, the basic division now is between "radical fundamentalism" on the one hand and "traditional fundamentalism" on the other.[4] Both Populist Islam and Establishment Islam compete to demonstrate their greater commitment to the faith and the law. Each attempts to discredit the beliefs and practices of the other.

The growing power of Populist Islam in the Persian Gulf region is not monolithic in character. There are Sunni as well as Shi'i dimensions, and the important Sunni movement is itself divided.

[2] *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 29, 1984, p. 1.

[3] Personal interview, Kuwait, October 5, 1983.

[4] See John O. Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, pp. 282–291. Other scholars who have referred to this important distinction include Ali Dessouki, Mohammed Ayoub, and Fouad Ajami. Dessouki and Ayoub use the terms "Islam from above" and "Islam from below," while Ajami discusses "the rulers' Islam" and "Islam of the ruled." See Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, New York: Praeger Publications, 1982, p. 8; Mohammed Ayoub, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, London: Croom Helm, 1981; and Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 177ff.

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Three major Sunni fundamentalist movements rest at the core of Populist Islam: the most extreme is the *al-Salafi* (traditional/ancestral) movement; slightly less dogmatic is *al-Islah* (reform) fundamentalism; and even more accommodating to traditional fundamentalism are the new *al-Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood) groups.[5] All three Sunni movements share a strong antipathy for the Shi'i component of Populist Islam. In the words of a leading Sunni fundamentalist theoretician in Kuwait: "Although the Shi'is do share some of our social and political goals, they have distorted Islam beyond imagination. We cannot and will not communicate and cooperate with them."[6]

The Sunni *al-Salafi* movement engages completely committed, fervent members who seek to transform today's society into a replica of the Muslim society of 1,400 years ago, as directed by the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate successors. They are the Populist Islamic equivalent of the Wahhabi segment of Establishment Islam. The members of these groups are not interested in any form of discussion and dialogue with those who do not share their particular perspective. The individuals involved in the seizure of the Great Mosque of Mecca in the fall of 1979 are examples of those who embrace this form of extremism.

The *al-Islah* societies, by contrast, tend to adhere to the basic fundamentalist goals, but as "reformists" they are willing to enter into discussions both with other Populist Islamic groups and with the guardians of Establishment Islam. The principal *al-Islah* societies are located in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, and they cooperate, at least temporarily, with the governments in power from whom they accept financial assistance.

The new *Ikhwan* movement is a contemporary, more flexible variant of the old Muslim Brotherhood born in Egypt half a century ago. It attempts to appeal to the educated, professional intelligentsia and stresses the need to interpret the changing world in view of immutable and enduring Islamic principles. The new *Ikhwan* movement receives its inspiration from Egypt and other North African countries and its ideas are spread by Egyptians and Sudanese who hold critically important positions throughout the educational and administrative systems of the Gulf states.

There is constant tension between the *al-Salafi* movement on the

[5] There is also a fourth Sunni group that is part of resurgent Populist Islam in the Gulf. This is Populist Sufism represented by the mystical movements such as the *al-Rifa'i* brotherhood in Kuwait. This mystical component of Sunni Populist Islam is especially strong in North Africa but has only a limited presence in the Gulf at this time. The Sufi groups that do exist are sharply opposed both to the *al-Salafi* movement and to Shi'ism.

[6] Personal interview, Kuwait, October 3, 1983.

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one hand, the *al-Islah* society and new Muslim Brotherhood on the other. The latter two Sunni groups enjoy a relatively close relationship; indeed, many of the leading theoreticians of the *al-Islah* society were once members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The *al-Salafi* movement, however, considers both of these groups too compromising and is especially critical of their relationships with Establishment Islam.

Populist Sunni Islam is a potent force in the Gulf countries, representing a particularly strong challenge to the social and political status quo. Yet unlike the Shi'i movement (to be discussed below), it is viewed with tolerance by the ruling governments who are reluctant to embark on any form of confrontation.

Across their organizational divisions, all members of Populist Islamic movements share the following four important ideas: (1) a fundamentalist faith in the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed, and the Sunna (tradition); (2) a strong opposition to corrupt and oppressive government; (3) a commitment to the related principles of human equality and social justice; and (4) a condemnation of external, imperialist intervention in the Middle East.

The first principle is what sets this framework of goals apart from those presented by other revolutionary ideologies, i.e., the Populist Islamic belief that solutions to the accumulating social, economic, and political problems are to be found only within the context of Islam. Islam carries a special strength; it can reasonably expect to receive from its adherents an unwavering commitment and deep dedication to the goals of its leaders. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan demonstrate that the adherents of Populist Islam are willing to make a total commitment to their beliefs and, when necessary, to die for them. The leaders of Establishment Islam understand this point full well: one astute ruler of a Gulf state remarked to his advisers, "I would rather deal with 10 communists than with one Muslim fundamentalist."[7]

To meet this growing challenge, ruling elites in the region are taking unprecedented action to demonstrate their own fidelity to Islam. The Establishment has sought to co-opt the power of Islam by pouring huge sums of money into Islamic projects and by reinforcing fundamentalist rules and regulations of extreme rigidity. But the practitioners of Establishment Islam suffer from disadvantages that weaken their appeal and credibility. Their response to Populist Islam's four areas of concern is found wanting. As supporters of Islam, they have done much to promote the practice

[7] Personal interview with adviser to the ruler, Gulf emirate, August 17, 1982.

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of the faith and have poured huge resources into this goal. But much of this emphasis has been placed on the externalities such as buildings, bureaucracies, and literature. The emphasis of Populist Islam upon probity, austere living and equality, by contrast, runs against the freer lifestyles of many guardians of Establishment Islam.

More serious, perhaps, is the fact that Establishment Islam is weakened by its close association with external superpowers, most notably the United States, which is viewed as inseparable from Israel. This association badly damages the credibility of pro-American governments, and Establishment Islam loses strength and appeal in the process.

The competing positions of Populist, as opposed to Establishment, Islam have greatly affected the foreign policies of the Gulf states. The former position decries close relations with the superpowers and is extremely critical of all forms of external influence in the affairs of these states. Establishment Islam is somewhat more willing to cooperate with the superpowers, especially the United States. Both Islamic worldviews are strongly opposed to the policies of the state of Israel. At one level, this conflict divides the Gulf countries against one another, with Saudi Arabia and the other five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states now representing the forces of Establishment Islam, and Iran attempting to fly the banner of Populist Islam. At another level, this division helps bind the GCC countries closer together as they increasingly confront the internal challenge of Populist Islam and the external challenge of revolutionary Iran.

III

The gathering power and deepening reaffirmation of the faith have causes internal and external to Islam. The Populist Islamic movements are partly a reaction against corruption and repression which, in the minds of many citizens, have reached intolerable levels in their societies. Issues of inequality and injustice are discussed across the Middle East by those who contrast the sometimes unpleasant realities of everyday life with the Quranic ideals of equality, justice, and almsgiving. Despite great economic gains in many oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, the benefits have been unevenly distributed, making material inequities and social imbalances greater and more visible than ever before. The distressed, dispossessed, and alienated have chosen Populist Islam as a means to express discontent.

Looking at the world around, millions in Islam feel besieged.

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The intervention of both superpowers in the Middle East has alienated the peoples of the area. The Soviet Union has a well-known historical record of activities down toward the Persian Gulf. Its presence in Afghanistan today is a vivid reminder of an old imperialistic policy. Even in countries such as Algeria, Libya and Syria where Moscow provides substantial economic and military assistance, the Russians find themselves extremely unpopular.

The United States, which long had an excellent reputation in the region, increasingly finds itself the object of criticism and condemnation. The American military presence in Lebanon was seen less as a "peacekeeping" mission than a partisan maneuver to support the minority Maronite Christians who dominated Lebanese politics for years preceding the civil war, and whose victims were mainly Muslim. Muslim distrust of America is increasingly shared by many Middle Eastern Christians as well, largely because of the link with Israel. American policymakers voice disapproval of Israeli actions, and then go on to increase economic, military, and diplomatic support to those just criticized. The image of U.S.-Israeli collusion becomes graven in the Arab mind.

There are other problems as well. In the eyes of many Muslims, the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 was a victory of popular forces against the corrupt and repressive regime of the Shah—a regime supported by outside powers led by the United States. The Khomeini government's policy of condemning and excising the influence of superpowers has also stimulated Islamic renewal. Western cultural penetration in general is often seen as eroding the traditional Islamic social system. Although this influence has sometimes involved a liberalizing trend, it is also blamed for the breakup of the family and the emphasis on the mechanical and the material over the personal and the human.

The Muslim peoples of the Middle East have not always responded well to external challenges. They have often become defensive and self-righteous, blaming everyone but themselves for their problems. They have failed to cooperate with one another and have spent more time bickering among themselves than addressing their common problems and foes. They have not used their great newfound wealth nearly as effectively as they might in attempting to confront their internal and external problems. As a result, Arabs and other Middle Eastern Muslims of all classes are beginning to reassess their positions and strategies.

This reassessment, born perhaps out of desperation, has resulted in an increasing rejection of ideologies adopted in the recent past. It has become clear to growing numbers of Muslims that these

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

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ideologies, most of which were imported, have failed miserably when adopted and adapted to local conditions. Socialism, Marxism, liberalism and Western capitalism, along with their local manifestations, Baathism and Nasserism, have not provided the necessary answers. As a result, Middle Eastern peoples are returning to the all-encompassing ideological system of Islam, which permeates all aspects of their lives and rests at the existential roots of their history and being.

IV

The Persian Gulf is a shallow arm of the Arabian Sea; its waters, speckled with drilling platforms and oil rigs, touch the shores of eight countries: Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. These eight countries possess approximately 370 billion barrels of proven reserves of petroleum—60 percent of the world's reserves.

But the Gulf is more than a giant oil field or an arena for superpower competition. It is the home of ancient tribal civilizations, of peoples deeply involved with their own customs and cultures, their own successes and failures. Modern issues of political participation, governmental legitimacy, citizenship definitions, and social justice remain to be successfully resolved. But the three decades past have seen only two revolutions in the Gulf, Iraq in 1958 and Iran in 1978–79. The other six countries are governed by ruling families who exercise power according to traditional modes of tribal democracy.[8]

Taken together, the Gulf countries have a total population of nearly 69 million people, 61 million of whom are citizens, the others immigrant laborers. With a combined total population of over 56 million people, Iran and Iraq account for over 80 percent of the population of all the Gulf states.

All was relatively placid around the Gulf through the century and a half of British political dominance. With the British withdrawal from the region east of Suez in 1971 and the newfound wealth of the 1970s, the Gulf states took the fast track to modernization. This subjected the traditional system of social life to enormous strain, resulting in unprecedented personal tensions, economic imbalance, and political alienation. Extravagant luxury hotels

[8] Iran will only be discussed in terms of the relevance of its revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic to the politics and stability of the other Gulf countries. Iraq will not be discussed at all in this context since its Baathist political system controlled by Saddam Hussein has de-emphasized Islam and has suppressed the Shi'i element in particular. These policies along with the traumatic Iran-Iraq war have stunted the growth both of Establishment Islam and Populist Islam in Iraq.

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mushroomed in the midst of nomadic tents; skating rinks and bowling alleys appeared in the lands of deserts and palm groves; and cinemas, discotheques, and even gambling casinos appeared to challenge mosques as social centers. In the Gulf, perhaps more than in any other part of the world, modernization and economic growth raced far ahead of social and political development. As the socio-cultural fabric began to unravel, the ensuing disaffection gave rise to a quest for the familiar traditional values. Both the champions of Establishment Islam and Populist Islam—those who defend the system and those who challenge the system—justify their policies and their demands in terms of the Islamic faith.

Mosques proliferate everywhere in the Gulf; governments and opposition groups alike are creating new Islamic organizations; ministries of Islamic affairs and endowments are acquiring more power and responsibility; college and university students are enrolling in increasing numbers in Islamic studies; Islamic banks are cutting into the financial holdings of the standard banking systems; Islamic legal codes are being debated and reintroduced; Gulf citizens of all social classes are increasingly and fervently embracing tenets of Islam.

The boom in mosque construction is particularly vivid evidence of the trend of priorities, if not proof of the depth of religious conviction. The number of mosques has tripled in the past decade, to a total of nearly 4,000 in the smaller Gulf states: Kuwait has 560, the United Arab Emirates 1,769. Bahrain, a tiny nation of less than 250,000 citizens, has over 1,000 mosques while Qatar, with no more than 70,000 citizens, has over 600. Beyond this, Saudi Arabia currently has at least 20,000 mosques and recently announced plans to construct more than 2,000 more.[9]

Although most of the mosque construction is being planned and financed by governments, much of the impetus comes from Populist Islamic movements, which have sponsored the development of private mosques without any support from Establishment Islam.

In the Gulf today Populist Islam, carrying an ideology of protest, confronts an Establishment Islam on the defensive to preserve a tenuous status quo. The conflict was joined with the dramatic political events that took place in Iran beginning in 1978–79 that ultimately produced an actual model of Populist Islamic rule.

[9] These figures are based on information provided by official sources in the ministries of the countries of the Gulf and on data gained through personal interviews in the Gulf 1982–1983. They were first presented in J.A. Bill, "Islam, Politics, and Shi'ism in the Gulf," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, January/February 1984, pp. 3–12.

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V

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a government dominated by the principles of Populist Islam in general and of revolutionary Shi'ism in particular. Here the Populists have become the Establishment.

The revolutionary message radiating from Iran has three major drawbacks, as viewed by the other peoples of the Gulf. First, a long history of tension has separated Arabs and Persians, diluting to some extent the appeal of the Iranian revolution to Arab populations throughout the region. Gulf residents of Persian origin are referred to as *Ajam*, and they have been distrusted in varying degrees over the years by much of the Arab population, especially by the ruling families. Saddam Hussein of Iraq has used this traditional ethnic tension as a means to rally Arab support behind his cause in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war.

Second, the style of rule in Iran is predominantly Shi'i in nature. This poses a major problem for the Sunni-dominated fundamentalist groups which make up the core of the Populist Islamic movement. The distrust and tension between fundamentalist Sunni and Shi'i was demonstrated in September 1983 in Kuwait when a band of Sunni fundamentalists attacked and burned a Shi'i mosque construction site in the al-Bayan district.

The third difficulty is the violence and extremism, the social and political upheaval in Iran since the fall of the monarchy. Populist Islamic political rule in Iran is tarnished, especially in the eyes of the better educated and growing professional classes of the other Gulf states.

This is the negative side. The Islamic Republic of Iran nevertheless has appeal for the lower and middle classes of the Gulf states. The revolution was, after all, a movement carried out by the masses. They succeeded in the face of one of the most powerful military/security forces in the entire Third World and against the will of a regime supported by outside superpowers. This revolution resulted in a government that cut its outside ties and strongly declared its own autonomy and independence; the Islamic Republic's central slogan "Neither East nor West" is a constant reminder of this stance. Finally, the revolution in Iran represented a rare victory for Islam in the modern world. Over the past two centuries, Islamic countries have consistently been defeated in their confrontations with the West—until the advent of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Iran's credibility among the Gulf citizens of Iranian extraction and/or Shi'i beliefs increased greatly upon its success in defending itself against the surprise Iraqi invasion of September 1980. The

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Iranian successes, however, frightened the Sunni leadership of the conservative Gulf states who now fear an ultimate Iranian victory against Iraq and the prospect of a Persian/Shi'i empire across the region. Not that all Gulf Sunnis have rallied behind the Iraqi cause; many regard the regime of Saddam Hussein with distaste. The Kuwaitis, for example, well remember Iraqi attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to annex pieces of their territory. Saddam's repressive policies at home, his continued use of Soviet-supplied missiles in attacks upon Iranian cities, his resort to nerve gas and other chemical weapons, and his escalation of attacks upon oil tankers in the Gulf in 1984 are privately deplored and condemned by many Gulf citizens. Finally, when the United States in late 1983 began to tilt toward Iraq, both superpowers found themselves on the same side. Gulf citizens who have been critical of Khomeini's style of rule are nonetheless impressed by Iran's ability to survive against such international pressure. Although the governments of the Gulf states are deeply fearful of an Iranian victory, the total dedication of the Iranian population and the resulting successes against increasingly heavy odds have earned respect.

Iran further gained popular stature following the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon with the important symbolic act of support for the besieged Palestinians: an estimated 1,500 members of its Revolutionary Guards were sent to Syria and Lebanon. Except for the Saudis who did what they could to convince the United States to slow the Israeli aggression, and the Syrians who crumbled in the face of superior Israeli air power, Iran was the only Muslim country that made any visible, concrete moves to assist the embattled Palestinians.

The leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have set their sights on exporting their revolution throughout the Gulf. They have made their methodology clear: force is considered unnecessary, counterproductive, and antithetical to the tenets of Islam. In September 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini summarized this position: "By exportation of Islam we mean that Islam be spread everywhere. We have no intention of interfering militarily in any part of the world."[10]

Instead, Iran has devised a sophisticated system of information dissemination involving extensive radio and television programming beamed throughout the Gulf. Special attention is reserved for Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The presence of Gulf citizens of Iranian origin composes a large human communication grid across the Gulf

[10] *Teheran Times*, September 30, 1982.

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states through which information passes continually concerning the politics and ideals of revolutionary Iran. Of special appeal to the poorer citizens of the Gulf, the Iranian message has some attraction to Sunni inhabitants who live relatively deprived lives in the midst of plenty.

With its active example of Populist Islam in power, Iran has placed external pressures upon Gulf governments who promote Establishment Islam. Internally, the forces of Populist Islam continue to criticize the regimes and organize their cadres. Establishment Islam, therefore, today finds itself caught in the tightening vise of its domestic Populist Islam on the one side and the revolutionary Populist-turned-Establishment Islam of Iran on the other side. Cutting across both jaws of this vise is the important force of Shi'ism.

VI

Shi'ism is the practice of Islam that places a special emphasis upon the family of the Prophet. Although Shi'is, like the more dominant Sunnis, believe in the Quran, the Prophet, and the Sunna, they stress the role of Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. Shi'i Muslims believe that Ali should have succeeded the Prophet Mohammed as leader of the Muslim community and that Ali's chosen descendents (known as Imams) carry a special spiritual power and charisma. In the Gulf version of Shi'ism, the twelfth and last Imam is considered to have disappeared in the ninth century but is to return on judgment day. In the meantime, the chain of Imams is represented by *mujtahids*, learned clerics who possess the capacity to interpret events until the return of the Hidden Imam. Ayatollah Khomeini is the best-known example of a leading *mujtahid*.

Of central significance to Shi'i Islam is the martyrdom of Ali's son, Imam Hussein, at Karbala (in present-day Iraq) in A.D. 680. Badly outnumbered, Hussein's tiny band was massacred by the military forces of Yazid, the recognized political head of the major Muslim community of the day. This incident is commemorated every year during Muharram (the first month of the Muslim calendar) by Shi'is throughout the Middle East. It is a major social, political and religious event of deep emotional meaning and has come to symbolize the Shi'i experience—that of a suffering minority group long oppressed for its beliefs by an unjust and unbelieving establishment.

Shi'ism is a powerful force in the Gulf, across sovereign frontiers. With the sole exception of Iran, all of the Gulf states are governed

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by Sunni political elites. Yet 46 million of the 61 million Gulf citizens, over 75 percent are Shi'is; they are the majority in Bahrain and Iraq, as well as Iran.

SHI'I POPULATIONS IN THE GULF: 1984[11]
(in thousands)

Country	*Total Population*	*Citizen Population*	*Number of Shi'is*	*Percentage of Shi'i Citizens*
Qatar	255	70	11	16
Oman	950	700	28	4
U.A.E.	1,100	250	45	18
Kuwait	1,370	570	137	24
Bahrain	360	240	168	70
Saudi Arabia	8,500	5,500	440	8
Iraq	14,400	13,500	8,100	60
Iran	42,000	40,000	36,800	92
Totals	68,935	60,830	45,729	75

Besides the citizen Shi'is, there are today an estimated 300,000 non-citizen Shi'i immigrants, largely from Iran, who reside in the Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Although most governments have tightened restrictions on this kind of immigration, there is still considerable movement between Iran and these other Gulf states.

Except in Iran, the Gulf Shi'i communities remain largely locked out of the corridors of political power. Bahrain, where the Shi'is make up 70 percent of the population, has five Shi'i ministers, but their work is closely monitored and the ministries they head are the least significant politically in the country. In Kuwait, the government's policies of gerrymandering and of promoting Bedouin citizenship have cost the Shi'is seats in the National Assembly. Saudi Arabia, with nearly a half-million Shi'is, has never had a Shi'i minister in its government.

Shi'i power rests, not on government position, but on four mutually reinforcing pillars: geography, ideology, economics and organization. Geographically, the Shi'is are concentrated in particularly critical areas, for example, around the major oil fields. The Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia has a Shi'i population of approximately 450,000 citizens. The world's largest oil field, the Ghawar field, is situated in al-Hasa, a district 55–60 percent Shi'i Muslim. The sizable Qatif field is also in an area dominantly Shi'i in composition. Shi'is continue to play an important role in the petroleum

[11] The figures in Table I are drawn from the sources cited in footnote 9.

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business in the Eastern Province where they are an integral part of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO).

The Shi'i ideology is a particularly potent form of the Islamic belief system. There is in Shi'ism a historical mindset of martyrdom. Gulf Shi'is are deeply committed to their ideas and have revealed a determined willingness to give their lives for these beliefs. Their faith is renewed and reinforced every year during the month of Muharram in moving ceremonies of grief. Thus, Shi'ism remains a strong, living ideology with roots that delve deeply into the past and which give nourishment to the community today.

Economically, the Shi'is have influence at two levels. The Gulf countries have small cadres of Shi'i merchant families who are among the most dominant and dynamic financial forces in their respective states. Such families have proven their loyalty to their countries and to the leaders of these countries over many decades. They also provide a high-level protective umbrella beneath which the majority of Shi'i residents are able to live with some modicum of economic and political security. Then, down at the core of the traditional economies of the Gulf, the Shi'i merchants dominate the markets and bazaars. In Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, they control the sale of meats, fruits, vegetables, textiles, and jewelry.

A great strength of the Gulf Shi'is is their sturdy but flexible organizational network which binds the members of the various Shi'i communities together. This network, informal and highly personalistic in nature, crisscrosses the Gulf, having as its nodes Shi'i homes, shops, *diwaniyyahs* (places of assembly), mosques, and mourning centers.

Known as *husseiniyyahs*, these centers are designated structures where the Shi'is congregate during Muharram. They are also often used for funerals and for other religious and even social purposes throughout the year. It is in the *husseiniyyah*, even more than in the mosque, that the Shi'i community builds consensus, perhaps because it is here where the faithful gather in remembrance of a shared suffering. Both mosques and *husseiniyyahs* serve as institutional places of refuge for the Shi'i population. Many are built, financed, and operated by the community itself and not by the governments. This provides independence and security for the Shi'is who live in countries with sometimes hostile political systems and Sunni majorities. External political pressure is absorbed and dissipated in this situation because the faith system exists in a private domain highly resistant to outside manipulation. It is in this unofficial, personal domain that the Shi'i community meets and makes its key decisions.

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The Shi'i communities of the Gulf states share all the goals of Populist Islam and have a faith system similar to that of the Muslims in power in today's Iran. Furthermore, very large numbers of Gulf citizens (both Shi'i and Sunni) are Persian in origin. In this sense, they are an especially potent part of the Populist Islamic movement.

VII

The ruling families of the six traditional Gulf states (all Sunnis) are deeply concerned about the issues of social and political stability involved in the Populist Islamic challenge. Until now, these political elites have managed to maintain the stability of their systems for two major reasons. First, petroleum resources have enabled them to meet many of the social and economic demands of their populations. Since the actual size of the indigenous populations is very small, it has been possible to upgrade the lifestyles of citizens enormously as a result of the distribution and redistribution of wealth. Although gaps and imbalances are still present and do breed discontent, the abundance of financial wealth has provided the capacity for improving the lives of the citizenry.

A second factor is the high sensitivity of the political leadership. Traditional and tribal, the leaders have managed to remain in close contact with their people. A major institution facilitating this contact is the *majlis,* a gathering or assembly where all citizens have the recognized right to meet their leaders, present petitions, make demands, and receive redress and assistance on an individual basis.

In Abu Dhabi and Dubai (the two leading units of the United Arab Emirates), Sheikhs Zayid and Rashid have established especially impressive records as leaders. Leaders of their sheikhdoms since 1966 and 1958 respectively, they have repeatedly demonstrated their skills as political negotiators and mediators. Sheikh Isa of Bahrain is also an able leader consistently underrated by outsiders.

In spite of these strengths, the problems of corruption, inequality, political development, social justice and association with the Western powers are all thorny issues that persist and fuel the growing forces of Populist Islam. The leaders of the region have not found consensus on the best way to confront these challenges; so far, their policies have been at times a product of panic, at other times of reasoned calculation.

The most positive general action taken in response to the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and Populist Islam in general was the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. The six traditional member states, led by Saudi Arabia, seek to cooperate on

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matters of mutual security and economic and educational ventures. The GCC is not an experiment in political unification, but rather a flexibly organized council of states whose members remain in constant communication with one another. It is designed to stand independent of the two warring Gulf powers, Iran and Iraq, and to develop enough credibility and strength to deter superpower intervention into the region.

A specific tactical response of the six traditional states has been to reinforce institutions of Establishment Islam while attempting to divide and co-opt the forces of Populist Islam. Sunni fundamentalist groups have been courted and encouraged. Saudi Arabia has poured large sums of money into the *al-Islah* organizations active in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Gulf officials have also helped finance and promote Islamic education.

At the same time, Shi'i groups have been increasingly pressured. Iraq and Saudi Arabia have strongly urged that a hard line be adopted toward the Shi'is, and in 1983 this policy began to take hold slowly in the other Gulf states as well. Some Establishment spokesmen are emphasizing the differences between Sunnis and Shi'is and pressing the argument that the Shi'is give their first loyalty to Iran rather than to the governments of the countries in which they reside. Gulf leaders had previously argued that Shi'i Muslims had a historical record of proven loyalty to their governments, believing that it would be politically unwise to set Sunni against Shi'i and to develop a policy of confrontation.

There are many indications that the Iraq/Saudi position has begun to take hold. In Kuwait, Shi'i officials are being eased out of higher positions in the bureaucracy, and it is also becoming extremely difficult for them to obtain permits to build their mosques and their *husseiniyyahs*. Bahraini government leaders have recently begun to tighten controls through heavier reliance upon their security forces. The same is true in the United Arab Emirates.

The emerging policy of encouraging Sunni fundamentalism while applying increasing pressure on the Shi'is carries a number of serious risks. First, it is a policy of negative reaction rather than positive initiative. Such attitudes only focus upon smothering and controlling the effects of the problems, without confronting the causes. More attention needs to be paid to increasing social benefits, building political participation, controlling corruption and stressing national autonomy.

Secondly, by encouraging and supporting the Sunni fundamentalist component of Populist Islam, the governing elites may be strengthening those very forces quietly but explicitly committed to

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their demise. Ironically, the schools and colleges supported by the Establishment are the breeding grounds of Populist Islamic ideas and ideals.

This is precisely what happened to President Sadat. In 1971, he had helped encourage a Muslim fundamentalist movement in Egypt in order to assist him in destroying the left. A decade later it destroyed him. In the words of Mohamed Heikal, Sadat and his team "did not know the sort of religion with which they were dealing. In fact the new strain of Moslem fundamentalism which was so recklessly being encouraged was largely superficial, concentrating on the visible attributes of religion and the letter of the law but ignoring the real lessons of history." Heikal concludes that this was not a genuine attempt to resuscitate Islam, "but a rough and ready attempt to mask political and social problems beneath the *galabiyeh* and the *chador*. Other strains of fundamentalism were at work elsewhere, unseen and uncontrolled by the authorities."[12]

Finally, it is a dubious proposition that a hard-line policy can succeed as a method of control over the Shi'is. The Shi'i mindset does not respond well to frontal attacks and intimidation. The organizational system of Shi'i communities provides them with endless avenues of retreat. The fact that their religious and social institutions are independent from government control and supervision is a major consideration. A policy of destroying or prohibiting the construction of Shi'i mosques and *husseiniyyahs* risks sealing off the safety valves whereby that community releases pent-up emotion and frustration. Confrontation also closes down important channels of communication between the Sunni officialdom and the Shi'i community leaders who have played a key mediating role over the years. In the end, repressive policies can force the Shi'i population into quiet resistance and ultimately even into rebellion.

The ruling elites of the six traditional Gulf countries face a difficult and challenging future. Both internal social forces and external political pressures constantly threaten to explode the delicate dialectic between tradition and modernity that is at work. This confrontation has to a large extent been responsible for the struggle between Establishment Islam and Populist Islam. Bahrain and Kuwait would seem to be the most exposed and vulnerable of the Gulf states. If their leaders should abandon their time-proven techniques of flexible rule and instead adopt a repressive policy, major upheaval could ensue.

The Iran-Iraq war is an ongoing threat to the stability of all Gulf

[12] Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, New York: Random House, 1983, p. 135.

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states. Since both warring regimes took power in revolutionary coups, and since both pose threats to other states in the region, a clearcut victory by either side could result in a serious challenge to the six other Gulf governments. At the same time, the continuation of the war has become increasingly debilitating to all the countries of the region who now find themselves hemorrhaging economically and psychologically. The inability of these countries to exert influence over either protagonist became very evident in 1984 and the resultant sense of powerlessness and insecurity is clearly present. Thus, in 1983–84, growing segments of the populations of these states quietly began to blame their own leaders for Saddam Hussein's rash aggression and for Ayatollah Khomeini's continuing intransigence.

VIII

The United States would seem to be on a collision course with the forces of Populist Islam. Two separate but related issues plague America's Middle East policy.

First is a seemingly uncritical support for regimes that promote Establishment Islam. The American relationship with former Egyptian president Sadat is the best example both of this policy and of its outcome. The results were disastrous for Sadat, while the final results for America of its alliance with Egyptian Establishment Islam are yet to be determined.

Second, the American-Israeli connection is making Muslims everywhere increasingly critical of the United States. This attitude pervades Establishment as well as Populist Islam. The leaders of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, for instance, have repeatedly expressed their deep misgivings about this U.S. position. Israeli actions, sometimes taken against the express wishes of Washington, have reinforced the ideology of Populist Islam. The lack of will and/or capacity of the United States to prevent the Israeli invasion of Lebanon crippled the already weakening legitimacy of pro-American Arab regimes. In this situation, the Populist Islamic position carries more popular credibility than an Establishment Islam tarnished by outside associations.

The regimes of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan, already under great pressure at home from Populist Islam, respond to the American-Israeli relationship not only on its merits but also on the basis of their own self-interest. Political survival is the issue. They in fact have little alternative but to intensify their criticism of American support for Israeli policies. They allow their newspapers to be strongly and consistently critical of the United

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States. But such a message also reinforces the appeal of Populist Islam, which intensifies its own pressure on the political establishment. A vicious circle of anti-Americanism ensues, threatening both the United States and the Arab regimes which have been most friendly to American interests. Growing numbers of Middle Easterners are criticizing what they perceive to be America's one-sided association with Establishment Islam. In the words of one Kuwaiti intellectual leader, "We often refer to *al-Islam al-Rasmi* as *al-Islam al-Amriki*."[13] In the United Arab Emirates, an influential Palestinian government adviser criticized what he termed "Islam Americana."[14]

Estrangement between the United States and Islam occurs against a backdrop of many centuries of tension between the Muslim world and the West. There is nothing inherently anti-American about Islam. It is the policies of governments that have converted Muslims into critics and opponents. When these policies have been perceived to be supportive of corruption, oppression, and colonial or imperial interventionism, there has been criticism and resistance. This applies to the policies of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc as well. In fact, Islam has much more in common with the West than it has with communist ideologies of the East.

With the exception of South Yemen, no Muslim Middle Eastern country has accepted communism as its ruling ideology. In Afghanistan, the outgunned guerrilla groups struggling with Soviet occupation forces are Muslims motivated by a vibrant ideology of Sunni Islam. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, known for its virulent anti-Americanism, the revolutionary government has also instituted a long and intensive campaign against the communist left.

Over the years, communist organizations in countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have been destroyed. Today, those countries that accept Soviet military assistance (e.g., Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Libya) do so for political advantage and have largely resisted accompanying ideological messages. Russian advisers are intensely disliked and have been the objects of personal violence in countries like Syria.[15] The ideology of atheistic communism must inevitably swim against the tide of resurgent Islam.

American officials must attempt to understand the Middle East as the Middle East and not primarily as a battleground in the East-West conflict. A preoccupation with the Soviet Union to the exclu-

[13] Personal interview, Kuwait, October, 1983.
[14] Personal interview, Abu Dhabi, October 20, 1983.
[15] Over a dozen Soviet advisers were assassinated in 1980–1981 in Syria. See *The New York Times*, May 27, 1981, and *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 19, 1981.

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sion of the internal social forces at work in the Middle East promotes a distorted view of the realities of the region. Policy based on such misunderstanding is then unlikely to be successful. The Iranian revolution, the assassination of Sadat, the Lebanese civil war, and all the problems associated with the Palestinian issue cannot be explained in terms of Soviet or communist involvement.

America has commitments to the state of Israel which must be honored, even as U.S. long-term interests in the region require effective resistance to expansionist policies of Israeli governments.

The United States must be wary of involvement in regional conflicts and resist the urge to respond to complex social and political problems with a policy of military intervention. Creative diplomacy should take precedence over military methods. The United States might attempt to work with the forces of constructive change rather than buttressing a weakening status quo. Specifically, America could encourage the leaders of friendly, moderate states to develop more constructive policies toward their constituents. Force, corruption, and arbitrary decision-making need to give way to programs of reform that will build stability and legitimacy.

Given the realities of politics and the momentum of the U.S. foreign policy-making system, these new attitudes toward Islamic unrest will not come easily. Supporting the state of Israel while at the same time criticizing and restraining Israeli policies considered ill-founded is a subtle task. Also, American diplomacy will require special skills and ingenuity to encourage the reform essential to the long-term stability of U.S. friends in the Gulf without damaging our official relations with these governments. The difficulties involved in the implementation of new policy attitudes should not be an excuse to downplay their central relevance. The alternative is an eventual foreign policy failure.

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Michael Sterner

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The Iran-Iraq war is now in its fourth year. For those of us in the West, the conflict has had a quality of remoteness for much of its course, an impression brought about in part by the nature of the struggle itself. We feel revulsion at a war that has sent teenagers by the thousands to their deaths against entrenched gun positions, at the use of poison gas which we had hoped the conscience of mankind had abolished as a method of warfare. We have been unable to comprehend fully the ideologies and motivations driving the leaders of these two nations to pursue a conflict that has led to such carnage and cynical disregard for human life. It has been easy—indeed a relief—to put this war out of mind. And besides, we ask, what can anybody do to bring it to an end?

The policymakers of all the major powers whose interests are engaged in the Gulf—the United States, our European allies, Japan, and the Soviet Union—have felt a similar sense of frustration in dealing with the conflict. They know that while interests of great importance to them are jeopardized by the Gulf crisis, their ability to influence the course of the struggle is limited. America's leverage in particular has been circumscribed: at the outset of the war we did not have diplomatic relations with either Baghdad or Teheran and were not supplying arms to either side. Moreover, once the U.S. position in Iran had been lost as the result of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution, and once the world saw that it could absorb the loss of a major portion of Iraqi and Iranian oil without shortages or continuing price increases, the stake for the United States and its allies in the progress of the war no longer seemed as great. This was the case, at least, as long as the war appeared headed toward a military impasse, and as long as it did not spread to other countries in the Gulf. And indeed, for the first 18 months of the war, the course of the conflict seemed to stay comfortably within those parameters. Washington was content to set up a watching brief.

The evolution of the Iraq-Iran war in the past two years has, however, drawn the United States into a larger role in the conflict.

Michael Sterner is a partner in The IRC Group, a Washington-based international consulting firm. He was Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates 1974–76, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for Arab-Israeli affairs 1977–81.

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The first shift in U.S. official attitudes came in the wake of Iran's impressive military victories in 1982, when it appeared that the Iraqis might collapse, leaving Iran in a commanding position of power throughout the Gulf. Washington gradually abandoned its policy of neutrality and non-involvement in favor of a "tilt" toward Iraq, although recognizing that there was little the United States could do to give practical effect to this policy shift. A more immediate threat to U.S. and Western interests occurred in 1983, when Iraq threatened to intensify its attacks on Iranian oil facilities and shipping, and Iran, in the ensuing bout of rhetoric, threatened to close the Gulf for "everybody" if the Iraqi attacks continued. In response, the United States announced it would not allow the Gulf to be closed, emphasized the capabilities of the U.S. carrier task force on station just outside the Gulf, began contingency consultations with its allies and regional friends, and stepped up diplomatic efforts to restrain escalation. When Iraqi patience with these efforts expired in early 1984, and the cycle of strikes and counter-strikes against shipping in the Gulf began, the United States acted to augment the air defenses of its Arab friends, especially Saudi Arabia, to which the United States supplied Stinger antiaircraft missiles and an additional aerial tanker to permit sustained fighter aircraft operations. America's proximity to the conflict was vividly demonstrated in June 1984 when two Iranian warplanes were shot down by Saudi interceptors using information supplied by the American-manned AWACS early warning aircraft that had been on station since the outbreak of the war.

Otherwise there has been a lull in the fighting, with accumulating evidence of sharp differences among Iran's leaders over military strategy, and some sign that Teheran may be moderating its war objectives. We are possibly entering a stage where Teheran's implacable determination to pursue the war at any cost may be evolving into a more complex policy that offers greater scope for outside efforts to encourage negotiations or at least keep the conflict under control. It is an advantageous moment to review briefly the course of the conflict, to assess the present options for each side in pursuing the war, to identify the interests of outside powers who might influence events, and to offer some judgments about how the policies of the United States and its allies can best be calibrated to achieve Western objectives.

II

Saddam Hussein's decision in October 1980 to launch an invasion of Iran reflected sources of tension between the two countries that

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are both historical and of more recent origin. Among the former were Arab-Iranian cultural antipathies, longstanding border disputes, rivalry for influence in the Persian Gulf, and a legacy of suspicion by each side that the other was seeking to undermine its authority by stirring up trouble among its ethnic and religious minorities. These tensions had been brought under control by a pact concluded between Shah Reza Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein in 1975, but they resurfaced with the collapse of the Shah's regime and the accession of Khomeini, who openly proclaimed a policy of hostility toward the Baath regime. There is no question that Baghdad was under a good deal of provocation; nevertheless, Saddam's decision to invade Iran must be ranked as one of this century's worst strategic miscalculations—a decision that could only have been based on the assumption that the invasion would help bring about Khomeini's fall, and that Iraq could use its occupation of Iranian territory to extract more favorable terms on a range of Iraqi-Iranian issues from any successor government. The assumption has proven fatefully wrong: the war provided a national cause that has rallied support behind Khomeini's Islamic regime, and postponed the day when the regime would have to moderate its policies to accommodate other internal economic and political pressures.

The initial phase of the war favored Iraq. The invasion caught Iran's political leaders by surprise, at a time when Iranian military forces were still badly disorganized and demoralized by the effects of the revolution. But Iraqi battlefield tactics were stodgy and unimaginative. Gradually the Iraqi offensive bogged down, and Iranian resistance stiffened. Capitalizing on Iran's superiority in raw manpower—its population of about 40 million is nearly three times Iraq's 14 million—Iranian commanders began to devise more effective tactics built around surprise and the use of "human wave" attacks. These proved extremely successful; Iranian forces overran Iraqi positions in a series of battlefield victories in 1982 and rapidly forced the Iraqis back to their borders.

The winter and spring of 1982 represented the low point in Iraqi fortunes. Battered militarily, Saddam now also faced a host of problems on the home front. Iraq's financial reserves were exhausted through a determination to maintain a guns-and-butter policy despite the destruction of its oil facilities in the Gulf and the further restriction of its oil exports by Syria's decision to close off the pipeline running through Syrian territory. Baghdad's Arab supporters, who had willingly extended assistance at the beginning of the war, became less open-handed as their oil incomes declined

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in slumping world markets. But, once again, the tide turned. Fighting now on their own territory, with their backs against the wall, Iraqi forces beat back three massive Iranian assaults in the summer of 1982, inflicting heavy Iranian casualties.

Since the failures of the 1982 Iranian attacks on Basra and the spring 1983 offensive at al-Amarna, the battlefield situation has been essentially a stalemate along lines that closely approximate the international border between the two countries. In 1983 the Iranians appeared to be switching to a strategy of smaller scale attacks at different points along the Iraqi lines, but their troop dispositions in 1984 have suggested a reversion to a strategy of trying to achieve one major victory that will bring about Saddam Hussein's ouster. Early in the year the Iranians amassed an imposing force (estimated at around 250,000 men) in the southern sector opposite Basra. Their objective would be to sever communications between Baghdad and Basra and to drive a wedge between the two Iraqi army corps defending this sector.

Some sharp but limited fighting took place in the spring, but the expected main offensive has run into major obstacles. One source of difficulty is the high water level in this marshy area, resulting partly from a heavy run-off of last winter's rains and snows, and partly from deliberate Iraqi flooding of the area. Another appears to be the increasing effectiveness of the Iraqi air force and artillery, which have been striking at Iranian assembly points, disrupting troop concentrations and logistics. Evidence is also accumulating of differences among Iranian commanders, with at least some taking the position that an all-out offensive should not be attempted until Iranian forces can be better equipped—particularly in the categories of aircraft and armor, both of which are in very short supply.

The Iranians possess a superiority in manpower, perhaps also still in fighting motivation, but the Iraqis have had time to build strong defensive positions opposite the Iranian concentrations. The Iraqis also have a decided advantage in air power, in the quantity and quality of their arms and equipment, and in being able to shift forces rapidly owing to the better network of roads behind their own lines. Even if the Iranians could achieve a breakthrough, they would have to deal with Iraqi counterattacks as well as the enormous logistical difficulties of attempting to exploit their initial advantage.

III

The war has been characterized on both sides by serious miscalculations about the loyalty and cohesiveness of their adversary's population, errors that flow naturally from the attitudes of cultural

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condescension that are endemic to the Middle East. Saddam Hussein's original assumption that the Khomeini regime would fall under the impact of Iraq's invasion has its counterpart in the conviction of Iran's leaders that as soon as the Iraqis were faced with military setbacks and economic hardship, they would rise up and throw the Saddam Hussein regime out. In fact, the war has had much the opposite effect. It has driven Iraqi public opinion behind a regime which previously had not been all that popular. The hopes of Iran's leaders that Iraq's sizable Shi'i community (more than 50 percent of the population) could be led to active disaffection have thus far also proved to be illusory. There has been no convincing evidence of any serious disturbances on the part of Iraqi Shi'i during the war, all the more remarkable because such disturbances did occur in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Conversely, Iraq's invasion route took its armies through the Iranian province of Khuzistan, also known as Arabistan because its inhabitants are largely ethnic Arabs and Arabic speakers, not Persians. Yet no defections of any significant magnitude took place among these people. Nationalism—loyalty to present states and governments—has proven a stronger force than religious affinity or distant ethnic identity.

Along with Iraq's improved military situation, the economic and political underpinnings of the strategic equation have also shifted in Baghdad's favor over the past two years. On the economic front Iraq's outlook for the short and mid-term seems stable. Through a slowdown in civil projects, the regime has brought government expenditures into better balance with revenues, an improvement that has put the Gulf Arabs in a better mood to continue their subsidies. Iraq's revenues from oil production have been limited to the 750,000-barrel daily capacity of the pipeline through Turkey (its sole remaining oil outlet since early 1982) but work is substantially complete on raising the capacity of the Turkish line to about one million barrels a day (mbd). In comparison, Iran's exports have averaged 2–2.5 mbd over the same period. Iraq also has plans to build two new pipelines. One would tie southern Iraqi fields into Saudi Arabia's presently underutilized "Petroline," running from the Gulf to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The other is a new line to the Jordanian port of Aqaba with a planned capacity of about one million barrels a day. If pursued urgently, these two lines could possibly be completed in 18–24 months, and might eventually bring overall Iraqi exports to a level approximately equal to present Iranian exports.

The trend of international political support has also moved in

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Iraq's favor. Baghdad has repaired the earlier strains in its relations with Moscow and appears to be getting all the arms it needs—one must assume on favorable terms. While Iraq has broadened its international support during this period, and diversified its sources of arms, Iran has become more isolated and is finding it increasingly difficult to acquire the arms it needs. Iraq has successfully generated American and Arab pressure to squeeze off some of Iran's sources of arms. Under U.S. pressure, Israel and South Korea have terminated any direct sales of arms to Iran. Iran is still getting arms from North Korea, Libya and Syria, and of necessity it has become resourceful at acquiring what it can on the international arms market. But these sources cannot supply all Iran's needs if it is to sustain a prolonged war effort; in particular they cannot provide spare parts to keep its original arsenal of U.S. equipment operational. Iran's air force especially has suffered: only a fraction of its original fleet of F-14, F-4 and F-5 warplanes are still operational.

IV

In spite of its better overall position, Baghdad cannot regard the possibility of a prolonged war of attrition with equanimity. If Iran could continue attacks over an extended period and inflict serious casualties, the drain on Iraq's manpower and the strain on its economy could sooner or later weaken the will of the population to continue the war. This is, however, a big "if." Iran's casualties so far have been very high; even assuming a continued high level of patriotic and religious fervor, such a casualty rate cannot go on indefinitely without political cost. Moreover, numbers are not the whole story. Iran is becoming critically short of certain categories of skilled personnel required to sustain the war effort.

Baghdad is not merely waiting for a change of heart in Teheran. It has carried the war to Iran's economic lifeline in the Gulf in a deliberate effort to increase the pressures on Teheran to end the conflict. Expanding the dimensions of the conflict into the Gulf confers significant advantages to Iraq: it provides some of the strategic depth Iraq lacks in the battlefield, draws the Gulf states into active support, and forces the Western powers also to become more involved. Iraq's crude oil exports from the Gulf are already blocked and Iraq has nothing further to lose in that respect. In contrast, Iran is totally dependent on the Gulf's shipping lanes for all its oil exports, as well as for nearly all its imports of food and war matériel. To counter Iraq, Iran would have to attack the shipping and oil facilities of the Arab Gulf countries, whose targets are dispersed and (except for Kuwait) relatively inaccessible to Iran's

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dwindling air force. Teheran now knows it must also contend with a well-equipped Saudi air force that has shown it is prepared to fight. Moreover, if Iran carries its retaliation beyond a certain point—certainly if it attempts to carry out its threat to "close" the Gulf—it will invite U.S. and Western military intervention. Sufficiently provoked, the United States could put Iran's navy and air force out of action, and could use its fleet at the mouth of the Gulf to impose a blockade, either selective or total, on shipping destined for Iranian ports. As far as the Gulf aspect of the war is concerned, Iran has been dealt a very poor hand and not even one that offers much prospect for bluffing.

For several weeks after Iraq's intensive series of attacks on tankers in April and May, Iranian oil exports dropped to about 500,000–600,000 barrels a day, about one quarter of Iran's normal wartime exports. The drop was artificially steep because Iran was slow to offer discounts to compensate for the sudden increase in insurance rates, and Iran's oil exports have since recovered. Still, the figures must be sobering for Teheran's leaders to ponder. If reduced to such a level of exports for any extended period, Iran would have trouble paying even for food imports. Iraq's upper hand in the Gulf must, then, be a further complication for Iran's leaders in deciding how—indeed, perhaps whether—to continue the war effort.

Not surprisingly, in view of these factors, there is growing evidence that serious differences on war strategy have emerged among Iran's political leaders. Teheran would appear to have four options in the present circumstances. Iran could take a chance on its "grand offensive" in spite of the high risks of failure, or it could keep the offensive as its objective but postpone it long enough to acquire more and better arms and equipment. Alternatively, Teheran might switch to a strategy of attrition, seeking to keep Iraq mobilized, to strain its economy, and to wear down its manpower resources and morale over time. Another option would be to explore a negotiated settlement, perhaps through one of the several mediators that periodically visit Baghdad and Teheran under a variety of auspices, such as the United Nations and the Islamic Conference. A successful negotiation would, however, require Iran to drop its insistence that Saddam Hussein be removed and "punished," which seems out of character as long as Khomeini is around to guide Iran's destiny. Perhaps most plausible might be a murky middle outcome, with Iran's leaders recognizing the inadequacy of their country's resources and allowing the war to wind down, without publicly backing off their war objectives by coming to a settlement with Baghdad. A good deal presumably depends on how long Khomeini

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continues to direct Iran's policy; his death or diminished political role due to advancing age would lessen the element of personal vendetta motivating this war and increase the chances for a shift to more pragmatic policies.

V

For the Gulf states, the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran war have posed the worst security threat that they have yet had to face. Endowed with a realistic sense of their own weakness vis-à-vis more powerful regional neighbors, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula have adopted the sensible policy of seeking to stay out of trouble and remain on good terms with everybody. They worked hard and, by and large, successfully at establishing good relations with the Shah; it therefore came as a particularly unpleasant shock when his government was overthrown and replaced by a regime that openly proclaimed its hostility to the "corrupt" rulers and societies across the Gulf. Although Gulf leaders will now say privately that they had misgivings about Saddam's invasion from the start, most of them backed Iraq at the time and many undoubtedly shared Saddam's misjudgments about the fragility of the Khomeini regime. While not entirely of one mind on the matter, the Gulf states generally see Iraq as their first line of defense against Iranian subversion and, consequently, are committed to sustaining Iraq in the war. They cannot be happy about the expansion of the war to Gulf shipping, but they do not have a convincing counter to Baghdad's argument that it has provided plenty of openings for Iran to negotiate, and indeed that it is presently handling escalation in the Gulf in a way that gives Iran every opportunity to end the war. There is little evidence to suggest that Iraq's Gulf backers are trying to pressure Baghdad to halt its attacks on shipping to and from Iranian ports.

Even so, the leaders of the Arab Gulf regimes are sufficiently seasoned to take a longer political view as well. Their long-term interest is to ensure that neither Iran or Iraq achieves a clear-cut victory, but rather that the conflict is resolved in a way that leaves neither power in a position to dominate the Gulf. They know that even in the best of circumstances Iraq cannot "defeat" Iran, and that whatever course Iran's internal revolution takes over the next decade, Iran will continue to be a paramount force in Gulf affairs, and that the Arab Gulf states will have to find a way of living with it. They have therefore sought to balance their support for Iraq by keeping the door open to Teheran, with the United Arab Emirates most often taking the lead in this effort. The message being deliv-

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ered—that the Gulf states have nothing against the Islamic Republic if it would only stop trying to subjugate Iraq—has probably been rather coolly received in view of the Gulf states' enthusiastic backing for Saddam when he launched the war. But, with persistence, the message may eventually be taken seriously, to beneficial effect.

In the meantime, from the Gulf states' perspective, the episode in early June when two Iranian aircraft hunting for ship targets were shot down by Saudi interceptors must be seen as a healthy development. All the fancy equipment in the world (and the Saudis certainly have plenty of it) cannot make a fighting force until men and machines are tested in a real combat situation. The episode has had the effect of giving Saudi Arabia confidence in its ability to defend itself, and it has also shown that the defense system worked out between themselves and the United States is indeed operationally effective. The Saudis handled the incident intelligently from a political point of view as well: they were careful not to gloat and their public statements made it clear they were not seeking further clashes with Iran.

VI

If the Iran-Iraq conflict has posted difficult choices for the West, the external evidence suggests that Moscow has faced an equal dilemma. The Soviets were slow to react to the Iranian revolution; they had painstakingly built a relationship with the Shah, and they were initially uncertain both about the durability of the revolution and the course its leaders would take. But recognizing finally that the new regime was taking a firmly anti-American direction, and hoping also that they might preserve a position in Iran for the day when the ayatollahs might falter, the Soviets decided to make a play for good relations.

But Khomeini reacted perversely to Soviet overtures. He moved ruthlessly against Iran's leftist parties which, during the interregnum, had become more active and visible; and, after a brief modus vivendi, he arrested and jailed the leadership of Iran's Tudeh (Communist) Party. Also, Iran voiced its strong opposition to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, even to the point of permitting shipment of supplies to anti-Soviet forces. Confronted by these adverse developments, the Soviets picked up their second option and switched back to their original tilt in favor of Iraq.

Like the Western powers, the Soviets have a complex of interests that are affected by the Gulf crisis. Among them are: preventing any reestablishment of a dominant U.S. position in Iran (not very likely in the foreseeable circumstances in any case), neutralizing

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Iran as an "Islamic model" that might have appeal to the U.S.S.R.'s Muslim populations, consolidating the Soviet position in Afghanistan, and building favor with the Arab world and particularly with the Gulf states by playing the role of Iraq's defender. The Soviets recognize, of course, that these objectives are to a certain extent contradictory, but for the present and near future at least, the conflicts between them seem manageable. More broadly, we can assume that the Soviets will continue to look for ways to exploit the Gulf crisis to further their longstanding objective of depriving the United States of its privileged position in the area—particularly military positions—and of loosening the ties that bind the Gulf states in one form or another to the West. But they must move cautiously in pursuit of this objective. A miscalculation could have the opposite effect of consolidating U.S. positions in the Gulf. Indeed, Soviet statements in the past year have revealed particular concern over the possibility that, under pressure from an escalating conflict, the peninsula states might agree to new U.S. military bases on their territory.

The Soviets certainly have no interest in seeing an Iranian victory over Iraq. They probably have a net interest in seeing the war resolved, or at least wind down, in circumstances that do not make either side a clear winner or clear loser. This would suggest some convergence of Soviet and Gulf states' and Western interests, but it is doubtful that this can be made to extend to active U.S.-Soviet collaboration to see the war brought to an end. The Soviets are too much at odds with the United States throughout the Middle East to wish to appear to be acting in concert with it anywhere in the region. Moreover, the atmosphere between the Reagan Administration and the present Soviet leadership is not one to encourage even a dialogue about such a venture. It is, however, at least an asset that the Soviets are not working at cross purposes with Western efforts to keep the Gulf war under control.

Looking at their overall situation in the Middle East, the Soviets have little reason to be displeased at the way things have gone for them in recent years. The Gulf crisis has served to divert world attention from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; with every passing year, the Soviets have consolidated their hold and the chances have improved that the West, as well as the Islamic states of the Middle East, will come to accept the Soviet role there as a fait accompli. In Lebanon the Soviets backed the winning horse and gained prestige while U.S. credibility suffered a severe blow. In both situations the Soviets come across as the power that has the determination and tenacity to stick by its friends and surrogates

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when the going gets tough. If the Soviets are now in a position to make the case as well that it was their support, their arms and military training that enabled the Iraqis to hold off the Iranians, it will give them a good foundation to resume their campaign, interrupted by strains over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan five years ago, to woo the Gulf Arabs into closer ties with Moscow.

VII

Oil is not the only Western interest in the Gulf, but among our various interests it is the most important. It is a stroke of luck for the West that the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war have taken place during a period when the world has a large surplus of crude oil capacity. World demand today is still nearly ten million barrels a day less than it was at its peak in 1979. With economic recovery in the United States, demand for oil is gradually rising, but thus far at a rate that can easily be supplied by bringing a portion of existing unused capacity into production.[1] Moreover, over the past decade, there has been a relative decline in the share of world oil supply that the Gulf provides. In 1973 Western Europe received about 60 percent of its oil from the Gulf, and Japan 90 percent; today those figures are about 40 percent and 60 percent respectively (only about three percent of total U.S. consumption comes from the Gulf).

The U.S. government's current estimate, which has not been seriously disputed, is that shipments from the Gulf could drop by as much as one half their present level (eight to nine mbd) without causing shortages or a real basis for price increases. The shortfall could be made up by filling the Saudi "Petroline" (an extra 500–700,000 bd) and by bringing on-stream unused capacity outside the Gulf (an estimated three mbd). It is worth noting that monthly statistics of production from the Gulf thus far show hardly any fluctuation due to the war. During the period of intensified attacks in the spring of 1984, insurance rates went up slightly for the Gulf as a whole and more sharply for cargoes to ports in the northern Gulf, but even the countries most affected—Iran and to a lesser extent Kuwait—kept their oil marketable by offering discounts to compensate for the increased insurance costs. Attacks on shipping, and/or the oil facilities themselves, would have to become far more intense and far more effective to cause a significant drop in overall Gulf shipments.

[1] The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development currently estimates that consumption in 1984 will be one to two percent greater than in 1983.

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The critical factor for "closure of the Gulf," of course, will probably not be physical blockage of the Strait of Hormuz or actual destruction of vessels but rather the point at which crews, in spite of high incentive pay, refuse to sign on for voyages in the Gulf. This might occur well before a 50-percent destruction rate is reached, but it certainly is well beyond the present level of fighting. While some tanker companies have said they will no longer send their own vessels and crews into the Gulf, they were able without difficulty to charter independent tankers to replace them. Even at the peak level of fighting in the spring of 1984, there was no dearth of tankers and crews willing to take their vessels into the war zone, provided the price was right.

Efforts by Iran to use guerrillas to damage oil facilities in the Arab countries are possible, and perhaps even likely given the weakness of Iran's air force. Sabotage teams could be landed from speedboats at night, and given the length of the shoreline the Gulf states have to protect, it would be very hard to defend against this. Undoubtedly some damage could be inflicted on individual facilities (desalination plants would also be an inviting target) if a campaign along these lines were pushed with determination. This could cause temporary difficulties for specific countries (Kuwait is the most vulnerable target), but Iran would find it much harder to put a substantial portion of overall Gulf production out of commission for any sustained period.

Beyond these factors, governments of consumer countries have actions available to head off shortages and price increases resulting from panic buying. Government-held stocks—such as the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve—can be brought into play. The Reagan Administration initially took a cautious view of use of the SPR but more recently has said it would be used "early" in any crisis, a helpful shift of policy. This could place as much as an additional two mbd on the market for a period of several months, a significant amount in terms of any likely Gulf shortages. In any impending crisis, one of the most important actions consumer-country governments can take is to intervene to prevent stockpiling by their oil companies; in such circumstances companies tend to build stocks to protect themselves against anticipated price increases, and this in turn adds to the upward pressure on prices. There is now substantial agreement among the governments of the industrial consuming countries to ward off such behavior.

Taken together, the various factors making up the oil situation, while certainly no basis for complacency, do indicate a considerable margin of safety. There is no basis for panic; the United States and

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its allies can afford to take deliberate, graduated action to meet a crisis as it develops. And, much to the relief of our allies, under most scenarios that can be projected there will be time for consultation and an exhaustion of diplomatic efforts before military action becomes necessary as a last resort.

VIII

The United States has three major policy objectives with respect to the present crisis in the Gulf. First and foremost, we need to prevent any disruption of Gulf oil shipments that is sufficient to cause severe hardship or dislocation to the Western economies. Second, we seek to ensure the security of the oil-producing governments in the area that have been friendly to the West—governments that have resisted the expansion of Soviet influence in the area, have followed reasonably responsible oil production and pricing policies, and that favor open and tolerant societies. Third, we would like to see an outcome of the Iraq-Iran struggle that does not give the Soviet Union a dominant position in either country, and that provides an opportunity for the United States and its allies to build relations with both countries. Since there is little likelihood that Iraq will defeat Iran, what we are really talking about is a policy that seeks to prevent the Khomeini regime from winning a victory that could undermine the position of pro-Western Gulf governments, give impetus to extremist Islamic movements throughout the Middle East, and create new opportunities for an expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

Stated in such broad terms, these are policy objectives which the United States, its allies, and even its friends in the area, can easily endorse. The differences among us hinge rather on the manner in which these objectives can be best pursued—in particular, over what blend of political action and military force is best suited to produce the desired results. The other part of the problem of policy coordination for the United States is a reluctance on the part of the Europeans, Japanese, and Gulf friends to become too closely identified with the United States. All of these "partners" are faced with a dilemma: they recognize that the American military capacity to prevent closure of the Gulf—and American arms to enable the Gulf states to defend themselves—are indispensable, yet they also feel that any direct intervention by the United States tends to heighten confrontation by introducing the element of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, and by enabling regional actors to capture nationalist sentiment by striking a posture of heroic resistance to the "imperialist superpower."

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America's policy on the Arab-Israel issue is a further problem: neither the Europeans nor the Japanese want to have the pursuit of their own commercial interests complicated by identification with U.S. policies on this aspect of Middle East affairs. They recognize that while the Gulf states cannot easily dispense with the United States because of its security assistance, the same advantage does not necessarily extend to them. The Gulf states themselves find this combination of U.S. "liabilities" to be a compelling reason to downplay U.S. security assistance and to treat any call for direct U.S. military intervention as a contingency of last resort. The U.S. performance in Lebanon was also troubling to Gulf leaders; they are worried that they may be saddled by the political disadvantages of an American military involvement only to find Washington pulling out when the going gets tough.

The need to interact with the interests of our allies and our regional friends has helped to bring about modifications in U.S. policy which have been an asset to the overall posture of the West in the Gulf. The reluctance of the Gulf states to engage in contingency planning for the use of U.S. forces has been frustrating for U.S. military planners, but it has had the advantage of placing the Gulf states themselves in the first line of defense for their own security, which is where they want and ought to be. One of the few beneficial by-products of the Iran-Iraq conflict is the impetus it has given to cooperation among the Gulf states within the framework of their six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain), formed in 1981 in response to the war. This is not yet an effective defense alliance, but it has added marginally to the security of its individual members by expressing political solidarity, facilitating intelligence exchanges, and providing for joint military exercises.

Washington's dialogue with its European allies has also been helpful. Compared with some U.S. officials, the Europeans have tended to take a less alarmist view of the likelihood of sudden escalation and believe that most situations will offer considerable scope for political action. In return for their willingness to join the United States in military planning and to make defense of the Gulf an allied effort (such as French and British willingness to help American forces sweep the Red Sea for mines, in response to an Egyptian call for help) the Europeans have sensibly refused to commit themselves ahead of time about the circumstances that would require military action. They have insisted that in any escalating situation time be allowed for the exhaustion of all diplomatic options before resorting to military force.

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All of this has helped to build greater flexibility and a greater margin of safety into the Western posture in the Gulf. The dialogue—or more accurately trialogue—that has ensued around these points has on the whole been constructive and has moved the three parties closer to consensus on the complementary role each would play in an overall effort. The Gulf states themselves have assumed responsibility in the first instance for the security of their territory and shipping lanes; the U.S. role is to help the Gulf states with military assistance and to stand by with its own force as the ultimate sanction against attempts to close the Gulf; and the Europeans can play a useful role by stressing the non-confrontational nature of Western policy, pursuing diplomatic solutions as different phases of a crisis develop, and perhaps, in quieter times, by trying to open a dialogue with Teheran. There is something of an inconsistency in a U.S. policy which states, on one hand, that keeping the Gulf open is a "vital" U.S. interest and, on the other, that the United States would only intervene if invited to do so by the Gulf states themselves. But sometimes absolute consistency is less important than finding a way to express fully the many considerations that U.S. policy must reflect. American public statements to date have served the purpose of expressing both the depth of U.S. interest in the Gulf and the restraint that we hope can characterize U.S. actions.

Perhaps the most difficult dilemma for Western policymakers would arise if the military situation turned against Iraq, and Teheran were able to bring about the replacement of Saddam with a regime subservient to Iranian interests. Such a development would raise the clear danger of broader Iranian efforts to unseat the region's moderate governments. If those efforts took the form of an actual physical attack, particularly against our most important regional ally, Saudi Arabia, Washington would have to be prepared to intervene with air and naval forces, and in such an event there seems little doubt that there would be a call for assistance from the Saudi government and that Saudi facilities would be made available for U.S. use. But even if Iran did not directly attempt to destroy the other Arab Gulf regimes, its enhanced power and influence would certainly be used over time to force accommodations from them, which would be harmful to long-term Western interests. This could well be the most likely scenario to emerge; it would also unfortunately be the one that the United States, with its emphasis on military dispositions, would be least well-equipped to counter.

In almost any scenario, it seems sensible to use as much restraint as possible for as long as we can, so as to give the political leadership

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in Teheran every opportunity to draw back from trying to pursue the war. We need to erect an effective defense in the Gulf, but it is also important for the United States not to appear to be seeking a confrontation with "Islam," for such an image will serve to build pressures against us and against regimes that are friendly to us elsewhere in the Islamic world.

In this respect we have a reasonably respectable record to build on. In spite of the legacy of bad feeling left by the Iranian revolution and the hostages, and in spite of the necessary thrust of our present policy, we have not supplied Iraq with arms, and we were forthright in our condemnation of Iraq's use of poison gas. We have seen enough of history to know that Iran's present policies are not likely to be immutable, and there is little reason to suppose that its political leadership is monolithically agreed on pursuit of the conflict, or on a holy war to convert the Muslim world to their brand of Islam regardless of the costs to Iranian society. Even if there were not much evidence to support it, we would have to assume that a struggle is under way in Teheran between those who want to "export the revolution" and those who see an increasing need to "consolidate it at home." It is the task of Western policy to strengthen the hand of the latter by demonstrating that the costs of pursuing an imperial policy are too high, but that at the same time we have no quarrel with an Islamic Republic confined within Iran's borders.

Finally, we need to keep in mind that an effective policy to deal with the Gulf crisis cannot be built in isolation from the context of our overall Middle East policy. Muslim sensitivities are affected by U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli problem, and they are particularly acute on the subject of Jerusalem. Opinionmakers in the area hear with dismay sentiments from Americans, including Congressmen, that go far beyond officially stated U.S. support for Israeli security and the search for an Arab-Israeli settlement. It would be pointless for the United States to waste time and energy fine-tuning a policy for the Gulf that takes those Muslim sensitivities into account in the Gulf region itself, and ignores them elsewhere.

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A. W. DePorte

FRANCE'S NEW REALISM

François Mitterrand, halfway through his term of office, is pursuing a French foreign policy that is more than a footnote to the career of Charles de Gaulle. Making full use of the presidential authority set up by de Gaulle, Mitterrand has been neither inspired nor bound by the Gaullist conception of France's place in the world. Fifteen years after leaving office, de Gaulle still casts a long shadow over France, and even more over perceptions of France. But Mitterrand's responses to the international problems France faces in the 1980s are very different from those of de Gaulle in the 1960s. They reflect a very different idea of what France is in the world and what it can claim to be.

There have been significant continuities, of course, in Mitterrand's policies. Like any other French leader, he has not overlooked what his foreign minister, Claude Cheysson, called "a continuity that goes beyond majorities" rooted in the geography and history of the country. Nor has he had any reason to dispense with the policies or rhetoric of his Fifth Republic predecessors (as, for example, with respect to France's independence) which are still serviceable in international or domestic politics. But the most important of his continuities have been, not with de Gaulle or Georges Pompidou, but with former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in matters where Giscard himself differed most from de Gaulle (as in relations with the United States). Where Mitterrand has differed most strikingly from Giscard (as in relations with the Soviet Union), the change has not been in the direction of Gaullism.

Mitterrand's new course is not easy to label. "Gaullist" does not fit. But it cannot be called "socialist" by any plausible deduction from the scattered heritage of French socialism with respect to foreign policy. Perhaps "realism" is as good a brief description as we can find of French foreign policy since mid-1981. It suggests Mitterrand's considerable ability to adopt policies which link France's permanent interests with reasonable effectiveness to an international environment over which he has, by his admission, only limited control.

A.W. DePorte is a visiting scholar at the Institute of French Studies, New York University. He was formerly director of the office of research on Western Europe in the Department of State. His most recent book is *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance.*

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The first rule of realism is that policies are not followed mindlessly, but are modified or discarded if they fail to produce the desired results, or if the circumstances they were devised to deal with change. Mitterrand, at the beginning of the fourth year of his presidency, made at least two significant policy shifts. He at last established personal contact with the Soviet leadership, and began to talk with new emphasis of Europe as "a force for peace and balance between the superpowers." For his predecessors, a privileged French-Soviet relationship and efforts to lead Western Europe were policy staples. For him these issues had been conspicuously muted—until now.

It is too soon to know whether this represents a mid-course tactical correction or the beginning of a more substantial reorientation of policy. The answer will depend on Mitterrand's judgment as to whether the international context is moving into a phase which calls for policies different from those of his first three years. But whatever his choices, they will be based not on some hallowed body of policy precedent but on his calculation of the distribution of forces in today's world and, particularly, of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, as always since World War II, the core of French policy attention must be the superpowers.

II

Perhaps the single most striking feature of French foreign policy under Mitterrand has been its constantly affirmed concern about Soviet power in Europe and the coolness of its approach to relations with the Soviet Union. This was not unexpected in light of the attitude of the Socialist Party—and of French intellectual and public opinion—toward the Soviet Union through the 1970s. But the persistence and vigor of this French policy have been remarkable, not least because it has run parallel to American policy preoccupations under Ronald Reagan. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would have preferred Giscard's reelection in 1981. But Russian expectations of Mitterrand's behavior proved to be more accurate than American.

Giscard, for example, tried to limit the damage to East-West relations caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or at least to assert France's independence and his own leadership, by meeting Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1980. This gesture was not only ineffective but was unpopular in France. Mitterrand's policy has been very different: that French relations with the Russians could not be intimate, or even normal, while Soviet troops remained in

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Afghanistan. With that, Mitterrand publicly threw out the window the once cherished, if tattered, concept of a privileged relationship with the Soviet Union. Trade, scientific and other relations have been maintained, but political contacts have been few, cold and unproductive. Mitterrand apparently believed that going through the motions of sterile conversations with the Russians would not add much to France's stature or influence.

The change from what *Le Monde* called the "serenity" of Pompidou and Giscard toward the Soviet Union has been popular in France. What did Mitterrand lose if, as a consequence of his policy toward the Soviet Union, the sanctified Gaullist vision of an independent Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals receded ever farther into the middle distance? He lost the opportunity to assert France's leadership in pursuit of that great goal. Apparently Mitterrand has found this tolerable. No doubt, of course, he would prefer to see a loosening up of the international system, particularly in Europe, which would give France more scope to pursue its own interests and display its leadership. But he faces a situation very different from that of the 1960s, the dawn of détente, and he has seen no reason to deny that fact. He did not use the occasion of his trip to Moscow last June to revive the Gaullist vision or suggest that France had a mission to speak for a Europe between the superpowers. His objectives were more defensive, more national.

De Gaulle believed that France's interest would be better served in a multipolar than a bipolar world. At least from 1963 on, he worked to loosen the two-bloc system he confronted, in order to weaken the hold of the two superpowers on France, Europe and the rest of the world. In particular, he took every opportunity to assert French non-dependence on the American "hegemony," whose domination of the West hindered France's assertion of its status as a major power in control of its own affairs and influential with other countries.

Mitterrand's policies toward the Soviet Union and the United States have not left him much room, nor does he seem to have much inclination, to make loosening of the two blocs in Europe a serious policy objective or even a distant goal, however much he might welcome movement in that direction as a Frenchman and a socialist. But what he is not able to pursue as a policy he chooses not to talk about as a policy goal. A man who can refer in a matter-of-fact way, as he has done, to "the two powers that dominate the world" does not sound like one who feels compelled either to deny the facts of life in order to exaggerate the importance of his own country or to try to raise the consciousness of others against that

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undesirable state of affairs. In this most central area of relations with the superpowers, Mitterrand has been remarkably un-Gaullist in style as well as substance.

He showed this early in a sharp break with his predecessor's policy toward the Atlantic Alliance's decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) in Europe. The Giscard government had expressed no official opinion about the matter, on the ground that France was not a member of the Alliance's military arm and, as an independent nuclear power, should not advise others about their nuclear weapons policies. Mitterrand, on the other hand, denounced the Soviet military buildup in Europe even before he took office and has not ceased to do so since. Peace, he has said, depends not on pacifism but on the balance of forces. The East-West military balance had to be restored, in Europe by the deployment of the planned missiles, globally by the American military buildup. Mitterrand preached this to the point of intervening in the West German election campaign, on his visit to the F.R.G. in January 1983, to urge the voters in effect to reject the Social Democratic Party and choose a government that would go forward with the INF deployments.

The need for a Western military buildup has been a much more insistent, even obsessive, theme with Mitterrand than arms control. Socialist France has not tried to facilitate a European nuclear arms agreement by offering to let its own nuclear force be factored into the negotiations, as the Soviet Union has insisted. One reason for Mitterrand's belated establishment of contact with the Soviet leadership probably was to make sure that they understood this French policy when and if U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations resume. No doubt he left the same message in Washington three months before he went to Moscow.

The French government's overriding concern with the long-term Soviet threat in Europe not only has precluded it even from talking about the dissolution of the blocs there as a policy goal, but obviously brings it into a remarkable alignment with the Reagan Administration. Not all French leaders have been as enthusiastic about present American leadership as Defense Minister Charles Hernu, who has called President Reagan a "great statesman" who, like Mitterrand, "is seeking to reestablish the identity of his own country." Mitterrand himself has roundly and repeatedly criticized the Reagan Administration's policies on the economy and Central America. Nevertheless, the Reagan-Mitterrand entente, based on policy concerns in Europe of major importance to both, has been the diplomatic wonder of the age.

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Preelection Socialist talk of renegotiating the Alliance stopped early, and Mitterrand provided a symbolic reaffirmation of France's ties to it by inviting the council of foreign ministers to hold its 1983 spring session in Paris, for the first time since 1966. Many expected that Mitterrand would try to link Alliance cooperation with changes he desired in American economic policy. But, notwithstanding very sharp public criticism of high American interest rates and much else, he has not tried to link security issues and economic issues in the U.S.-French dialogue. He has not even pretended to do so for home consumption. Perhaps he believed that he needed, and appreciated having received, a certain degree of American tolerance, or better, for his government's domestic economic policies.

Even so, the Socialist government's pronounced anti-Sovietism has not made the French any more willing than before to accept either the American view that there should be a global strategy for dealing with the Russians or many of the specific policies the United States has promoted as part of its own version of a grand strategy. The French accept even less the idea that the United States has a right to lay down policies binding on the allies in major matters in the absence of arguments they find persuasive. Thus, the French government does not think it is sound, sensible or prudent to try to undermine Soviet power by economic warfare and is pleased that the Reagan Administration, after certain alarums at the start, does not seem to think so either. The French also reject the American view that the bipolarity which they do not challenge for now in Europe extends also throughout the rest of the world. This is in line with past French policy, but contrasts with it in that the familiar policy of anti-hegemonism outside Europe has been joined to a stark new policy of anti-Sovietism in Europe which leaves little opportunity or hope for promoting the Gaullist policy of "overcoming Yalta."

France also sees no reason to keep quiet about American policies that injure it, such as high interest rates. But the French have kept their foreign economic policy as distinct from their security policy in Europe as they have kept security policy separate from their position toward superpower rivalry outside Europe. And they have not done as much as one might expect to use U.S.-European economic differences to raise European consciousness in the old Gaullist way or launch any move for closer European unity as a response to American economic preponderance.

France has thus dealt with the United States as a partner in European security, a competitor-partner in the management of the troubled international economy, and an opponent in those parts of

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the Third World where it sees the United States trying to block local pressures for inevitable change in the belief, or on the pretext, that these are Soviet-backed.

If Mitterrand's reading of events in the Third World precludes the kind of total cooperation the United States would like from France, so his reading of the European situation rules out the kind of policies aimed at dismantling the two blocs, or overcoming the cold war, or serving as broker or bridge between the two superpowers, which both Gaullism and socialism would seem to favor. As international tensions have grown sharper, Mitterrand has said little to suggest that he thought such French initiatives would be useful or appropriate. When he finally opened direct contact with the Soviet leadership in the fourth year of his term, his purpose was to make sure that the Russians understood his positions, particularly on arms control, and that France would not be left out if the United States, in an election year or after, suddenly leaped from neo-cold war to neo-détente. But the long-term dream of reducing the role of the superpowers in Europe and restoring the autonomy, and eventually the unity, of the old continent is seldom mentioned even as a distant goal of policy.

This is not the only imaginable policy for a French government today. It has an option of a very different kind. The United States presents an alarming image to many in Europe. France might choose to head those forces, which lack a leader, by arguing that now if ever is the moment for the countries of Western Europe to assert their independence of both blocs before the over-armed and reckless superpowers force them to, or over, the brink of war. If we add to these widespread concerns the fact that the allies have also suffered from American economic policy, and that they do not like much of U.S. policy in the Third World, there is clearly the material here for a very different kind of French policy, one that might deserve the name Gaullist or Socialist much more than Mitterrand's does. A left-led Germany would not find it easy to play the role this situation invites. Even a left-led Britain, probably more isolationist than European, would not. Who if not France seems cast for the part?

Mitterrand certainly has understood this. If he has not moved in that direction it is because of his genuine concern about the implications for French security of the imbalance of power in Europe, a situation very different from that when de Gaulle felt free to challenge the United States and the Atlantic system 20 years ago. No difference with the United States about economic policy or the Third World has been allowed to override these considerations.

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France has no difficulty in pursuing a compartmented policy that leads to cooperation with the United States on the most important issues, less cooperation or none on others.

Mitterrand stated his priorities clearly when he said that anything which might overcome Yalta would be good, but no one should mistake the wish for the reality. Vital security interests with respect to both the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic leave France no choice but to do what it has been doing, and few (outside the Communist Party) challenge this policy, either in the name of the former Gaullist vision or of some atavistic socialist dream.

This substantive realism has had a powerful impact on Mitterrand's style of conducting foreign policy. He has cultivated an image of calm candor by talking in Israel about a Palestinian state, in Washington about the rights of Central American nations, and in the Kremlin about Andrei Sakharov. But his sobriety of tone contrasts sharply with de Gaulle's theatrical and combative style. The difference suggests, in fact, that Mitterrand is not much concerned, as the General was, with proving to the French that they are still the masters of their fate even in a world of superpowers.

Mitterrand certainly does not hesitate to proclaim that France is independent. But he does not talk much about independence as a goal in itself or zealously defend the fine points of France's international status. He does not mind visiting the United States more often than President Reagan visits France or going to Moscow when protocol called for a Soviet leader to come to Paris. His disinclination to use or abuse foreign policy for domestic political purposes (and no French president has had more urgent reasons to want to do so) means that a very major element of Gaullism no longer counts for much in the making and staging of French foreign policy.

III

French independence is most explicitly affirmed, as it has been since 1958, in the area of defense policy. One of de Gaulle's most enduring successes was not only to build the independent French nuclear force—in the face of considerable opposition—but to convince the French public that by doing so he had ended their security dependence on the United States. Perhaps there has been a certain cynicism mixed with this conviction, for the French know that they have no frontier or bilateral quarrel with the Soviet Union and are surrounded by countries which remain linked to the United States militarily through NATO. Still, they probably do believe that their independent defense posture has made it impossible, because un-

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necessary, for concern about being a helpless pawn of superpower conflict or entente to breed pacifism and neutralism in France, as in some of its neighbors.

While independence in defense continues to be not only affirmed but strengthened by a decision to improve the nuclear forces, there have been other changes in French defense doctrine and planning which are more ambiguous. There had been expectations that Socialist defense policy might be more Gaullist than Giscard's in that it would reemphasize the power and autonomy of the French nuclear force and play down such signs as there had been that France might nuance or supplement its basic doctrine of nuclear deterrence with some concept of flexible response (without the name) that might lead it to take part in war in Germany in cooperation with the other Atlantic allies.

Mitterrand has indeed emphasized the continuing priority of the nuclear force and the classic Gaullist anti-city deterrent strategy. But his government's thoughts about the relation between nuclear deterrence of an attack on France and the circumstances in which France might engage in fighting elsewhere in Europe (that is, in Germany) are unclear, no doubt deliberately so. France continues to keep troops in Germany, as it has done under all Mitterrand's predecessors, which in itself exposes it to the risk of involuntary engulfment in war short of a Soviet attack on the French home sanctuary. Moreover, it is revamping some of its conventional forces into a so-called rapid action force (FAR), which would purportedly allow France to participate more effectively in conflict outside the home territory. The existence of the FAR is said to strengthen the overall French deterrent capability insofar as the Soviet invader of the F.R.G. would know that, once it encountered the FAR, it would be risking nuclear reprisal from Germany's one continental ally with an independent nuclear force.

The French government also is developing a neutron weapon (though it says it has made no final decision on production), and plans to replace the army's Pluton tactical nuclear missile with the longer-range Hades. These innovations, like the FAR, point to the possibility of combat in Germany alongside the allies should the president choose in given circumstances to enter such combat.

At the same time, however, the French government says that the French nuclear deterrent cannot protect the other continental allies, who must look to the United States and the NATO integrated command for guarantees. There is no automatic French commitment to fight in Germany. Moreover, flexible response is derided, the notion of renouncing possible first use of nuclear weapons has

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few friends in France, and conventional forces are being reduced in overall number for budgetary reasons even while their effectiveness is being upgraded. In short, the Mitterrand government has reaccentuated the main lines and the main ambiguities of its predecessors' defense planning—dating back to de Gaulle—with policies which continue as before to reflect cross-cutting foreign and domestic (including budgetary) considerations.

IV

The Mitterrand government may not have clarified its security commitment to the Federal Republic, but good relations with Bonn have been the keystone of its European policy, as with that of its predecessors back to 1958, if not 1950. Such relations are also essential to its economic well-being. France and the F.R.G. are each other's best trading partners and the joint centers of the European Community and the European Monetary System. The French have had occasion to find out in the last three years how useful to them is a dependable degree of German support in economic and, particularly, monetary matters. Not surprisingly, polls show that the French think the Germans are their best friends.

German collaboration would be essential to the success of any French policy which aimed to lead Western Europe, whether in cooperation with or opposition to the United States. But the choice France makes between the pursuit of one or the other of these policy options is based in part on a reading of the German situation itself as well as of Soviet and American policies. De Gaulle aspired to the leadership of Western Europe, which he hoped would play an increasingly independent role in East-West affairs, by means of a privileged French relationship with the Federal Republic, within and also beyond the European Community. But Mitterrand, unlike de Gaulle, has done nothing to encourage greater German independence from the United States. On the contrary, he has consistently encouraged German attachment to the Atlantic Alliance and the United States.

The French government and people fear German pacifism and possible neutralism, the prospect that the F.R.G. might fall prey to nationalist extremism of the left or right, that German membership in the Western Alliance—which both assures German security and confines German initiative—might become weakened, and that the Federal Republic might seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union on terms inimical to French security interests. France does not want a nationalist or neutralist or, as some would say, Gaullist Germany on its eastern border, pursuing security or reunification

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outside orthodox Alliance channels where its activities are subject to French and American influence.

In the 1960s, many Europeans feared that de Gaulle's policies might lead to just such results in Germany, so they resisted de Gaulle and clung the more to NATO and the United States. Now, in the 1980s, the French government itself, and most Frenchmen, share that fear and react in much the same way. The Gaullist policy of unraveling the two blocs—which, if that were imaginable, would imply, at least to the Germans, the eventual reunification of their country—does not seem to the French a better answer to their permanent German problem than the one devised in the early 1950s based on the division of Germany and the integration of the F.R.G. with the West. The French are not displeased that the Gaullist option is not now imaginable. They take the basic solidity of the Soviet bloc as a given, notwithstanding all its troubles, and see no better way to secure Germany, and France too, than in the Atlantic system and, supplementary to that, the European Community. In present circumstances we might well speak of a U.S.-French entente to contain West Germany.

It is remarkable that the Mitterrand government, enjoying a firm relationship with the Kohl government in Bonn, has made so little effort to promote West European unity or closer cooperation. Mitterrand and the Socialist Party were supporters of European integration during the Fourth Republic, and criticized de Gaulle for turning away from it. To revive such a policy now would not in itself contradict the government's realistic attitude toward the present facts of power in Europe, but it would at least let France hold out the hope of better times to come to those many Europeans who are resentful or fearful of superpower dominance. It would also enhance France's leadership role.

In fact, the behavior of the Mitterrand government toward the European Community, and toward European cooperation more broadly, suggests that its objectives have been practical and, measured by the dream of unity, limited. There has not been much effort at European consciousness-raising of the kind de Gaulle, and to some extent his successors, engaged in. The low level of French effort in favor of a greater role for the EC group in European and world affairs, in the longer term if not the near term, is a further indication of Mitterrand's doubts about being able to achieve much now in that direction. It also reflects, once again, his disinclination to talk about things he cannot hope to accomplish.

France's first priority in European affairs has been to maximize French economic benefits. A major aspect of this has been monetary

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cooperation with the Federal Republic in the European Monetary System. Another has been to get the best deal possible for French farmers, industries and regions. But the government has also used the EC for longer-range domestic purposes. It agreed, for example, to cuts in EC subsidies to French steel and milk production, notwithstanding high political costs from the constituencies involved, because it wants to gear up France to compete in an increasingly rough international market by shifting resources to more productive uses.

One consequence of this French priority has been to make nonsense of the once popular notion that Socialist France would make a particular effort to bring Socialist and Latin Spain and Portugal into the EC, both to strengthen democratic institutions in those countries and to strengthen its own weight in the Community by using them as counterweights to the northern countries. Nothing that has been done by the French government supports the notion that it wants to build a Socialist or southern bloc in the EC. This is perfectly sensible of the French, for such a bloc looks more weighty and coherent to theorists than it would be likely to prove from the point of view of French interests in the rough-and-tumble world of Community bargaining. The Federal Republic and none other is France's privileged partner in that world.

France has talked of strengthening the social policy of the Community and preparing its members for the third industrial revolution. But those members, all suffering from hard times, have not been able to agree on much of substance in these fields. Perhaps it is an achievement that, notwithstanding the times, France has resisted the temptation to withdraw from the European Monetary System or to try to "recapture the home market" by instituting intra-EC trade barriers in one form or another. Its decision not to do such things has been buttressed by a clear understanding of the benefits it derives from the Community and by concrete support, above all by the F.R.G., of French economic and monetary policy, the essentiality of which to France, after three devaluations of the franc since May 1981, need not be emphasized.

The Mitterrand government would no doubt have been happy to work with its EC partners to get the United States to change what European finance ministers, in February 1982, called its "murderous" monetary policies. If they have had little effect on U.S. decision-making in this sphere it is not because of lack of French effort but because, as *Le Monde* observed on that occasion, "the Europeans note yet again the cruel fact that the dollar rules the world and they are its slaves." But this painful realization—never

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more obvious than in the last three years—has not spurred the EC members to closer economic unity, any more than has the problem of dealing with a recession common to them all.

More surprising is the absence of any French initiative to strengthen the unifying elements in the Community, through expanding the authority of the Commission or Parliament, or moving to implement the letter of the Rome treaty, annulled in practice by de Gaulle, that provides for less than unanimous decision-making on some matters. Nor has Mitterrand made much effort to put a French stamp on the political consultation mechanism that parallels the Community. This group achieved some visibility in Giscard's time, if not much effectiveness, because of its initiatives with respect to the Middle East and Afghanistan. France made an effort in 1982 to update their Venice Declaration on the Middle East. But it could not persuade all its partners to go as far as it wished with respect to the Palestinian question, and nothing was done. But then France has its own position on these and other issues, its own influence on and channels of communication to the United States and others. Perhaps Mitterrand finds that France's voice is adequate to speak for France's interests, and that the traditional effort to magnify it by "leading Europe" is more trouble than it is worth.

During the last few months, however, there has been some increase in official French attention to the Community. During the first half of 1984 the rotating presidency of the Community institutions happened to come around to France, and the campaign for the June elections to the European Parliament took place. In France, as elsewhere, the elections were much more a referendum on the popularity (or unpopularity) of the government in power than on any issue connected with the Community. But the Mitterrand government, pressed by the opposition on European issues, judged that it might be good politics as well as sound statesmanship to talk up Europe somewhat more and, particularly, to use the period of the French presidency to resolve the issues that had increasingly sapped the Community's morale and reputation.

Throughout Mitterrand's tenure the members of the Community had been engaged in a drawn-out negotiation over Community resources and programs, which in fact involved the balance of costs and benefits for each member. Great Britain was the principal *demandeur*, arguing that its contributions under existing rules were excessive. Connected with this question was whether and how the EC would be able to continue to finance its programs, particularly the common agricultural program, which subsidized farmers—above all French farmers—to produce unsellable output at above

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market prices in so costly a manner as to absorb most of the Community's financial resources. The debate on all these issues had become so bitter by the end of 1983 that it not only precluded progress on other Community issues but raised the question of whether the EC could survive with Britain as a member—or perhaps even without it.

The ten governments reached agreement on financial and agricultural issues, but not the British contribution, before the European elections, in which nearly all the ruling parties suffered setbacks. Perhaps spurred by this, they finally achieved a settlement during a summit meeting held at Fontainebleau at the end of June. Mitterrand's tactful handling of the unpopular British and his willingness to reduce French milk production suggest the value he attached to obtaining agreement. Certainly he did not want Britain to leave the Community or be driven out during the French presidency, nor did he want a failure to reach agreement that would lead to the Community's bankruptcy. Beyond that, he also believed that the time had come for the EC to move on to other issues (including the admission of Spain and Portugal) and for Western Europe to organize itself better, within the limits of the practical.

The Fontainebleau agreement, by ending (at least for a time) the seemingly permanent quarrel about costs and benefits, has removed what many have thought were the main obstacles to improved European cooperation. It should soon become clear whether the financial and agricultural issues were truly obstacles to progress in other areas or whether they were a pretext for the absence of progress which, for other reasons, could not be made. The actual French proposals for closer union have so far been modest, and the likelihood that the ten—or twelve—members will be able to agree on enhanced common decision-making remains uncertain.

We should mingle caution with our hopes for early strengthening of European cooperation, particularly in the realm of defense policy. Partly because of the tense international situation focused on Europe, and partly because of the European Parliament elections, there has been a revival of talk about strengthening the Western European Union in order to maximize European defense efforts, fortify European morale and self-assurance in the face of pacifism and neutralism, and better balance American predominance in the Alliance.

Some of the policies of the French government itself can be seen as responding, among other objectives, to these considerations. The role of the rapid action force is described in such a way as to encourage some degree of German confidence in French protection

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while avoiding any firm commitment to concerted action with the other allies in wartime. France has shown interest, not for the first time, in the joint development and production of new weapons by various groupings of European countries. It has also implemented defense talks with the F.R.G. on the basis of a long dormant article of the 1963 treaty between them. The two governments announced in May an important agreement for the joint production of combat helicopters.

But these points of policy are far outweighed by repeated French assertions that the nuclear force guarantees French vital interests only (to be defined by the president in given circumstances) and that non-nuclear allies, including the F.R.G., must look for their guarantees to NATO and the United States. Former Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy has said that a European defense system presupposes a European political authority, presumably out of the question now. Foreign Minister Cheysson has derided the prospects for a common European foreign policy and said that sharing responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons is unimaginable. Defense Minister Hernu said in Bonn that any effort to devise a French (or, presumably, a French-British) nuclear umbrella for Europe would encourage U.S. decoupling and isolationism, which would leave things worse than they are. These comments tell us nothing about French policy we do not already know. They should scotch any wishful hopes about the prospects for extensive European defense cooperation in the foreseeable future which, going beyond conversation, would succeed in better balancing Alliance burdens and responsibilities to the benefit of American taxpayers and West European morale.

V

Cooperation with the United States in Europe may give a Socialist president of France additional reasons not "to kneel" before the United States in other matters, as Cheysson put it. But the pattern of disagreements between the French and American governments with respect to non-European issues is a persistent one, going back to the end of the French colonial empire and de Gaulle's brilliant seizing of that occasion to transform France into the champion of Third World countries and causes. In this area of policy, Mitterrand is essentially following de Gaulle's script, but in his own way.

Mitterrand's France presents itself as the patron among aligned countries of the nonaligned, the best friend among the developed of the less developed. Cheysson has said that France is not nonaligned but that it encourages those that can "escape" alignment. The word "escape" has a poignancy in this context which is surely

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not Gaullist. The General broke the constraints that tied France's hands, or claimed to. Mitterrand accepts them while counseling Third World countries to avoid the fate that sadly overtook Europe in the 1940s: division by the superpowers.

France now tolerates and even sanctions bipolarity in Europe while denouncing it as the worst of evils elsewhere. It rejects the American view that wars and revolutions in the Third World should be addressed mainly as emanations of the East-West contest. Mitterrand, on the contrary, has said that they "are born first from misery, exploitation and totalitarianism, before becoming, unhappily, the stake of East-West conflicts." He does not deny that the Soviet Union exploits such conditions, but says that the West cannot prevent or resolve the resulting upheavals if it focuses on the Soviet element in the situation, real or fancied, and neglects the local roots.

Mitterrand has spoken with conviction and eloquence about the disparities between rich and poor countries and has urged the West to address these problems, and the violence to which they give rise, on their own merits. The French have ranged themselves, not for the first time, in favor of increasing aid from the advanced countries to the underdeveloped, including price supports for the raw materials they export and a new world monetary order. This traditional French policy has been buttressed by the argument that the recovery of the industrial countries from recession cannot take place unless more is done to help the less developed buy and produce. Theory has been joined to practice by an agreement providing for French purchase of Algerian gas at a political, or higher-than-market, price. France undertook this agreement proudly, calling it "not a simple commercial agreement but a fundamental agreement of codevelopment." In doing so, France was not being naïve or even merely principled, since Algeria—always a key French partner in the Maghreb and among Arab and nonaligned countries—has a strong stake in so profitable an arrangement and, therefore, in maintaining good relations with France.

The special attention the Mitterrand government has given to Algeria signals a broader innovation in its approach to Third World policy: a search for privileged partners in various parts of the world with whom it can act in order to enhance its own influence. Algeria is one such partner. Egypt may be another. India is the object of French attentions in Asia. The most striking manifestation of this approach to regional problems was France's effort to act with Mexico in Central America. During Mitterrand's first year, France

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provided arms to Nicaragua and, jointly with Mexico, called for negotiations with the Salvadoran rebels.

This French behavior has somehow not had the unsettling effect on the Reagan Administration that de Gaulle's Phnom Penh speech about the future of Indochina, for example, had on Lyndon Johnson's Washington. For one thing, France's cooperation in Europe is appreciated, an asset the General did not have. Then, it seems to have been noticed that France does not have much influence in Central America, even in league with Mexico. In addition, France has pulled its punches on this subject since 1981. The French-Mexican initiative has not been followed up. Mitterrand, who visited the United States before the Versailles Summit in 1982, said then that France did not want to complicate things in Central America where, after all, the United States was in the front line.

The French policy of trying to keep the superpowers in their place in—or out of—the Third World has been more pronounced in the Middle East, an area of obviously far greater importance to France than Central America. There have been significant French initiatives and activities on all the many problems that have dominated the area during Mitterrand's tenure.

Taking office as the best friend Israel ever had in the Elysée, Mitterrand was to be the first French president to visit that country. But his visit had to be put off twice, first because of the Israeli bombing of Iraq's French-built nuclear facility in June 1981, which his government condemned as "unacceptable and very grave," and then because of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights in January 1982, described by Cheysson as "a veritable provocation to international law." By the time the visit took place, in March 1982, Mitterrand's attempt to tilt France's longtime pro-Arab policy somewhat more in the direction of Israel had been largely negated, not only by these episodes but by the evolution in the other direction of his policy on the key Arab-Israeli issues.

Mitterrand has consistently reaffirmed his commitment to Israel's right to existence and security, and has said that Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with anyone who refuses to recognize these rights in advance. But when he spoke to the Knesset, he had the courage to say that the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank should have a state of their own at the appropriate moment. Further, both he and Cheysson have said repeatedly that they know of no Palestinians other than the Palestine Liberation Organization who could take part in eventual negotiations. The French have continued to support the PLO as the expression of Palestinian nationalism through the vicissitudes of its fortunes in the last two

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years. PLO leader Yassir Arafat, for his part, has praised "the friendly and courageous attitude of the French president and people."

This evolution of France's policy toward the PLO has facilitated its courtship of every available Arab state, which has been rewarded with substantial contracts, particularly for arms. There has been a significant improvement of relations with Egypt, displayed most strikingly in the shift of French policy toward approval of the Camp David agreement and process. By agreeing to put troops in the Sinai force, France took an important step toward Israel and the United States, but also toward Egypt, notwithstanding French skepticism about where the peace talks might go next.

In this and other ways, French activity in the Middle East has been aimed at reasserting France's presence in the area and its potential role in the negotiation of settlements of area problems. At the same time, the French have been careful not to describe their activities in exaggerated terms. French policy toward Lebanon has been based on these considerations as well as the historical tie which has made the policy popular in France despite its risks and costs in the lives of French soldiers. France's long-standing interest in the Levant was reinforced by Giscard's decision to allow French participation in the United Nations force stationed in southern Lebanon. The Mitterrand government then added another dimension to French activity by allowing French troops to be included in the four-power Western force which was sent to Lebanon to expedite the PLO's departure from Beirut in 1982. They were sent back later to protect the Palestinians in the camps, thereafter assigned an escalating role—by the French government as well as by the United States—of staying on until Lebanese reconciliation was achieved and the Lebanese army was able to maintain order. And they were then withdrawn before these goals were achieved.

Here as elsewhere the French think that a solution, if there can be one, depends on negotiations rather than the use of force, and that such negotiations require the participation, and eventual agreement, of all the parties that carry weight in the situation, including the Lebanese factions, Syria and the Soviet Union. Thus, the French military presence worked in parallel with American policy while French objectives were quite different. At the same time, the French have also expressed the view that a settlement in Lebanon depends on a broader Middle East settlement between Israel and its enemies, which depends, in turn, on American pressure on Israel. An election year in the United States does not seem to them a likely time for such pressure to be exerted, and the French

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therefore cannot be very surprised about the present stalemate in the area. But they maintain contact with as many of the interested parties as possible and are ready to take part, to the limit of their connections and influence, in whatever movement toward negotiations may develop.

France's conspicuous role as an arms supplier to Iraq stands somewhat apart from its broader Middle East policies because that country has been largely immobilized in the maneuvering about the Arab-Israeli and Lebanese questions by its war with Iran. The most criticized manifestation of this French policy was the decision in 1983 to withdraw five Super-Etendard attack planes equipped with Exocet missiles from duty with the French fleet for loan to Iraq. Implementation of the decision was far from neat and France was accused of risking a dangerous escalation of fighting in the Gulf in order to promote a narrow self-interest. Defense Minister Hernu said afterward that "the world is still turning."

French efforts to keep relations with Libya on as even a keel as possible have been tortuous but less successful. French motives are political but also commercial, as they have been since Pompidou first targeted Libya as an interesting object of French attentions. The Mitterrand government has not believed that Qaddafi was out of reach as a possible negotiating partner and has not wanted to leave him isolated and dependent on the Soviet Union. But French-Libyan relations have gotten worse for several reasons, including Libyan opposition to French policy toward Israel, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon. The most important source of disagreement, however, has been Chad. Mitterrand's very reluctant decision to reinvolve French forces in Chad deserves attention because that country has been a point of junction for French policy toward Africa, Libya and the United States as well.

The new Socialist government had been expected to keep Africa as the centerpiece of France's extra-European interests, but to adopt a more "decolonizing" and less *affairiste* policy of helping progressive African governments and curbing relations with the more repressive and corrupt regimes. In practice, however, Mitterrand made clear from the start not only that France would maintain its existing ties and commitments but that progress toward democracy or social improvement in African countries would not be a prerequisite of satisfactory state-to-state cooperation.

Giscard had cut his losses in Chad's seemingly endless civil war by withdrawing French forces in May 1980, leaving in power a regime sponsored by the Organization of African Unity and dominated by the Libyan-backed Goukouni Oueddei. Mitterrand tried

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to renew France's presence in Chad by extending aid to this regime but without challenging the Libyan position. The fragile status quo broke down in 1982 when former President Hissen Habré, whom Libya had opposed, returned to power (with American support according to French suspicions). France, however, resumed aid to him, presumably with the hope that Libya might limit its response if the French could limit Habré's dependence on the United States. But this French hope was disappointed when Goukouni set up a government in the north of Chad under Libyan auspices.

As the Libyans advanced south, a chorus of appeals came to Mitterrand from the many francophone states that feared they might be next. He became increasingly concerned both that these states might turn to the United States for help if France did not provide it (the presidents of Zaïre, Senegal and the Ivory Coast all visited Washington during the summer of 1983), and that the United States itself might come to Habré's aid or even attack Libya, thus opening the door to superpower conflict in an area where French interests and prestige were heavily committed.

Mitterrand's decision in August to send French troops back to Chad was taken only after assistance short of intervention and warnings to Libya failed. His hesitation was not because of scruples about the use of force but reflected very realistic concerns that France might be able to preserve part of Chad from Libyan absorption but could not bring the affair to a satisfactory once-and-for-all conclusion. But this well-founded doubt was overridden by the conviction that a line had to be drawn if the entire French position in Africa was not to be swept away by further Libyan intrusions and/or a rush of the francophone states to American protection.

The American factor in France's African policy was clearly an important one. The public quarrel that broke out between the two governments after the intervention began about the degree of their cooperation reflected, from the French side, a concern to avoid over-identification with the Western superpower. Mitterrand does not share the Reagan Administration's obsession with Libya and expects sooner or later to negotiate an arrangement with it. But contacts between the French and Libyan governments have failed so far to produce an agreement. The Libyans may be waiting to see how long France will be content to sit in Chad if it is unable to negotiate an agreement and unwilling either to go to war itself or help Habré carry the war into the north. Mitterrand foresaw these costs and risks and is presumably committed to bearing them while pursuing a negotiated settlement. If so, the results of French policy in Chad itself, whatever the benefits in other respects, may be at

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best a de facto partition and Libyan absorption of the north, and even that only at the price of an indefinite French military presence.

VI

Throughout this discussion I have emphasized Mitterrand's realistic adaptation of French foreign policy to circumstances, and his tendency to avoid talk of grand designs and distant visions. But a policy which is strongly linked to circumstances is more likely to change as circumstances change than one that is more deeply rooted in the psychological needs or private dreams of the policymaker. Significant changes in the environment are likely, therefore, to have significant impact on Mitterrand's policies.

One change with little or no connection to foreign policy was the appointment of Laurent Fabius in July to head a new cabinet, and the departure of the Communist Party from the government coalition. A change of prime ministers halfway through a president's term has been standard practice in the Fifth Republic. Mitterrand had even more reasons than his predecessors to want to reinvigorate a government weighed down by the negative political consequences (shown in the June elections to the European Parliament) of a dismal economic record. As for the Communists, their alliance with the Socialist Party first served the domestic interests of both and now has ceased to do so. It is no more likely that Mitterrand will now become less anti-Soviet because he no longer has to compensate for the presence of Communists in his government than that his posture between the superpowers was ever determined by anything other than his reading of the international balance of forces.

If and when the French government becomes convinced that the East-West military balance has been reestablished, the premises of its policies toward the Soviet Union, the United States and Europe will be changed. Opportunities would be increased for dialogue with the Russians—if they are so inclined—and greater distancing from the Americans in Alliance and European affairs. Even short of such a change in the environment, the Mitterrand government might find it essential to step up diplomatic contact with the Russians if that seemed likely to be fruitful in, for example, Middle East affairs, or if the United States decided to do so.

Some change in this direction may be underway. It is not easy for the allies to keep up with the shifts in American policy, or rhetoric, toward the Soviet Union, linked as these are to domestic political calculations. In 1984 the United States has seemed to be moving toward dialogue as the Soviet Union seems to be moving in the other direction. The French expect U.S.-Soviet negotiations

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on arms control to resume after the November elections. Mitterrand told President Reagan in March that the time was ripe to reopen talks with the Soviet Union now that the Alliance had reaffirmed its coherence and firmness by going ahead with the INF deployments. His visit to the Soviet Union was announced at that time. Whether or not he thinks such dialogue will be immediately fruitful—and his visit last June does not seem to have been—he no doubt believes that France must not let itself be bypassed by the United States in the opening of doors to Moscow. No one can expect greater rigidity from the French government than from the American in such matters, even if, as the French claim, "normal" relations with the U.S.S.R. remain precluded by the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Mitterrand will not follow de Gaulle's example, up to 1964, by being the last of the neo-cold warriors, the more so as his German partner, unlike Adenauer's F.R.G., has quite different ideas.

A second change which would affect French policy would arise from an American embrace of the Federal Republic so intimate as to downgrade the place of France in the policy affections of the United States. This would undermine one of the main premises of the remarkable U.S.-French entente of the last three years. As France and the United States moved together when the F.R.G. and the United States seemed to be moving apart, so a too close coming together of the latter pair would weaken the ties between the former, impelling France to look for new diplomatic combinations in order to avoid isolation and whatever threat to its interests it might see in an overly exclusive U.S.-German entente.

These tendencies, of course, are relative, not absolute. The ties of all three countries to the Atlantic Alliance are not likely to be called into question. But tact on the part of the United States in its dealings with both major European allies, and attention to their individual interests and susceptibilities, would help avoid unnecessary frictions. Up to now the U.S. government has, on the whole, shown such tact (and when it failed to do so, as during the pipeline controversy, it alienated both France and the F.R.G.). Mitterrand's visit to Washington last March was a triumph of mutual appreciation. He seemed at that moment almost to have achieved by cooperation that American recognition of France's independence and importance as a voluntary ally which de Gaulle had tried and failed to win by other means.

Finally, in the Third World, U.S.-French disagreements have not seriously strained the relationship in the last three years because, first, these issues have not become more important than European

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problems. Second, both of the governments have been willing to live and let live, at least compared to the past, with respect to extra-European matters, and even to cooperate to a considerable extent. But a sharp increase in the level of conflict in Central America, for example, or in some other part of the world where the United States becomes involved in resisting what it considers Soviet-backed upheaval, has the potential of making it more difficult for both France and the United States to maintain the level of mutual tolerance they have been displaying.

In such an event, forbearance on both sides would be required if unavoidable disagreements were not to affect cooperation in Europe. The American government would have to be content with little or no French support for actions which it might think were in the interests of the allies as well as itself. It would need to make clear at home that the security of Europe, maintained by cooperation with France and other allies, is valuable and necessary in itself, however much or little the Europeans cooperate on other issues and in other places. This has always turned out to be the U.S. attitude in practice (the Alliance would not have survived for 35 years otherwise), but it would be easier on everyone's nerves if the United States in the future could avoid going up the hill in quest of French (and other allied) support in cases where it is not to be had, and then going back down again after a damaging spate of bad language on both sides.

The Socialist government of France will do well in such cases to recognize that the United States will not take much account of its analysis of Third World problems and will act in response to the American reading of the Soviet position, the local situation in each given case, and the latitude given it by Congress and American public opinion.

In the future, as in recent years, realistic expectations on both sides will be the single most important ingredient of a productive relationship between the United States and France.

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Richard N. Cooper

A MONETARY SYSTEM FOR THE FUTURE

In this fortieth anniversary year of the international monetary conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, there have been numerous but vague calls for a new Bretton Woods conference to improve our international monetary system which, if not actually ailing, at least leaves many participants uneasy and discomfited. Much of the discomfort relates to the large and burdensome external debt that has accumulated around the world, but much also goes beyond debt to the underlying monetary arrangements among countries.

Are international monetary arrangements stable? Are they likely to survive over a considerable period of time, such as a couple of decades? My answer is negative. Dissatisfaction with the very short-run and year-to-year movements in real exchange rates, combined with technological developments which will lead to further integration of the world economy, will sooner or later force a change of existing arrangements. Unless that alteration is carefully managed, it will take the form of defensive, insulating measures involving restrictions on international transactions, both trade and finance. That would be politically divisive and economically costly.

A new Bretton Woods conference is wholly premature. But it is not premature to begin thinking about how we would like international monetary arrangements to evolve in the remainder of this century. With this in mind, I suggest a radical alternative scheme for the next century: *the creation of a common currency for all of the industrial democracies, with a common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue to determine that monetary policy.* Individual countries would be free to determine their fiscal policy actions, but those would be constrained by the need to borrow in the international capital market. Free trade is a natural but not entirely necessary complement to these macroeconomic arrangements.

This suggestion, outlined in the following pages, is far too radical

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Richard N. Cooper is the Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics at Harvard University. He was Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs during 1977–1981, and Provost of Yale University in 1972–74. He is the author of *The Economics of Interdependence* and other works. This article draws on a paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston to honor the fortieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods Conference. Copyright © 1984 Richard N. Cooper.

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

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



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

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

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for the near future. It could, however, provide a "vision" or goal that can guide interim steps in improving international monetary arrangements, and by which we can judge the evolution of national economic policy.

The plan of the article is as follows. Section II offers a brief sketch of the main features of the Bretton Woods system and why it failed, drawing attention to two intrinsic flaws in the original conception. Section III briefly characterizes the present system and suggests that it is workable and even useful, but unstable in the long run—again, it suffers from two fundamental weaknesses. Section IV offers a technically workable scheme for the twenty-first century which, however, calls for major political commitments to international collaboration by the key countries, commitments which are much too ambitious for the present time. Section V brings us back to the present and suggests what steps we might take in the near future with a view to reaching the longer-term objective as it becomes politically possible.

II

Bretton Woods. The system that emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference 40 years ago had five key structural features:

First, it consciously provided a great deal of freedom for national economic policy to pursue national economic objectives, with the objective of assuring full employment, price stability, economic growth, and so forth. The Bretton Woods agreement was produced in the same climate of opinion which resulted in the White Paper on Employment Policy in the United Kingdom, the Employment Act of 1946 in the United States, and comparable legislation or statements of national policy in other countries, deriving directly from the experience of the 1930s and from a determination that that experience should never be repeated.

Second, the Bretton Woods system stipulated that exchange rates between currencies should be fixed. It was taken for granted that fixed exchange rates were desirable against the turbulent background of flexible exchange rates that prevailed in the early 1920s and again briefly in the early 1930s.

Third, currencies should be convertible one into another for international trade in goods and services, including travel. Again, that stipulation was against the background of extensive use of exchange controls by Nazi Germany during the 1930s and the tight wartime restrictions on trade and payments levied by many countries, which the Bretton Woods architects considered desirable to end as quickly as possible.

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These three features taken together—autonomy of national policies, fixed exchange rates, and convertibility of currencies—were in conflict with one another. Countries could not frame their national economic policies independently and still maintain fixed exchange rates and currency convertibility except by luck and coincidence. That potential conflict was recognized by the Bretton Woods architects, who therefore added two further features.

Fourth, provision was made for medium-term international lending to cover balance-of-payments deficits that might result temporarily from the combination of the first three features. A new institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was created as a channel for this new lending.

Fifth, countries were allowed, and in time came to be encouraged, to alter their exchange rates if it became clear that imbalances in payments were not temporary in nature. In other words, if a "fundamental disequilibrium" emerged, the exchange rate was to be changed by a discrete amount, with international agreement, in recognition that such imbalances would be inappropriate to finance indefinitely.

These then were the basic features of the Bretton Woods system. Interestingly, there was no provision in the system for secular growth in international reserves beyond a somewhat ambiguous provision permitting what was called a "uniform change in par values": that is to say, a deliberate rise in the price of gold. It was implicitly assumed that new gold production taken into monetary reserves would be sufficient to provide for adequate growth. In the event, the U.S. dollar came to provide for the needed liquidity, as well as emerging as the currency of intervention in a regime in which some operating medium was necessary to assure that exchange rates remained fixed.

During the quarter century between 1945 and 1970, world monetary reserves outside the United States grew by $54 billion, averaging 4.5 percent per year. Gold provided $13 billion of this increase, of which $9 billion was transferred from the high gold reserves of the United States (which reached 70 percent of total world monetary gold reserves in the late 1940s), and $4 billion came from new gold production. Foreign exchange, which was overwhelmingly in dollars, provided $30 billion of the growth in reserves. The IMF provided $11 billion, including $3 billion of the new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 1970. U.S. reserves, of course, declined during this period because a substantial part of its gold stock was lost to other countries.

As it emerged—though not as it was designed—the Bretton

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Woods system might be said to have involved a bargain between the United States and the rest of the world: the United States would maintain domestic economic stability, and other countries would fix their currencies to the dollar and would accumulate their reserves in gold-convertible dollars. After a relatively brief period of postwar redistribution of the world's monetary gold stock, they would not actually convert their dollars into gold. Under this bargain, other countries would import economic stability from the United States. If a country got out of line with the world norm, it would have to change the par value of its currency. In turn, the United States did not have to be as concerned as other countries about how it financed a balance-of-payments deficit. Indeed, the very notion of a balance-of-payments deficit was an ambiguous one for the United States under these circumstances, although that did not keep the Commerce Department from publishing figures which it called the "deficit" for many years.

A second characteristic of this arrangement was that the dollar was overvalued relative to what it would have been without steady accretion of dollars in the reserves of other countries. That feature permitted some export-led growth by the rest of the world that would not have taken place under different monetary arrangements, under which American products would have been somewhat more competitive in world markets.

In this view of the world, the United States broke its part of the bargain in the late 1960s by inflating too much in connection with the Vietnam War and the Great Society programs. Some Europeans thought that the United States was inflating too much even in the early 1960s. On this point, they would not have found much agreement from Americans. Indeed, disagreement over U.S. policy in the early 1960s indicated one of the weaknesses of the supposed bargain, namely dispute around the world over what exactly represented economically stabilizing behavior by the United States.

The structure of the Bretton Woods system had two intrinsic flaws in it, so that it would have broken down sooner or later even without the burst of U.S. inflation in the late 1960s. First, the gold convertibility of the dollar was bound to become increasingly doubtful as dollar liabilities rose over time relative to the U.S. gold stock. To halt the accumulation of foreign-held dollar reserves would have stifled growth of the world economy. Yet to allow the accumulation to continue would have gradually undermined the foundation of the system. Professor Robert Triffin of Yale University pointed out this dilemma as early as 1959. A new international reserve asset, IMF-issued Special Drawing Rights—aptly described

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as paper gold at the time—was finally created in the late 1960s as a long-run substitute for the dollar, thus offering a solution to the dilemma. But the solution came too late. This part of the system broke down in 1971, when President Nixon indefinitely suspended gold convertibility of the dollar. Two points are worth noting in passing. The first is that the U.S. dollar was the only currency that was convertible into gold, even though the Bretton Woods agreement was formally symmetrical with regard to all currencies. The second is that countries continued to accumulate dollars in their international reserves even after gold convertibility of the dollar was suspended.

The second flaw in the Bretton Woods system was its reliance on discrete changes in exchange rates to correct imbalances in payments. Once a disequilibrium persisted long enough to be "fundamental" rather than temporary in nature, it was clear to everyone and the system thus produced the celebrated one-way option for currency speculation. Since the remedy to a fundamental disequilibrium was a jump in the value of the currency, speculators could move into or out of the currency at relatively low cost when they thought the jump would occur and take their gains after it occurred. It is interesting to note that the Bretton Woods architects had appreciated this problem, at least in principle, and to remedy it had stipulated that currencies should be convertible for current account transactions, but not for capital account transactions. The possibility was envisioned that countries might maintain controls on capital flows, and indeed countries were even enjoined to help other countries maintain and enforce their capital controls. So capital controls were in principle allowed under the Bretton Woods system, and indeed in a certain sense they were required by the internal logic of the system.

This feature of the system did not anticipate the enormous changes both in the nature of trade and in international capital movements that would take place over time. With improved and cheaper communications, it became easy to move capital through telegraphic transfers around the world at relatively low cost. In addition, many firms, especially American firms, began to invest heavily abroad in the 1950s and 1960s, so that many intra-corporate transactions became international in nature. Finally, international trade gradually evolved away from traditional commodity trade toward special order and long-lead-time manufactures in which payments for trade and credit terms become inextricably mixed. For all of these reasons, it became increasingly difficult to separate

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capital from current account transactions and to maintain control on capital transactions.

The movement of funds that was associated with anticipated discrete changes in exchange rates became quite enormous and greatly complicated the management of domestic economic policies. In many countries, they threatened the autonomy of domestic national policy which was to have been preserved by the Bretton Woods system. For example, Germany in 1969 experienced a 25-percent increase in its money supply in a single week due to the inflow of speculative funds across the foreign exchanges and to the requirement that Germany maintain a fixed exchange rate for the mark in terms of other currencies.

In truth, the free movement of capital is incompatible with a system of exchange rates that are occasionally changed by consequential amounts and in a predictable direction. This part of the Bretton Woods system broke down definitively in 1973, although the breakdown started in 1970 when Canada allowed its currency to float.

The U.S. inflation of the late 1960s resulted in large dollar outflows in the early 1970s that strained the Bretton Woods system to the breaking point. But it should be clear by now that this was only the proximate cause of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The intrinsic flaws in the system would have come to the surface sooner or later, in response to one strain or another. They happened to come to the fore in 1971–73.

It is worth remarking that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system was only partial. The International Monetary Fund is an important survivor, both as a lender and as a forum for managing the international monetary system. The convertibility of currencies and the continuing autonomy of national economic policies—both features of the Bretton Woods architecture—are still taken as desiderata in a well-functioning international monetary system. It is a measure of the success of that system that we take them for granted. It was the exchange rate features of the system that broke down, and the psychologically important but technically tenuous link to the historic gold standard via the gold convertibility of the leading currency.

III

Present Arrangements. For the past decade, the world has permitted a variety of exchange rate arrangements, but in practice with a much higher degree of flexibility than prevailed under the Bretton Woods system. This "non-system" has served the world economy

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rather well during a turbulent decade. It is true that the overall economic performance during the past decade, whether measured in terms of inflation rates or growth rates or unemployment rates, has been far inferior to what it was during the 1950s and 1960s. But it probably would have been even worse if governments had tried to maintain the Bretton Woods system through the period. In view of the large disturbances which the world economy has undergone, an attempt to maintain fixed but adjustable exchange rates would almost certainly have required a much higher degree of restrictions over both capital and current transactions than in fact prevailed. Thus exchange rate flexibility helped to preserve a relatively open trading and financial system.

During the decade, movable exchange rates have generally corrected for differences in national inflation rates, as economists predicted they would. But the movements in exchange rates have gone beyond that and affected "real" exchange rates as well—that is, competitiveness as measured by the relative prices at which the goods of one country on the average trade against the goods of another.

An evaluation of the period as a whole is complicated and difficult. Many of the movements in real exchange rates followed textbook predictions, responding to imbalances in current accounts, or to dramatic changes in resource endowments (such as the discovery of North Sea oil), or they followed divergent movements in aggregate demand. But some of the movements in real exchange rates have not followed textbook patterns, and even when they have, they have often been viewed as unwelcome disturbances by some countries, especially following the sharp depreciation of the U.S. dollar in 1978, and again following the sharp appreciation of the dollar in 1981 and 1982. Perhaps for this reason, most countries of the world in fact have not allowed their currencies to float. Rather, they have fixed the value of their currencies against something—against another currency, or a basket of currencies, or, in the case of the European Monetary System, against one another. Thus it is not entirely accurate to characterize current arrangements as involving floating exchange rates. In practice, the exchange rates of several major currencies—the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the British pound, the Canadian dollar—do float more or less freely, but other currencies do not float, although they have shown greater flexibility than they would have under a Bretton Woods regime.

Movements in some key bilateral exchange rates, such as the dollar-deutsche mark rate, have shown sharp short-run variations

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on occasion during the past decade, which were not keyed to fundamental economic developments in any obvious way. There have been occasional weeks of average daily variations in excess of three percent. Why such great variability? In some respects foreign currency holdings are like any other financial asset, whose current price reflects all the information available that may have a bearing on its future value. New information may then affect market prices (in this instance exchange rates) sharply as the "market" reappraises the future in the light of new information.

This analogy to stock prices helps to explain the abruptness of some movements in exchange rates. But it hardly helps to explain month after month of sharp variability, up and down. Much "new" information, in a longer perspective, is in fact only noise, whose bearing on the price in question can reasonably be expected to be reversed in the near if not immediate future, especially since trade can eventually be expected to respond to persistent movements in exchange rates.

Abrupt up-and-down shifts in exchange rates may not, by themselves, greatly affect trade and production, since they should reasonably be expected to be reversed soon if they are not clearly linked to more fundamental economic developments. The added uncertainty about what an exchange rate will be when a transaction is completed will, however, undoubtedly discourage trade and investment for export to some extent.

The main difficulty with flexible exchange rates is that another influence is also at work, which can transmute the influence of noisy news into larger changes in exchange rates than otherwise would take place. It is the presence of crowd or bandwagon effects in the trading community. Few know how to interpret the news. Many use a movement in the exchange rate itself as a source of information about market sentiment. To avoid being left behind, dealers jump on the bandwagon, thus pushing the exchange rate further in the direction it tended to go initially. Expectations feed on expectations.

When this process is operating, even those who suspect the exchange rate has gone too far still have an interest in holding their investments so long as the prospect for further gain outweighs the probability of reversal. Thus a secondary judgment, oriented toward market dynamics, is superimposed on the reassessment based on the new information, and may come to dominate the movement in exchange rates for a time. This would not be troublesome if there were no real economic consequences. But in some periods expectations about the "fundamentals" may be so weakly held that

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the rate can be dominated by purely market dynamics for periods measured in weeks or months. When that is so, the exchange rate may in turn affect new information, such as price indexes, increases in which the public interprets as "inflation." Or it may set in motion urgent steps to avoid risks, as when multinational firms move to protect their quarterly balance sheets (at the expense of the operating earnings of the firms). So a vicious circle may temporarily be set in motion. And this vicious circle may aggravate inflation rates and hence inflationary expectations, or it may divert management attention away from real long-term investment to short-term balance-sheet considerations. In either case an unnecessary and avoidable element of instability is introduced into national economies.

Two features of present exchange rate arrangements will not be satisfactory over the long run. First, movements in real exchange rates have major effects on national economies, effects which are often unwelcome. Yet movements in real exchange rates cannot be easily controlled by use of the usual instruments of national economic policy because the determinants of exchange rates are diverse and complex. The result is that at any moment the influence of policy actions on exchange rates is uncertain. Portfolio decisions with respect to financial assets play a key role in the short-run determination of exchange rates, yet the influence of policy actions on portfolio decisions, via expectations, is uncertain. This marks a substantial contrast with the influence of policy actions on the aggregate demand for goods and services, where the linkages with policy are clearer. Despite this, we have not to date been able to eliminate the so-called business cycle. Unpredictable movements in real exchange rates, and unpredictable responses of real exchange rates to government action, greatly aggravate the problem of macroeconomic management.

Second, under a regime of flexible exchange rates there is a temptation, hence some tendency, to manipulate the exchange rate for national purposes. This can be done either to fight inflation, since monetary tightening produces an immediate reward—at the expense of other countries, so long as others do not respond in kind—in terms of a reduced inflation rate brought about by an appreciated currency. Or it can be used to combat unemployment, when expansionary monetary policy depreciates the currency—again, in general, at the expense of other countries. Of course, the new configuration of exchange rates may be satisfactory to all or most countries, but that would be a coincidence. Ordinarily these represent self-centered national actions which simply pass the problem either of inflation or of unemployment to other countries.

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Members of the IMF have a general responsibility to avoid such manipulation of exchange rates, and the IMF has a general responsibility for surveillance over exchange rate practices, with the aim of preventing such practices. But surveillance really has not gotten off the ground, and it is not clear under today's arrangements what the IMF can really do, for example, when a Sweden deliberately depreciates its currency in order to increase output and employment, or when a United States achieves a substantial reduction in its inflation rate through a policy of tight money which has greatly appreciated the dollar against other currencies.

Just as present exchange rate arrangements are not really sustainable over the long run, neither are present arrangements for the creation of reserves. The principal reserve medium today is a national currency, the U.S. dollar, dependent in large part for its supply on the policies of the United States. This has been accepted, more or less grudgingly, because it has worked reasonably well and there is no clear feasible alternative. But it leaves a deep sense of uneasiness around the world, even when the United States in the judgment of others is relatively well behaved; and the uneasiness grows dramatically when in such periods as 1970–71 and 1978 and 1981–82 the rest of the world, or parts of it, believe the United States is not well behaved.

Moreover, as the United States shrinks in relation to the rest of the world, as it is bound to do, the intrinsic weaknesses of reliance on the U.S. dollar will become more apparent, especially in the United States, where the possible reaction of foreign dollar-holders will become an ever greater constraint on U.S. monetary policy. The United States is bound to shrink relative to the rest of the world, not because it is doing badly, but because the rest of the world may be expected to do well. The natural growth in the labor force and the rate of capital accumulation are both higher in many parts of the world than they are in the United States. Furthermore, technologically lagging countries can reduce the technological gap between themselves and the United States, which operates on the frontiers of modern technology. Thus the simple arithmetic of economic growth will insure a gradual relative decline of the United States, for instance from about one-fourth of gross world product at present to around one-sixth 25 years from now if the United States grows on average at three percent a year and the rest of the world grows on average at five percent a year, both plausible numbers.

In short, the present set of monetary arrangements, while not in any immediate danger of collapse from its intrinsic features, as

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distinguished from some external event, is not stable in the long run. It is not a durable system. It must evolve into something else.

But what will or should it evolve into? One possibility is that the frustrations arising from the sense of loss of national control will lead to significant attempts to reassert national control by sharply reducing the openness and permeability of national economies to external influences. The move to flexible exchange rates can itself be interpreted as such a response, since countries enjoyed even less control, especially as regards monetary policy, under a system of fixed exchange rates with high capital mobility. But we have now learned that flexible exchange rates, while they offer some degree of greater national autonomy, do not effectively insulate national economies from external influences, and indeed in some instances may even exacerbate the impact of external influences on national economic developments. So the frustrations at loss of national control continue, and alleviating them requires much stronger insulating material than flexible exchange rates alone provide. It would probably involve a reversion to extensive use of restrictions over capital movements. And since capital transactions cannot be effectively separated from current transactions, there would be a tendency to extend restrictions to current transactions as well.

IV

Future arrangements. I suggest a different possible evolution of international monetary arrangements that attempts to deal with the intrinsic problems with present arrangements that render them unstable in the long run. First, let us go forward 25 years, to the year 2010. That is far enough ahead so that developments that are completely unrealistic in the next five or ten years can be contemplated. But it is not so far ahead that we cannot really contemplate them at all.

By 2010 the populations and labor forces of the modern industrial economies will of course be larger than they are today, but the labor force engaged in manufacturing production in today's OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries will probably have declined. Manufacturing is likely to go the way that agriculture has already gone, with a declining share of the labor force able to produce all of the material goods that the rest of society needs. Real incomes per capita will be over 50 percent higher than they are today. The world will be very electronic. Thus not only will large-scale financial transactions take place virtually instantaneously to any part of the world—we are close to that situation today—but even retail transactions in financial services

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and in goods can take place electronically. That is, householders will be able to purchase information regarding taxation, investments, retirement possibilities, or education by consulting electronic catalogues and information sources in their own homes. Even goods will be able to be purchased by inspecting them on a television screen, placing the order electronically, and having them delivered in a relatively short period of time. English will become even more widespread as the language of commerce.

With higher real incomes and lower relative prices for long-distance transportation, much more travel will take place than occurs today. Reliable, high-speed and low-cost communications over the globe will permit management control of production locations in many places. Lower transportation costs (relative to the price of other goods and services) will encourage trade. These factors taken together are likely to result in greater possibilities for substitution of geographic locations, not only in manufacturing production but also in many services. Thus, real movements in exchange rates will be highly disruptive of profits, production and employment in any particular location.

Yet financial factors will still dominate the determination of exchange rates in the short run. In view of the greater sensitivity of production to changes in real exchange rates, governments must reduce arbitrary movements in real exchange rates in order to maintain an open trading system. With widespread information and low transaction costs, an adjustable peg system of exchange rates that requires occasional discretionary movements in market exchange rates is not likely to be tenable—indeed, did not prove to be tenable even under the technological conditions prevailing in the 1960s.

These various considerations lead me to conclude that *we will need a system of credibly fixed exchange rates* by that time if we are to preserve an open trading and financial system. Exchange rates can be most credibly fixed if they are eliminated altogether, that is, if international transactions take place with a single currency. But a single currency is possible only if there is in effect a single monetary policy, and a single authority issuing the currency and directing the monetary policy. How can independent states accomplish that? They need to turn over the determination of monetary policy to a supranational body, but one which is responsible collectively to the governments of the independent states. There is some precedent for parts of this type of arrangement in the origins of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, which blended quite separate regions of the country, and banks subject to diverse state banking jurisdictions,

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into a single system, paralleling the increasingly national financial market. Similarly, we will need a world monetary system that parallels the increasingly global financial market. It will probably not be possible, even within the time scale envisaged here, to have a truly global Bank of Issue. But that will not be necessary either, and it may be possible to have a Bank of Issue which serves a more limited group of democratic countries, and which can serve as the core of an international system.

The Monetary Authority. The tasks, the instruments, and the decision-making structure of the Bank of Issue could look something like the following:

—The governing board would be made up of representatives of national governments, whose votes would be weighted according to the share of the national GNP in the total gross product of the community of participating nations. This weighting could be altered at five-year intervals to allow for differences in growth rates.

—The task of the monetary authority would be to stabilize the macroeconomic environment and to avoid or mitigate liquidity crises by acting as a lender of last resort, just as national central banks do today. The debate on the relative weights to be attached to output and employment as opposed to price stabilization, and on how monetary policy should actually be managed, could continue just as it does at present, without prejudice.

—The Bank of Issue would accomplish its tasks by engaging in open market operations in which it issued the new currency for the securities of member countries. It could also engage in rediscount operations, whereby it extended claims against itself in exchange for acceptable paper at the initiative of banks within the system, subject to its own acquiescence in those initiatives.

The Bank of Issue need not engage in detailed regulation of the banks throughout the system covered by the new currency. That could be left in the hands of national regulators. It would, however, probably want to issue guidelines—minimum standards—to be followed by national regulators, and to maintain enough surveillance over banks to be sure of itself when it was called upon to act as a lender of last resort.

In the first instance, open market operations by the Bank of Issue could be distributed among the securities of national governments in proportion to their voting weight (i.e., their GNP share), but over time this limitation would probably cease to be necessary as financial

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markets evolved and securities issued by many national governments became virtually perfect substitutes one for another. In any case, the Bank of Issue's holdings of national government securities could be altered from GNP shares via the rediscounting facility, as needed.

Seigniorage in this system would automatically be distributed to national governments as their securities were purchased by the Bank of Issue, thereby giving them the purchasing power to buy goods and services. In addition, the Bank of Issue would run profits from its interest earnings, and those could be distributed from time to time to national governments on the basis of their voting shares.

The currency of the Bank of Issue could be practically anything. Most natural would be an evolution from the present U.S. dollar, making use of the extensive dollar-based worldwide markets. But if that were not politically acceptable, it could be a synthetic unit that the public would have to get used to, just as it had to get used to the metric system when that replaced numerous national systems. The key point is that monetary control—the issuance of currency and of reserve credit—would be in the hands of the new Bank of Issue, not in the hands of any national government, no matter what the historical origin of the new currency happened to be.

National Economic Policy. The publics of the industrial democracies have placed high expectations on their national governments for economic management. Here governments are being asked to pass monetary policy to a supranational agency, the actions of which they can influence but not determine, taken one by one. Would national governments be giving up all of their macroeconomic control? The answer to this question is negative, since they could still pursue fiscal policy at the national level. What they would be giving up is monetary financing of budget deficits beyond their prorated allocation from jointly agreed open market operations. In particular, they could not engage in inflationary finance to reduce the real value of outstanding currency and debt at the national level, although the requisite majority could do so at the international level. To finance budget deficits, therefore, it would be necessary to go to the capital market. But under the envisaged circumstances there would no doubt be a very high degree of capital mobility among participants, since all securities would be denominated in a single, widely used currency. Of course, the influence of national fiscal actions on national aggregate demand would be limited by leakages abroad through demand for imports, and at the outer limits by the extent to which individual governments could borrow in the capital market.

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Governments could also use their fiscal powers to attract internationally mobile firms by means of tax holidays or other fiscal incentives. These practices have already emerged as a new form of fiscal action both within countries (e.g., industrial development bonds issued by individual states within the United States) and between countries. With internationally mobile capital, these practices may indeed succeed in generating local employment in "depressed" areas without necessarily resulting in a misallocation of resources, as the burden of taxation is shifted to relatively immobile residents. Nonetheless, if these practices became too competitive among nations, they might want to put some collectively agreed limits on them, and even allow special differentiation under some circumstances, e.g., when unemployment rates were higher than some agreed norm.

One old-fashioned policy instrument for encouraging local investment and employment is the use of tariffs to discriminate against foreign goods. It would be logical if this single currency regime were accompanied by free trade, just as the dollar area within the United States is accompanied by free trade. That would also be consistent with the collaborative political spirit that would be required for the single currency regime to be established. Free trade would insure one market in goods as well as in financial instruments. The scheme would be quite workable also with modest tariffs, at or below the levels that now generally prevail among industrialized countries. But the exact nature of the commercial regime is beyond the scope of this article.

How the Regime Would Work. Governments could determine the balance between their expenditures and taxes as they do now, but beyond their pro-rated share of the Bank of Issue's open market purchases and profits they would have to borrow on the capital market to cover any budget deficits. Market access would be determined by a market assessment of the probability of repayment, which would assuredly be high within a plausible range of budgetary behavior. Both receipts and expenditures would be made in the common currency, as would the borrowing. Each country could set its own course independently, with no need for formal coordination of fiscal policy. Financial markets would "coordinate" to some extent, via interest rates, since if all governments decided to borrow heavily at once, in a period in which private demands for credit were also high, interest rates would rise and that would induce greater caution in borrowing. But the larger countries would certainly find it useful to exchange information on intentions with

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respect to future actions, so that each of them could take the prospective actions of others into account. This exchange would no doubt evolve over time into an iterative process that was hardly distinguishable from coordination, although in the end each country would be free to act as it saw fit.

Monetary policy would be set for the community as a whole by a board of governors, who in practice would probably be finance ministers. No single country would be in control. A weighted majority of the governors would decide the principles both to govern monetary policy (e.g., how much weight to give to monetary magnitudes as opposed to other economic variables in framing monetary policy) and with respect to actual operations. The governors in turn would be accountable to legislatures. The Bank of Issue would have a certain autonomy by virtue of not being beholden to any single legislative or executive authority. Thus it could not be manipulated for particular electoral reasons. On the other hand, its actions would be determined by a majority of officials who would be individually accountable to legislatures or executives, so that if a (weighted) majority of them desired a shift in policy, it would occur.

Balance-of-payments adjustment within this regime would be as easy, or as difficult, as it is between regions of the United States or any other large country today. The adjustment would be automatic, except insofar as it was cushioned by capital inflows induced by fiscal actions. Automatic balance-of-payments adjustment sometimes leads to unemployment, as following a shift in demand away from the products of a particular region or country. Fiscal policy in its various forms could be used to cushion such unemployment. In addition, my guess is that there would be considerable net immigration into the present industrial democracies by early in the next century, and the distribution of that flow of migrants would provide considerable flexibility to the labor force in the region as a whole.

This one-currency regime is much too radical to envisage in the near future. But it is not too radical to envisage 25 years from now, and indeed some such scheme, or its functional equivalent, will be necessary to avoid retrogression into greater reliance on barriers to international trade and financial transactions. Moreover, it is useful to have a vision to provide guidance for the steps that may be feasible in the near future. Some idea of where we would like to get to provides a sense of direction for the next steps.

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V

Next Steps. The idea of a single currency is so far from being politically feasible at present—in its call for a pooling of monetary sovereignty—that it will require many years of consideration before people become accustomed to the idea. But the economic effect can be gradually approximated by giving greater weight to exchange rates in framing national monetary policy. Many countries—all those with fixed or semi-fixed rates—of course already do this. This injunction therefore applies mainly to the United States, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the members of the European Monetary System taken as a group. If monetary policy were governed in such a way as to limit wide swings in key exchange rates, this would tend also to reduce fluctuations in real exchange rates. This result could be accomplished by adoption of one or another of the formal schemes that have been proposed from time to time, such as the target zone, whereby countries undertake to confine market movements of the exchange rate within a specified band centered on a target rate, which target can if necessary be altered from time to time. The European Monetary System is a variant of such a scheme, with central rates being subject to periodic renegotiation as they become questionable. Seven changes in central rates have been made in the period since 1979, and generally the changes have been sufficiently small so that market exchange rates were not immediately affected, or were affected only modestly.

It may not be possible to reach international agreement on a formal scheme for exchange rate management. But the process of official discussion of such schemes, each particular one of which is subject to defects under some circumstances, will apprise officials of the possibilities for accomplishing the principal objective, viz. to reduce undue fluctuations in real exchange rates. Thus launching a move toward "reform" of exchange rate arrangements may fail in the sense that no formal scheme is agreed on, but still succeed in its underlying purpose of establishing a more or less shared view of what exchange rates should be at a given time and a consensus to work toward keeping market rates within the neighborhood of the consensus rates.

What is also necessary is some consultation among major countries on the overall "tone" of monetary policy. This is a politically difficult step and cannot be taken overtly any time soon, since each nation has its formal system of decision-making and channels of responsibilities for determining monetary policy. However, the same result can be accomplished informally, centered around dis-

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cussion of exchange rate management, for which there seems to be a widespread desire, especially in business circles.

It was suggested in the previous section that the choice of a currency for a one-currency regime is open and in a sense is arbitrary. It could be anything that is agreed, since money is above all a social convention. In fact the choice would be a politically charged issue, with strong if irrational objections to the choice of any national currency. If national currencies are ruled out, that leaves the European currency unit (ECU) and SDR in today's world. The ECU might meet the same objections in the United States and Japan as the U.S. dollar would meet in Europe. That in turn leaves only the SDR, which is now defined as a weighted average of five leading national currencies: the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the German mark, the French franc and the British pound. The new Bank of Issue could not issue IMF-SDRs unless the Bank were the IMF itself. But the Bank could use the SDR as its measuring unit, and issue both currency notes and reserve bank credit in that unit.

The future of the SDR as a currency would be immeasurably enhanced if private parties could conduct transactions in SDRs; indeed, that would be a necessary condition. It would also greatly facilitate the use of the SDR as a central bank currency, since the modus operandi of central banks in most cases is through private markets, and they need a medium which can be used in private markets. Thus the IMF-SDR would be enhanced if some mechanism could be found to make this possible. The IMF Articles would have to be amended to make it possible for private parties and commercial banks to hold the IMF-SDR directly. Professor Peter Kenen of Princeton University has recently made an ingenious proposal which would accomplish much the same result without formally amending the Articles.[1] This is not an urgent step, but it should be done if the role of SDR is to be strengthened. Also, it would be desirable to issue more IMF-SDRs to keep that asset alive and in use. We will want it sometime in the future. The British economist John Williamson, of the Institute for International Economics, has recently shown that an issue of SDR 43 billion over the next two years, while at first glance a large figure, could easily be justified.[2]

A key question concerning the new Bank of Issue is what countries should participate in its management, use its currency, and forswear national monetary policy. We have come to think of the international monetary system, centered on the IMF with its 146

[1] See Peter B. Kenen, "Use of the SDR to Supplement or Substitute for Other Means of Finance," in George M. von Furstenberg, ed., *International Money and Credit: The Policy Roles*, Washington: IMF, 1983.

[2] See John Williamson, *A New SDR Allocation?*, Washington: Institute for International Economics, March 1984.

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members, as a global system, albeit excluding most communist countries and Switzerland. That was certainly the conception at Bretton Woods, even though most of the early negotiation had been between the Americans and the British. That was also the spirit of the times at Bretton Woods, when the wartime allies placed their hopes for a better world in the United Nations Organization and its functional affiliates.

But there is serious question about whether one world money is either necessary or desirable. And it is certainly not feasible, even within our generous 25-year time frame. It is not feasible for two reasons. First, it is highly doubtful whether the American public, to take just one example, could ever accept that countries with oppressive autocratic regimes should vote on the monetary policy that would affect monetary conditions in the United States. I believe that the same reservations would obtain in other democratic societies. For such a bold step to work at all, it presupposes a certain convergence of political values as reflected in the nature of political decision-making, and the basic trust and confidence to which those give rise.

Second, countries with different values, circumstances, and systems of governance are bound to introduce into negotiations leading toward a common Bank of Issue elements which are of greater interest to them, thus broadening the agenda for negotiation and rendering impossible an already difficult negotiation. For both reasons the proposal should be undertaken in the first instance by the United States, Japan, and the members of the European Community. This group represents the core of the monetary system at present and for some time to come. Other democracies would be free to join if they wished, and if they were willing to undertake the commitments involved, but no one should be obliged to join. Very likely many countries would find it attractive in the early stages not to join, but nonetheless to peg their currencies to the SDR or whatever was the unit of account of the Bank of Issue. They would retain some monetary freedom, however, which members had given up. Some countries would also be reluctant to give up the seigniorage from currency issue, which can be consequential where currency still bears a high ratio to GNP.

In short, there would be an inner club accepting higher responsibilities, but open to additional members who met the requirements, and of value even to nonmembers by providing a stable monetary environment against which to frame their economic policies. But this arrangement would mark a formal break with the universalism that governs the de jure if not the de facto structure of the Bretton Woods system today.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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General: Political and Legal

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUR TIME: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF VICTOR BARAS. Edited by Marc F. Plattner. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 161 pp. $18.50.

President Carter's human rights campaign, whatever its success or failure in furthering his foreign policy aims, has had one measurable result: the cascade of published words on the subject. Many of the publications are overlapping or repetitious, but, as this book illustrates, the topic has a way of stimulating thought going further than the official statements and unofficial comment of the time. This series of essays, ranging rather widely and not tied to a single thesis, is a pleasant surprise. Some are historical, some contemporary; some philosophical, some directed to recent or current policy. All are worth reading.

INTERNATIONALIZING THE SEABED. By Roderick C. Ogley. Brookfield (Vt.): Gower, 1984, 247 pp. $38.50.

The Law of the Sea negotiations were inordinately long and complex. The author of this monograph, who followed them closely as an unofficial observer, gives a play-by-play account of how they dealt with the key questions involved in exploitation of minerals of the deep seabed, "the common heritage of mankind," and in the establishment of an international authority to regulate it, the issue on which the U.S. decided not to go along with the treaty signed by 118 other states in 1982. The reader may come close to suffocation by the mass of technical detail, but can be grateful for so full a background and so intelligent a commentary both on the negotiations and on the issues.

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF LAW-MAKING. By Keith Suter. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 192 pp. $27.50.

The conclusion of this book is that there is no clear or effective international law covering the conduct of guerrilla warfare, despite the conclusion in 1977 of two detailed protocols supplementing the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the humanitarian law of armed conflicts. One may wonder whether the long story of the decade of conferences and negotiations involving international lawyers, diplomats, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and especially the International Committee of the Red Cross, with disappointing results, is

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worth telling. Governments were not sufficiently concerned to make the effort succeed, and the world press showed no interest. However, the subject is an important one, and Keith Suter, an Australian scholar, enlivens his narrative with pointed, even barbed, commentary.

AMERICA IN DECLINE, VOL. I. By Raymond Lotta with Frank Shannon. Chicago: Banner Press, 1984, 278 pp. $21.95 (paper, $11.95).

It is Lenin's age of imperialism and crisis, with America at the center of the structure of imperialist power, but with the U.S.S.R. now as head of a rival "social imperialist" bloc. An ambitious and often interesting attempt at Marxist interpretation of world developments in the 20th century.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

THE ABOLITION. By Jonathan Schell. New York: Knopf, 1984, 192 pp. $11.95.

In his earlier book, *The Fate of the Earth*, Jonathan Schell sought to resolve our difficult nuclear dilemmas through an undefined type of world government, and seemed to wish away our reliance upon nuclear deterrence. In this sequel he makes an effort to confront, honestly and eloquently, some of the criticisms he received. Now he is willing to accept deterrence, but of a special sort: nuclear weapons would still be abolished, but the known ability of the various nations to build them would provide a "weaponless deterrence." Unfortunately, this raises more questions than it answers. Schell's strength is his ability to make us question the assumptions and accepted wisdoms of 40 years of living with nuclear arms. His continuing weakness is an unmistakable political naïveté. Yet, this book is evidence that Schell's thinking is evolving. Might a third volume not espouse arms control?

THE COLD AND THE DARK: THE WORLD AFTER NUCLEAR WAR. By Paul R. Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy and Walter Orr Roberts. New York: Norton, 1984, 229 pp. $12.95.

The report of a major conference on the long-term biological consequences of nuclear war. Carl Sagan presents the atmospheric and climactic effects, while Paul Ehrlich summarizes the biological implications. The report concludes that even a relatively small nuclear war could trigger a "nuclear winter," producing conditions much worse than previously anticipated; smoke, soot and damage to the ozone layer would blot out sunlight, producing severe and prolonged low temperatures. The report, as well as the conference, intentionally avoided drawing any policy implications from the findings. There may have been good reasons for this, but it nevertheless limits the usefulness of the report. "Consciousness raising" may be achieved, but it would be regrettable if such an important scientific undertaking on the world's most critical problem should not have an impact upon arms control policymakers.

THE DAY AFTER WORLD WAR III: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S PLANS FOR SURVIVING A NUCLEAR WAR. By Edward Zuckerman. New York: Viking, 1984, 407 pp. $18.95.

This uncommon book, produced by a writer rather than a defense specialist, is essentially about civil defense planning for emergency procedures following

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nuclear attack. Too often his approach is simply to ridicule—the implication being why bother to plan for such a world at all?—and some of the specifics do seem absurd. Yet government does have a responsibility to seek to assure its continuity in the event of nuclear war. Some of the details Zuckerman has uncovered are fascinating.

MEASURING MILITARY POWER: THE SOVIET AIR THREAT TO EUROPE. By Joshua M. Epstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 288 pp. $22.50.

Assumptions about the military balance in Europe are usually based upon an enumeration of static peacetime inventories—"bean counting"—rather than an evaluation of wartime effectiveness. This outstanding book takes a single, though important, element of the Soviet threat—tactical air power—and analyzes its effectiveness through dynamic indicators such as combat skill, efficiency in support functions, tactical decision-making and other "acts of war." Epstein's work is not for the general reader, but it should be of immense interest to defense analysts and professionals. In this path-breaking study, they will find an intelligent and rigorous way of measuring military power based on outputs (performance) rather than the conventional inputs (numbers of tanks, planes, etc.).

THE DEFENSE REFORM DEBATE. Edited by Asa A. Clark IV and others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984, 370 pp. $30.00 (paper, $12.95).

A potpourri of innovative ideas and proposals designed to bring about changes in American military doctrine, strategy, weapons and organization have been made in recent years. Their scope and diversity is striking: should conventional war doctrine emphasize maneuver rather than attrition? Should priority in military procurement shift from a smaller number of sophisticated and expensive weapons to a larger number of proven, less sophisticated and cheaper arms? Should the Joint Chiefs of Staff be reorganized, and, perhaps, given a general staff? These and other questions are at the heart of the defense reform debate; its participants include liberals (Gary Hart) and conservatives (Newt Gingrich), civilians and soldiers, technicians and strategists. This volume, the best on the subject, contains papers presented at a 1982 West Point conference. Although its contributions make clear that "reformers" often point in contradictory directions, it is evidence that the debate is wide-ranging, fundamental, and likely to have lasting impact on the defense establishment.

NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE: ENDURING DILEMMAS, PRESENT PROSPECTS. By Leon V. Sigal. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 181 pp. $22.95 (paper, $8.95).

By this time there is little new that can be said about the 1979 "dual track" decision on the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs, the political conditions that preceded the decision, and the great debate that ensued. Yet, Sigal's study pulls it all together exceedingly well. Beyond marshalling the many complex details and arguments, he evokes the many paradoxes in the INF debate, the contradictions and inconsistencies that often result when nuclear weapons become mixed with politics. He leaves the reader appropriately concerned about the future: the Soviet response of new deployments beginning this year, and the breakdown of arms control, may be less easily reversed in the coming year or two than some people believe.

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THE INFLUENCE OF BRITISH ARMS: AN ANALYSIS OF BRITISH MILITARY INTERVENTION SINCE 1956. By James H. Wyllie. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984, 125 pp. $19.95.

A short book with much wisdom about the problems of intervening with military force in unstable Third World regions. The British author examines his nation's interventions, from the Suez to the Falklands, and is impressed by the limits of power. When major interests of the West are at stake, he thinks that the United States should shoulder the burden. If Britain is involved, "the action should have sound moral foundations; the legal basis for the intervention must be clear; military capabilities need to be adequate for the task at hand . . . and the political purpose of the use of military force must be unambiguous." Not bad advice for Washington, either.

ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 157 pp. $18.50 (paper, $8.95).

THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE AND ARMS CONTROL. Edited by Steven E. Miller. Cambridge: Ballinger, 208 pp. $12.00.

Conferences about the nuclear issue have proliferated in the past three years in response to the growth of public concern. So has the number of volumes which record the discussions at these meetings. Necessarily, they are partly overtaken by events by the time they are published (often more than two years) and very brief on a variety of issues. But they do gauge the intensity and richness of the debate. The two books above are among the best of the genre. The first is the product of a conference at the Center on International Security and Arms Control at UCLA, which was intended to kick off a University of California program to discuss these problems. The second comes from Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and discusses almost every aspect of the nuclear freeze issue.

NUCLEAR ARMS: ETHICS, STRATEGY, POLITICS. Edited by R. James Woolsey. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984, 289 pp. $22.95 (paper, $8.95).

A collection of essays on the key issues of nuclear arms control, with several of them dealing with other matters such as energy security and international terrorism. Many of the authors are eminent defense policy experts, and there is a balance in the political perspectives, but the contributions are too brief to bring much that is new to the ongoing debate. They do serve, however, to underscore how deep the fissures are on such issues in the American body politic and how difficult—and important—it is to grapple with them.

THE NEW POLITICS OF SCIENCE. By David Dickson. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 304 pp. $22.95.

The author was Washington correspondent for the British weekly *Nature* for four years and is now European correspondent for the journal *Science*. His thesis is that decisions on science—ranging from the broad allocation of resources among competing areas of basic science to the detailed application of scientific achievements to market-determined needs—are increasingly concentrated in a closed circle of corporate, banking, and military leaders. Although most research in the United States is federally funded, the nation's scientific enterprise is being steadily removed from public decision-making. This has come about at a time of scientific and high-technology renaissance. One need not accept the thesis in toto

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to find this a valuable book, full of information and insights about the political relationships which affect science funding and politics.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF SPACE. Edited by Uri Ra'anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1984, 324 pp. $32.50.

A collection of essays from a Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy conference which generally views space as an important arena for competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, one in which the U.S. should substantially increase its efforts. Robert Pfaltzgraff's conclusions support President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and argue in favor of accelerating work on space-based ballistic missile defense.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

CAN AMERICA COMPETE? By Robert Z. Lawrence. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 156 pp. $22.95 (paper, $8.95).

Much of the pessimism about the performance of the American economy in the 1970s is misplaced, according to the sophisticated statistical analysis that is at the core of this challenging study by a Brookings economist. Production, investment and R&D in manufacturing compared well with past decades and current European performance. America is not deindustrializing; employment has shifted significantly to high-growth and high-technology industries; the main troubles have come from domestic factors rather than foreign trade competition. Naturally there are some problems about this analysis, but it is well argued and cannot be ignored. Lawrence is less original in his case against sectoral policies and his preference for macroeconomic policies and letting market forces play. He calls for clearer analysis of what we are doing to ourselves and has some ingenious suggestions about trade policies and adjustment incentives.

COMPETITIVE EDGE: THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN. Edited by Daniel I. Okimoto, Takuo Sugano, and Franklin B. Weinstein. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, 296 pp. $27.50.

Japanese and American scholars, working as a team, compared the semiconductor industries of the two countries as to technology, finance, forms of business organization, industrial policy and relations with government. Although not everything is crystal clear—even to the researchers—there is a remarkable amount of information in this book, and Professor Okimoto makes a yeoman effort to determine where each industry is stronger. There is no way for this kind of study to be completely up to date, but there is enough here to help one appraise changes as they occur.

THE AMERICAN DISEASE. By George C. Lodge. New York: Knopf, 1984, 352 pp. $18.95.

The many indicators of poor performance by the American economy are symptoms of "an ideological schizophrenia" whose causes are "psychological, philosophical, and religious." Sometimes our institutions adapt to contemporary needs but do not acknowledge the change; sometimes they stick to old ideas and fail to make the changes they should. In making his case—which will not persuade everyone—Professor Lodge covers a wide range of subjects with vivid case

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illustrations and ends up with recommendations about government, business and labor that move towards what he calls "communitarian" principles. His vigorous arguments are supplemented by excellent material from interviews with business and labor leaders and others that add to the interest of this challenging book.

REBUILDING AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW ECONOMY. By Gar Alperovitz and Jeff Faux. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 384 pp. $20.00 (paper, $10.95).

Laying about both to the left and the right, and denouncing the "broker state" that gives out what any group is strong enough to demand, the codirectors of the National Center for Economic Alternatives force their readers to think. Their program for full employment and utilizing America's wealth instead of wasting it is a supply-side approach with a strong public sector, much community participation, and a good bit of planning. The implications for foreign economic policy are not altogether clear, but this is a book that cannot be easily dismissed.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH IN THE WESTERN ECONOMIES. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, 128 pp. $5.95 (paper).

The combined experience of the authors—Marina Whitman, Raymond Barre, James Tobin and Shirley Williams—helps give variety to their judgments about what is significant about unemployment and what ought to be done about it. Their prescriptions converge on some points but show some fundamental differences as to what can be achieved by macroeconomic policy and what calls for a more structural approach.

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Evan Luard. New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 270 pp. $27.50.

Liberalization, nondiscrimination, multilateralism and full employment, the four pillars of the postwar international trade system, are all losing ground. This thoughtful book makes a good case for the view that to restore them, and bring the world back to economic growth, there will have to be increased international management in a number of key fields. The author, a British academic with political and diplomatic experience, examines the problems of combining efficiency with justice and calls for a "distributionist" strategy that turns needs into real demand.

CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS. By Jane Jacobs. New York: Random House, 1984, 384 pp. $17.95.

Cities have been compared with countries in their relations with the rest of the world before, but the case has probably never been as fully developed, and then carried too far, as it is here. Good points are made about how cities thrive and why they can be damaged by being parts of nations, but criteria are vague, differences are not explored, and some problems seem defined away. Monocausal explanations are always dubious, but this one sets a reader thinking, at least for a while.

CLOSING THE GOLD WINDOW: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE END OF BRETTON WOODS. By Joanne Gowa. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 208 pp.

Professor Gowa of the University of Pennsylvania interprets the 1971 decision to break the link between the dollar and gold as the choice of national autonomy over supporting the international monetary regime. She has interviewed key

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people (who are often very well characterized), has some previously unpublished material, and argues well. The book is a good addition to the literature on this important subject even though it looks at only part of the story.

BANKING ON POVERTY: THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK. Edited by Jill Torrie. Toronto: Between The Lines, 1984, 336 pp. $22.95 (paper, $12.95).

Originating in a kind of counter-meeting to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank sessions in Toronto in 1982, a number of these short papers criticize these bodies for monetarism, supporting banks and business, and not doing enough about human rights. Other papers concern international monetary reform, the debt crisis, the problems of several developing countries (for which the Fund is sometimes blamed) and alternative Canadian policies. The writing is quite clear and crisp and the prevailing note is socialist.

POWER, PASSIONS, AND PURPOSE. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati and John Gerard Ruggie. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984, 334 pp. $30.00 (paper, $12.50).

Under a rather grandiloquent title, a dozen good scholars, who are sympathetic to the aims of the developing countries, analyze the "global negotiations" for a New International Economic Order that have produced so few results. They recommend changed priorities, new tactics, and shifts in approaches to international organizations. This is far superior to most books on this much-written-about subject.

THE YEAR 2000. By Raymond Williams. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 288 pp. $16.95 (paper, $8.95).

One of Britain's consistently most interesting radical thinkers tries here to look at the future in the light of present trends. Most striking to read, or re-read, is the prescient essay called "Britain in the Sixties," reprinted here from his book *The Long Revolution*. Writing in 1959, a (relatively) glowing moment, Williams foresaw that the economic boom was not going to last, that the egalitarian tide of the postwar years was losing momentum, that in spirit the British were becoming more "capitalist" than ever—that is, more compromising, more competitive, and not less obsessed with class. And indeed, brotherhood did not come to Britain in the 1960s. In this book he attempts the same sort of projection in terms of the conflict and competition between East and West and North and South. But in going outside British life in all its concreteness, his analysis is less original, because he is on less solid terrain. He can conjure up salvation only in "a positive redemption of the central socialist idea of production for use rather than for profit or power." This would indeed be a new international order, but it does not seem to be close at hand. L.D.

CRITIQUE AND ANTI-CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON DEPENDENCE AND REFORMISM. By Andre Gunder Frank. New York: Praeger, 1984, 336 pp. $34.95.

The prolific leftist author produced these 26 pieces since 1968 and explains interestingly how the events of the period—and especially in Latin America, where he lived for much of the time—altered his thinking about reform, revolution and dependency.

THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH: A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL 2000. Edited by Julian L. Simon and Herman Kahn. London and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 585 pp.

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Dismayed by the negativism of the Carter Administration's report *Global 2000*, and suspicious of the political uses being made of it, Professor Simon of the University of Maryland and the late Herman Kahn, with support from the Heritage Foundation, put together these studies by experts to correct what they think are fundamental errors. They call their rather optimistic statements about the future of population, food, water, resources, climate and other things "unconditional predictions in the absence of an unforeseeable catastrophe"—their underlying assumption being that people will do the right things to adjust constructively to change.

THE EMERGING MARINE ECONOMY OF THE PACIFIC. Edited by Chennat Gopalakrishnan. Boston: Butterworth, 1984, 246 pp. $39.95.

Fish, manganese, coral and methanol are among the resources examined in this original but somewhat miscellaneous and sometimes technical collection of papers.

NEW HORIZONS IN EAST-WEST ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS RELATIONS. Edited by Marvin R. Jackson and James D. Woodson, Jr. Boulder (Colo.): East European Monographs, 1984, 277 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $28.00).

The horizons are actually rather clouded, but there are a number of points of interest in these papers by Romanian and American economists about economic relations between the two countries.

MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980s. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin and Thomas R. Graham. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman & Allanheld, 1984, 266 pp. $48.50.

The experienced authors of this valuable collection of papers bring together useful data, good analysis and modest expectations as to what can be achieved. Prepared for discussions at the American Society for International Law in 1982, not all the papers have been brought up to date—but the issues remain. "The Outlook for GATT as an Institution" by R. Michael Gadbaw is particularly good.

TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE. By Leslie Stein. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 186 pp. $25.00.

If you want a concise and accurate statement of the up-to-date thought of economists, both theoretical and empirical, about the forces that shape international trade, read this book. It is weaker on national adjustment experience.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

PANAMA ODYSSEY. By William J. Jorden. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984, 780 pp. $24.50.

Turmoil in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the past four years has led people to forget the monumental achievement of American and Panamanian diplomats and politicians in negotiating and ratifying the canal treaties of 1978. Had those treaties—which provided for the end of a colonial anachronism and the restoration of Panamanian sovereignty over the canal by the year 2000—failed, a bad situation in Central America might now be catastrophic. This magnificent diplomatic memoir-history by the American ambassador to Panama at the time

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should be required reading for every diplomat or student of diplomacy. It is candid, exciting and subtle in its treatment of personalities, politics and the tangled facts of a complicated story. A classic.

THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S SOVIET POLICY. Edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, 416 pp. $27.50. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

Thirteen knowledgeable and experienced authors explore the reasons the American foreign policy process has such difficulty devising a consistent and sustained approach to the Soviet Union. Separate chapters deal with the actors—public opinion, Congress, the President; issues—nuclear weapons, political differences, economics; and the historical record since 1945. The conclusions are that strategy toward the Soviet Union should take more account of American domestic constraints, focus more on relations with allies, and be less concerned with military relations at the expense of economics and political communication.

NEVOENNYE FACTORY SILY VO VNESHNEI POLITIKE S.SH.A. By I.L. Sheidina. Moscow: Nauka, 350 pp. Rubles 2.40.

A product of present-day Americology in the U.S.S.R.—sophisticated, packed with data, freely and knowledgeably citing American sources including the leading theorists of international relations—all to the end of explaining and documenting the non-military factors in U.S. foreign policy. These economic, scientific-technological, ideological and political-diplomatic factors or instruments are described as serving a strategy (familiar to readers of Soviet literature on this subject) of exerting pressure on the socialist countries, reducing the independence of Third World states to neocolonial dependence, keeping Western allies and associates in line, and expanding the influence and domain of capitalism. J.C.C.

OUR OWN WORST ENEMY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By I.M. Destler, Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 256 pp. $15.95.

Three well-known and influential members of the new (since the 1950s) elite of full-time foreign policy professionals describe with insiders' authority the destructive ideological fragmentation which pervades the American approach to the world. They would like to go back to the good old days of consensus, but realize that is impossible. For the future they urge more pragmatism, less ideology.

ENDLESS ENEMIES: THE MAKING OF AN UNFRIENDLY WORLD. By Jonathan Kwitny. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984, 443 pp. $19.95.

A journalist's cry of outrage over what he sees as the American government's penchant for backing tyrants in the Third World, intervening in ways which ultimately undermine the national interest, and all the while lying. The book is fast-paced, anecdotal, and based on the author's personal observations and strong opinions. In a short epilogue, he speculates that the United States may have somehow contrived the bloody coup which led to Maurice Bishop's death in Grenada and the subsequent American intervention.

WESTERN INTERESTS AND U.S. OPTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S WORKING GROUP ON THE CARIBBEAN BASIN. Edited by James R. Green and Brent Scowcroft. Boston: Oelgeschlager, 1984, 331 pp. $27.50 (paper, $12.50).

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ENDLESS WAR: HOW WE GOT INVOLVED IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE. By James Chace. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1984, 145 pp. $3.95 (paper).
THE MORASS: UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Richard Alan White. New York: Harper, 1984, 319 pp. $14.95 (paper, $6.95).

If these three books constituted a vote on the policies of the Reagan Administration, the outcome would be two to one, against. The first book, the Atlantic Council report, is favorable. It resembles the Kissinger Commission report of January 1984 in its emphasis on the strategic threat, although it is more detailed. James Chace, former managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, and Richard Alan White share a critical posture. Chace is particularly concerned about the damage American unilateralism is doing to relations with Mexico. White describes American behavior in terms of a long obsession with counterinsurgency warfare.

OBBLIGATO: NOTES ON A FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER. By William H. Sullivan. New York: Norton, 1984, 279 pp. $16.95.

The author's 32 years in the career foreign service ended in 1979 when his disagreements, as ambassador to Iran, with the Carter Administration's policy became intolerable to the White House. For details see his *Mission to Iran* (1981). This book emphasizes the personal side of a career spent mostly in Southeast Asia.

THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952–1980. By Martin P. Wattenberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, 184 pp. $15.00.

A succinct analysis based on survey data of the public's perception of the irrelevance of political parties. Historians could argue that the decline of the parties began in the 19th century and was already well advanced by 1952.

TO PROMOTE PEACE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MID-1980s. Edited by Dennis L. Bark. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1984, 298 pp. $19.95.
TO PROMOTE PROSPERITY: U.S. DOMESTIC POLICY IN THE MID-1980s. Edited by John H. Moore. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1984, 429 pp. $19.95.

The 39 essays in these companion volumes can be read as position papers for a second Reagan Administration. The authors in the first volume generally favor larger military expenditures and greater assertiveness toward the Soviet Union. Those in the second volume are for low taxes, reduced welfare activity by the government, and deregulation.

CONTENDING WITH KENNAN: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF AMERICAN POWER. By Barton Gellman. New York: Praeger, 1984, 172 pp. $21.95.

This is an extraordinarily well-balanced and perceptive study of the thought of George F. Kennan. Gellman acquits his subject of the charges of inconsistency favored by many "Kennan-bashers" while delineating clearly Kennan's elitism and fundamental lack of sympathy with the American democratic process. The book could have done more to relate Kennan to other thinkers, especially Reinhold Niebuhr. The author, a recent Princeton graduate, is now a Rhodes scholar.

DRAWING THE LINE: THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN CONTAINMENT POLICY IN EAST ASIA. By Robert M. Blum. New York: Norton, 1982, 273 pp. $22.95.

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This is an interesting historical analysis of how the American government, frustrated over its inability to prevent the Communist victory in China, turned in early 1950 (before the outbreak of the Korean war) to a policy of containment in Indochina.

TOUCHED WITH FIRE: THE FUTURE OF THE VIETNAM GENERATION. By John Wheeler. New York: Franklin Watts, 1984, 259 pp. $16.95.
LONG TIME PASSING: VIETNAM AND THE HAUNTED GENERATION. By Myra MacPherson. New York: Doubleday, 1984, 640 pp. $19.95.

The author of the first book, John Wheeler, is a leading spokesman for the veterans of the Vietnam War. His book is a highly personal and idiosyncratic mix of exhortation, meditation, and memories. The MacPherson book is about the impact of the Vietnam War on the lives of those who fought and those who chose not to go. It is oral history on a grand scale and, like the subject, it is emotional, untidy and infinitely sad.

THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE LAUNCHING OF THE PAX AMERICANA. By Charles L. Mee, Jr. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 320 pp. $16.95.

A breezy, readable account for the general reader of what, by any measure, must be regarded the most successful American foreign policy initiative of the 20th century. The author deals primarily with the personalities of American and European actors. The tone is reminiscent of the panegyrics of the 1950s.

THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE DEPRESSION DECADE. By Harvey Klehr. New York: Basic Books, 1984, 528 pp. $26.50.

Seldom have so few been studied so hard by so many as have the members of the American Communist Party before 1941. But, as this outstanding work demonstrates, the attention is deserved if only to explain why, in such propitious times as the 1930s, the Party failed to achieve more than it did. The answer—the crippling effect of having to follow the Moscow line with unthinking rigidity—is familiar, but it is documented here with unprecedented detail and insight.

LIGHTEST BLUES: HUMOR FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION. By Jane Van Nimmen, edited by Clive Giboire. New York: Imago, 1984, unnumbered. (New York: Horizon, distributor, $25.00; paper, $14.95).

An anthology of "the best" from the magazine *Americana*, which was published briefly—17 issues in 1932–1933—under the editorship of Alexander King, Jr. and George Grosz. Contributors included Al Hirschfeld, Mary Petty, S.J. Perelman and E.E. Cummings. Some of the material seems almost shockingly contemporary. The horrors of unemployment, of soup kitchens and homelessness are powerfully depicted. The expected targets—politicians, businessmen, the complacent rich—are targets still. One surprise: the violent attacks on Stalin (Roosevelt had just recognized the Soviet government) long before the purges, the pact with Hitler, and the other milestones that alienated American liberal opinion. Hitler, who had just come to power, is treated as a mild joke. In all, this is a graphic history lesson with many relevant links to today. L.D.

THE OLD CHRISTIAN RIGHT: THE PROTESTANT FAR RIGHT FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE COLD WAR. By Leo P. Ribuffo. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983, 369 pp.

This excellent study avoids the usual condescension while dealing critically with three leaders of the radical right in the 1930s: William Dudley Pelley, Gerald B. Winrod and Gerald L.K. Smith. In an epilogue the author urges the

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political liberal left to avoid treating the theological right so smugly and to "raise discussion of cultural pluralism above the level of slogans."

OUTSTANDING INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTING: PULITZER PRIZE ARTICLES IN FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE. Edited by Heinz-Dietrich Fischer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984, 368 pp.

This collection, covering the years 1916 to 1945, shows only too clearly how foreign reporting has declined in recent years. The first winner of a Pulitzer for reporting from abroad was Herbert Bayard Swope of *The New York World* for a series from Germany during World War I. He set a standard which was still reflected a quarter of a century later in the work of Otto D. Tolischus of *The New York Times*, Louis Lochner of the Associated Press, and others reporting from Berlin and German-occupied Europe. The immediacy posed by circumstances is the quality which makes foreign correspondence one of the historian's most useful tools. For this the book has unique value. It will be followed soon by a second volume covering 1945–1962, and another taking us into the 1980s and covering the Far East and the Middle East, the tinderboxes of our time.

Percy Knauth

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

PUERTO RICO: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT. By Raymond Carr. New York: New York University Press, 1984, 477 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $25.00). A Twentieth Century Fund Study.

Judicial and non-polemical and researched in great depth, this historical and current account of Puerto Rico and its ties to the United States is a fine contribution to a subject which is continuously pertinent. The author points out the dilemmas of a people who are neither full-fledged Americans nor members of a self-sufficient community, but he asserts that the immediate problems, which are severe, are economic rather than political.

HONDURAS: CAUDILLO POLITICS AND MILITARY RULERS. By James A. Morris. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 156 pp. $20.00.

No comparable volume devoted to this distinctive and little-known country comes to mind. The caudillo tradition, military rule, elections, the economy, and international relations are all covered. The author maintains that "it is unrealistic to expect Honduras to evolve toward a democratic system based upon classical principles of individualism. The country's cultural heritage, hierarchical social structure, and centralized patterns of authority would suggest more collective forms of social and political interaction."

FREE TRADE BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES? By Sidney Weintraub. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 205 pp. (paper, $9.95).

"Impossible!" is the answer most informed people would give to the question in the title. But Professor Weintraub of the University of Texas—with a rich experience of government—makes a compelling case for the need to think about the subject more carefully than has been done in the past. He mobilizes the salient data and analyzes most cogently not only the basic economic issues but the political worries on both sides as well.

W.D.

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GEOPOLITICS OF THE CARIBBEAN: MINISTATES IN A WIDER WORLD. By Thomas D. Anderson. New York: Praeger/Stanford: Hoover, 1984, 175 pp. $25.95.

Anderson, author of a good book on Central America (*Politics in Central America*, reviewed in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982), focuses here on the eastern Caribbean ministates and the changes and problems facing them. The scope is broad, covering setting and background, boundaries, foreign policy options, Cuba, the oil trade, and U.S. policies.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST: A BASIS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Margaret Daly Hayes. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 295 pp. $24.50 (paper, $11.95).

The author sees the area as the most elementary of U.S. interests, and its contributions to American security as basically political and only secondarily economic. Friendly and stable nations in the region and the absence of hostile power or influence are the goal. There are chapters on Latin America and U.S. national interest, on the region's international economic role, the Caribbean Basin, Mexican oil (by another author), Brazil, and U.S. security interests.

GOVERNANCE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. Edited by Viron P. Vaky. New York: Praeger, 1984, 532 pp. $39.95.

Under the auspices of the Aspen Institute, a multinational steering committee headed by a former assistant secretary of state, Viron Vaky, has directed a major inquiry into the most pressing problems of both South and North America and the formal and informal mechanisms of governance appropriate to their solution. This volume consists of the committee's report and the very wide-ranging 19 papers it commissioned. It is a noteworthy contribution to the ongoing debate.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

LABOUR IN POWER, 1945–1951. By Kenneth O. Morgan. New York: Oxford/Clarendon Press, 1984, 546 pp. $29.95.

A superb interpretative history of Attlee's administration, one of the few governments to have "wrenched the course of British history into significant new directions." A massive work, describing Labour's success in establishing a welfare state and charting a new foreign policy for a country that was still regarded as a world power with world-wide responsibilities. The heroes are Attlee and Bevin, but after 1947, that "annus horrendus," Cripps emerged as the dominant leader: "He was the best of his time." Morgan is good on the cultural changes as well, on the mood of postwar Britain: it veered away from the "classless ethos" that had been a wartime ideal; it was "a conservative, cautious land. . . . But it did not feel itself to be a declining one." Morgan has written a first-rate work of detached yet passionate scholarship.

ROY JENKINS: A BIOGRAPHY. By John Campbell. New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 256 pp. $22.50.

An admiring, but not uncritical, biography of this ambitious, aloof and gifted politician. Impeccably proletarian by background, Jenkins became a worldly intellectual, an elegant writer, a Gaitskellite and Europeanist by temperament and conviction. A highly successful Minister in several Cabinets, he resigned the

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deputy leadership of the Labour Party over an issue concerning Europe, became president of the EEC, and returned to England in 1980 to help found the Social Democratic Party, of which he became the leader. This is a highly readable, chatty book, written with the hope that Mr. Jenkins may still end up at No. 10—a hope that an astounding number of his countrymen would have to learn to share before it could be realized.

WINSTON CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY. By Piers Brendon. New York: Harper, 1984, 233 pp. $16.95.

A pleasant, well-written recital of a great and familiar story.

THE ART OF MEMORY: FRIENDS IN PERSPECTIVE. By Lord Butler. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984, 175 pp. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, distributor, $18.95).

"Rab" Butler, who entered the House of Commons in 1929 and became a symbol of progressive Toryism, recalls some of his friends and colleagues, including Ernest Bevin, Lord Halifax, Nehru, and Aneurin Bevan, whom he considers "the greatest parliamentary orator since Charles James Fox." These rather rambling reminiscences contain some eloquent passages on individuals and on all manner of topics from education to poetry; they are supremely generous—to a fault.

STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY, 1870–1945: EIGHT STUDIES. By Paul Kennedy. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1984, 254 pp. $24.95.

Essays on a wide range of 19th- and 20th-century subjects, always treated with a clear eye for the connections between strategy, politics and economics. In many of these essays (e.g., on the tradition of appeasement in British policy from 1865, or "Arms races and the causes of war, 1850–1945") Kennedy suggests the relevance of past experience to the present. A prodigiously prolific British historian, now happily entrapped at Yale, he habitually picks audacious themes and handles them with great intelligence, insight, and mischievous, instructive wit. Is there perhaps a distant and unconscious link between the virtues of his style (and that of his fellow historians, past and present) and the British success he depicts in his light-hearted but ever-so-serious essay: "Why Did The British Empire Last So Long?"

THE RISE OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, 1920–1947. By Edward Mortimer. London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1984, 416 pp. $65.00.

A lucid and balanced retelling of the history of the PCF from its founding to its Bolshevization, to its "neutralism" during the German-Soviet Pact, to its role in the Resistance and its electoral victories after Liberation. An epilogue depicts the party's decline since 1947. Told in the context of French politics and Soviet hegemony, by a British correspondent and writer.

THE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER, 1938–39: THE PATH TO RUIN. By Williamson Murray. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 494 pp. $50.00 (paper, $19.50).

A thoroughly documented study of the years of Hitler's triumph—which the author sees as anything but inevitable. He emphasizes Germany's economic difficulties—lack of raw materials and foreign exchange—and sees an objectively weak but strong-willed Germany challenge a strong but weak-willed West, with the British always relying on a worst case analysis of their military strength and a best case analysis of Hitler's intentions. An important study that in many ways

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returns to an earlier view that the West would have been in a better position to fight a war in 1938 than in 1939, that appeasement promoted what its proponents most feared: German aggression leading to protracted war. The author bolsters a familiar thesis with new evidence and great zeal.

BERLIN ALERT: THE MEMOIRS AND REPORTS OF TRUMAN SMITH. Edited by Robert Hessen. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1984, 172 pp. $19.95.

Smith was the U.S. military attaché in Berlin from 1935 to 1939, having had earlier tours in Germany and an interview with Hitler in 1922. He took the initiative in arranging for Colonel Lindbergh's first visit to Germany in 1936; on subsequent trips, Lindbergh helped Smith write favorable reports on the new *Luftwaffe*: "this miraculous outburst of national energy," proof of "the technical and scientific skill of the race." Because of his links to Lindbergh, Smith became a controversial figure, though always backed by General Marshall. Smith's observations are historically interesting, including Goering's remark to him in 1937: "Smith, there are only three truly great characters in all history: Buddha, Jesus Christ, and Adolf Hitler." At the height of the Sudeten crisis in September 1938, Lindbergh wrote to Ambassador Joseph Kennedy that a European war would "result in something akin to Communism running over Europe and, judging by Russia, anything seems preferable." Better to "permit Germany's eastward expansion than to throw England and France, unprepared, into a war at this time."

DÖNITZ: THE LAST FÜHRER. By Peter Padfield. New York: Harper, 1984, 523 pp. $25.00.

A readable biography of a man whose life was the German navy since before World War I. He served as a U-boat commander in the Great War and remained a fanatical believer in that weapon ever after. He directed the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, which was lost *inter alia* because of Ultra, i.e., the decoding of German communications. The author, a man of the sea and lately a writer on naval affairs, is persuasively harsh on this major figure of the Third Reich, whom Hitler appointed his successor and who was given the lightest term of those convicted at Nuremburg; Padfield believes that had the court known all the facts about Dönitz he would have earned the harshest sentence.

FROM RED TO GREEN: INTERVIEWS WITH NEW LEFT REVIEW. By Rudolf Bahro. London: Verso/NLB, 1984, 208 pp. (New York: Schocken, distributor, $26.50; paper, $9.50).

Extensive interviews, held between 1980 and 1983, with an East German dissident, imprisoned for his Dubcek-like ideas, finally released and in effect exiled to West Germany. A critic of capitalism, a self-proclaimed utopian socialist, he believes in a protest movement against nuclear and ecological disaster that would cut across class lines, thus negating the elemental force of the class conflict. He argues for a defense policy that would not threaten the U.S.S.R. and hopes that German Social Democracy will wither away. A quick and intelligent summary of some of the essential views of the Greens—views which probably have resonance even among those who do not vote for the Greens—or live in Germany.

SICHERHEIT UND ENTSPANNUNG: ZUR AUSSENPOLITIK DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, 1953–1982. By Helga Haftendorn. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983, 767 pp.

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A well-known German political scientist studies the major issues of West German foreign policy, with emphasis on the limited possibilities of autonomous action. The book is grounded on a fine mastery of the massive relevant literature. At present she sees the need to balance security demands within an Atlantic commitment with a policy of détente within a European commitment.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

SOVIET JEWRY IN THE DECISIVE DECADE, 1971–80. Edited by Robert Freedman. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1984, 167 pp. $34.75.

Much of this volume is devoted to what happens to Soviet Jews after they emigrate to Israel or America, but the investigations also cover several aspects of Soviet policy, including anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. and the place of the emigration issue in Soviet-American relations during the period of détente. The questions remain controversial, but these competent and sober studies should help to hold the controversies more closely to the facts.

DEZINFORMATSIA: ACTIVE MEASURES IN SOVIET STRATEGY. By Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's (for the National Strategy Information Center), 1984, 210 pp. $19.95 (paper, $12.95).
NEW LIES FOR OLD: THE COMMUNIST STRATEGY OF DECEPTION AND DISINFORMATION. By Anatoliy Golitsyn. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1984, 432 pp. $19.95.

The Shultz/Godson book is a useful survey of how the Soviet Union uses "disinformation," propaganda, agents, covert political techniques and front organizations to influence events in foreign countries and to further its strategic aims such as discrediting America and weakening NATO. Parts of the presentation are novel, but the revelations are not particularly sensational. For originality and sensationalism, turn to the exposé and arguments of Anatoliy Golitsyn, a former KGB officer who defected in 1961. His thesis is that the Communists, by a massive disinformation campaign begun in 1958–60, hoodwinked the West's analysts and policymakers time and again. As carefully arranged examples of agreed Communist strategy, he cites the Soviet disputes with Yugoslavia since 1958, the rift with Albania, the Soviet-Chinese split, Romania's independent line, the Prague Spring, Eurocommunism, and the appearance of Solidarity in Poland. The author's KGB experience and background doubtless give him a special vantage point, but most of this story can be taken with several grains of salt.

TERROR AND COMMUNIST POLITICS: THE RISE OF THE SECRET POLICE IN COMMUNIST STATES. Edited by Jonathan R. Adelman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 292 pp. $25.00

On the theory that too little academic attention has been paid to terror and repression in communist systems, a group of specialists contributes a series of case studies on the Soviet Union and four East European states, which conform to a rough general pattern, plus two dissimilar and less relevant essays on China and Cambodia. The book brings together useful information and adds some speculation on what theories fit the facts. As the editor says, much work remains to be done.

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THE DILEMMA OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Timothy J. Colton. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, 120 pp. $6.95 (paper).

Here in a brief but meaty presentation is a status report on the U.S.S.R. and the decisions that lie ahead. Cautious but not timid in his analysis and predictions, Colton assesses the Brezhnev legacy, the shifts in emphasis if not direction under Andropov, the inevitable generational change in leadership, and the prospects for reform. He finds considerable evidence in the economic and other specialized Soviet publications on how the problems and dilemmas are seen and discussed in the U.S.S.R. itself.

THE REALITY OF COMMUNISM. By Alexander Zinoviev. New York: Schocken, 1984, 320 pp. $22.95.

Alexander Zinoviev, who held academic posts in the U.S.S.R. until his expulsion in 1978, undertakes to set the world straight on communism, not as theory but as it exists in fact in the Soviet Union, a subject on which he finds much ignorance in the West. Much of what he says belabors the obvious, but there are interesting parts too, especially on how things work at the level of the "primary collective," the key to the system's extraordinary stability. Although this is a highly personal analysis—the author disdains traditional sociological research, cites only his own works, and writes with total assurance—it represents keen observation and some impressive argument.

DIARY OF THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. By Vittorio Vidali. London: Journeyman Press/Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1984, 192 pp. $8.95 (paper).

Vidali was a veteran of the Comintern and, after World War II, the leader of the Communist Party in Trieste. These notes describe two important conferences which he attended, the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP in 1956 and the conference of world communist parties in Moscow in 1957. Revealing for the discussions of the question of Stalin and Stalinism, and also for what the foreign delegates did and did not know about what was going on in Moscow.

MEMOIRS. By Raisa Orlova. New York: Random House, 1984, 366 pp. $20.00

A very personal revelation of the erosion of communist faith, leading to disillusionment, dissidence and eventual emigration—a familiar theme of emigré books now published in the West. At the same time, it is a sharp portrayal of the workings of the Soviet cultural bureaucracy and of the interplay of the Soviet literature, international cultural relations, political events, and the "system" as it has existed in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

THE STATE IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY. Edited by Neil Harding. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984, 256 pp. $34.50 (paper, $14.95)

A series of essays on the concept of the state (in relation to society, the Party, the *apparat*, the various nationalities, etc.) from Marx to present Soviet theory and practice, with additional brief chapters on Poland, Yugoslavia and China. It is a subject that needs periodic review and gets thoroughly professional treatment here in a book written by political scientists largely for their colleagues.

WHERE NIGHTS ARE LONGEST: TRAVELS BY CAR THROUGH WESTERN RUSSIA. By Colin Thubron. New York: Random House, 1984, 212 pp. $16.95.

A travel book by a non-academic, non-diplomatic non-expert which is much more than light reading. It has great literary quality in its descriptions of people

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and countryside, and the encounters and conversations with Russians are well-drawn vignettes of individuals and of the system.

SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ORIENTATSIYA OSVOBODIVSHIKHSIA STRAN. Edited by K.N. Brutents and others. Moscow: Mysl, 1982, 311 pp.

Since several of the authors in this collective volume work in the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee, it can be taken as an authoritative source on how the Soviets now regard the adoption of Marxism-Leninism by leaders of the developing countries. The book stresses that these radical countries are still in the pre-socialist stage and remain part of the world capitalist market. Hence their transition to full socialism needs time until various preconditions are met. Moreover, the contrast between political goals and economic realities creates problems that make "socialist orientation" a reversible process. Elizabeth K. Valkenier

RAZVIVAYUSHCHIESIA STRANY. Edited by V. L. Sheinis and E. Ya. Elianov. Moscow: Nauka, 1983, 655 pp. Rubles 5.60.

An important innovative study of the development processes in the Third World, written by the staff of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Refining pat Marxist explanations, it provides a complex analysis of recent socio-economic trends and offers a realistic prognostication. Considerable stress is put on the uniqueness of the Third World situation which makes it impossible to follow the road traversed by the developed countries. Nevertheless, the authors find that a separate, alternative Third World model is also impossible and that the developing countries will have to integrate their economies with global requirements and processes. Elizabeth K. Valkenier

POLAND'S SELF-LIMITING REVOLUTION. By Jadwiga Staniszkis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 352 pp. $25.00.

The first version of this unusual book, completed in 1980 before the Gdansk strikes, was an original analysis of the nature of the Polish regime up to that time. The author then became a participant in the stormy events of the next 18 months, which she uses to test, supplement and transform her earlier study. The story of the revolution is written in pieces between September 1980 and January 1982, each of which captures the moods of the moment; all are disciplined and often brilliant interpretations. Dr. Staniszkis writes in the language of sociology and political science, with much attention to categories and definitions, but there is no oversimplification here; on the contrary, the study demonstrates the complexity, inconsistencies and division of all the forces involved (Party, Church, Solidarity, and others).

ANTIPOLITICS. By George Konrád. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984, 243 pp. $12.95.

A noted Hungarian novelist, who is also a political philosopher of sorts, writes in arresting terms on world politics and on the destiny of his own country and of Europe. His *bête noire* is the "Yalta system" of the division of Europe, which he hopes, with wishful logic, the superpowers and the Europeans will have the vision to end. His hope for greater democracy and self-government in Eastern Europe rests on the ability of the intelligentsia and the civil society to increase their influence over the holders of political power—hence, the "antipolitics" of the title. Konrád is partial to broad dicta, many of them unproven or unprovable, but his message is honest, stimulating, and keenly perceptive.

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POLICYMAKING IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. Edited by Klaus von Beyme and Hartmut Zimmermann. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 401 pp. $25.00.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC SINCE 1945. By Martin McCauley. New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 282 pp. $26.00.

The volume edited by von Beyme and Zimmermann, with extensive references and an excellent bibliography, is intended more for the professional political scientist than for the general reader. The contributors, West German experts on the GDR, cover the institutional structure and the way it functioned in the 1970s in political decisions, military policy, economics, social policy, and other fields, pointing out adaptations and reforms but always keeping in view the limits of change. The McCauley book is a useful factual history, supplemented by a detailed chronology, covering a great deal of ground in rather hurried fashion. It is strongest on internal events and less expansive, and less reliable, on intra-German relations and the international background.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE MIDDLE EAST: OLD RULES, DANGEROUS GAME. By L. Carl Brown. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 363 pp. $35.00 (paper, $15.00).

With a historian's tools and perspective, Carl Brown draws comparisons between the 19th century's classic "Eastern question" and the succession of Middle East crises which have marked world politics since World War II. The names of most of the players have changed (the "sick man of Europe" has died), but the nature and the rules of the game have not. Understanding the interaction between the policies of outside powers and the politics of the region, Brown rightly notes, is the key to sound policy, but there is no sure way to reach that understanding, although he comes closer to it than most U.S. policymaking officials over the past 30 years. He might have given more space to the historic role of the "Concert of Europe" and how that role might be filled today.

THE KISSINGER LEGACY: AMERICAN-MIDDLE EAST POLICY. By Ishaq I. Ghanayem and Alden H. Voth. New York: Praeger, 1984, 237 pp. $24.95.

This essay in diplomatic history is not strikingly new in information or interpretation, covering much the same ground, without the same authority, as William Quandt's *Decade of Decision* and Kissinger's own memoirs, but it is a good and thorough survey, well and judiciously written. Kissinger is given much credit, but not always taken at his own evaluation.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Praeger, 1984, 221 pp. $27.95.

One may question the editor's premise—the need for another book for the "intelligent, nonspecialist audience" on the Arab-Israeli conflict—but the result meets the requirement he has set. The essays are by six American and Israeli scholars, all of whom have excellent credentials.

FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE. By Joan Peters. New York: Harper, 1984, 601 pp. $24.95.

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THE CLAIM OF DISPOSSESSION: JEWISH LAND-SETTLEMENT AND THE ARABS, 1878-1948. By Arieh L. Avneri. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1984, 303 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Joan Peters undertook a massive research job in order to make the case against Arab claims that Palestine was peopled "from time immemorial" by Arabs, who were dispossessed and driven out by Jewish immigrants. It is a long, involved story which deserves a reading even though it is one-sided and repetitious and proves less than it claims. Some of the main arguments of Avneri's monograph run parallel to those of Miss Peters, such as that Jewish settlement attracted rather than displaced Arabs and that purchases of land by Zionists were mainly from Arab landowners eager to sell. His book is much leaner and less shrill in tone, although it is also aimed at making a political case.

THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE CAMP DAVID. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 263 pp. $28.50 (paper, $11.95).

Papers written for a conference in 1982, with a brief epilogue carrying the story to October 1983, survey the Middle East scene over the past five years. Professor Freedman, not for the first time, has performed a service, especially for teachers and students, and his contributors have done their job well. Unfortunately, books like this which bring us up to date are soon out of date.

THE WAR FOR LEBANON, 1970–1983. By Itamar Rabinovich. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 200 pp. $19.95.

This is partly a history of Lebanon's breakdown and civil war, partly a study of why and how Israel went to war in 1982. The author is at home in all the topics he covers, but most of all in dealing with the Israeli-Maronite connection and with Israel's policy dilemmas and decisions, about which his account is remarkably objective.

THE GULF AND THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY: SAUDI ARABIA, THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE GULF, AND TRENDS IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL MILITARY BALANCE. By Anthony H. Cordesman. London: Mansell/Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 1041 pp. $45.00.

The sheer size of this book may scare off prospective readers looking for a briefing on the background of the security problems in the Gulf. For those who are not so daunted the author provides quantities of data, especially on weapons and logistic problems, giving the book real value as a reference. The military facts and figures are accompanied by informed comment on security-related political factors. Cordesman, a former Defense Department official, recognizes the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the security of the Gulf, and, with more than a dash of optimism, sees possibilities of dealing with it in such a way as to make a strategic consensus possible.

CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: JAPAN'S DIPLOMACY IN TRANSITION. By Michael M. Yoshitsu. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 113 pp. $20.00.

Japan has vital interests in the Middle East, sometimes obscured by its self-effacing posture and limited political and military involvement. This welcome book, enriched by interviews with Japanese officials, tells the little-known story of how Tokyo has tried to protect its interests through the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the hostage crisis in Iran, the Soviet move into Afghanistan, and

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the Iran-Iraq war. Among the interesting aspects of the story are the frequent differences of view among the Japanese themselves and the friction between Japan and its American ally.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: ZONE OF FERMENT. Edited by Robert W. Stookey. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1984, 151 pp. $22.95.

Not much holds this book together other than the geography and the ferment, although the contributions themselves are competently done. Three specialized papers deal with Saudi Arabia, two give background information on Oman and on the Yemens, and the final one covers the Arab states' aid to Third World countries.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Adeed Dawisha. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 191 pp. $24.95.

Of all the recent books on resurgent Islam in world politics, this study growing out of a Chatham House project is probably the clearest and most enlightening. Even so, the subject seems to defy the most expert and sophisticated authors because Islam as a factor in foreign policy cannot be easily defined or disentangled from other elements. What does come through clearly is that only in one state, Iran (covered well here by R.K. Ramazani), is foreign policy shaped by a coherent conception of an Islamic world order. The chapters are all country studies, covering the principal states of the Middle East and North Africa, plus Nigeria, Indonesia and the Soviet Union (where Islam is "a double-edged sword").

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

U.S.-ASIAN RELATIONS: THE NATIONAL SECURITY PARADOX. Edited by James C. Hsiung. New York: Praeger, 1983, 208 pp.

In this collective effort to define the Reagan Administration's policy towards Asia, the best essay is by Norman Levin, an analyst for Rand. He argues that the current policy is not a dramatic departure from but rather "an evolutionary extension" of the last two years of the Carter Administration. To strengthen U.S. positions in the region, there has been a renewed commitment to treaty allies, an expansion of U.S. military assistance, an effort to build a loose coalition of friendly powers in the region, a significant expansion of the U.S. posture in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, and, finally, a major naval buildup.

Although Levin concludes that the Reagan policy in Asia has had a number of positive effects, he cautions that the Administration has yet to devise a strategy for moderating superpower competition and "ultimately coming to grips with the Soviet Union as an Asian power."

THREATS TO SECURITY IN EAST ASIA-PACIFIC. Edited by Charles E. Morrison. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1983, 221 pp. A Pacific Forum Book.

The result of a Pacific Forum project to analyze divergent perceptions of threats to East Asian security, this book is of uniformly high quality. It contains chapters on the ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as some overarching chapters by American and Asian scholars. There is a considerable disagreement on the seriousness of the "Soviet threat": many of the Asians consider it only one of a variety of threats and not necessarily the most pressing.

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With regard to China, although the Thai participants generally find China a valuable ally in containing Vietnam, other Asians contemplate it with fear. The most striking feature of most of the chapters written by Southeast Asian participants is that they deal primarily with internal problems as the most serious threats to security.

THE AMERICAN ROLE IN VIETNAM AND EAST ASIA. By Henry J. Kenny. New York: Praeger, 1984, 192 pp. $26.95.

A former army officer in Vietnam, who later served as an assistant to Ambassador Mansfield in Tokyo, describes what he calls the "second revolution in Asia today"—sustained economic growth, rising educational levels, progress in the arts and sciences, the rise of independent and pro-Western governments, growing commercial links across the Pacific Basin, and gradually increasing respect for democratic processes. The generally optimistic tone should be compared with the more reserved view of some of the writers in the Pacific Forum volume.

THE EMERGING PACIFIC COMMUNITY: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Robert L. Downen and Bruce J. Dickson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 245 pp.

The product of a conference sponsored by Georgetown's Center for Strategic Studies, this volume contains a variety of views about the value of the emerging Pacific Community concept. Some of the participants, including former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, believe that there are real grounds for optimism about the future of the Pacific Community. Others are skeptical. One ASEAN participant insists that the ASEAN countries need assurance that such a Community will not be a "camouflaged anti-Soviet group," a subtle device to split ASEAN from the rest of the developing world, or an effort to maneuver the ASEAN countries into dependency on the U.S. and Japan. Such statements reflect continuing suspicion about the idea in Southeast Asia.

THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEMS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. By Byung Chul Koh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, 274 pp. $28.50.

This is the most balanced and informative account of the foreign policy of the two Koreas to appear in many years. There is a variety of tables on North and South Korea's diplomatic relations, foreign trade, and military strength. The author analyzes the stalemate between the two Koreas and the great-power rivalry in which their foreign policies are shaped. He is not optimistic about a peaceful settlement and he is harsh about U.S. policy, which he finds has been "singularly sterile." "Do not American stakes and interests in the Korean peninsula warrant a higher priority and a more imaginative policy than what we have witnessed thus far?" he asks.

AMERICA'S PARALLEL. By Michael C. Sandusky. Alexandria (Va.): Old Dominion Press, 1983, 420 pp. $19.95.

This is a useful account of America's policy in Korea from 1945 to the outbreak of the Korean war, but its conclusion is highly questionable. It argues against the generally accepted belief that President Truman, by having U.S. troops occupy the southern part of Korea, saved at least that half of the country from communist dictatorship. Rather, the author insists, the separation of Korea was a decision "prompted by an arrogance of power, an impetuous desire to extend the universal relevance of the American way of life to the victims of

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Japanese imperialism." One wonders if the citizens of South Korea today would share such an assessment.

KOREA'S ECONOMY: MAN-MADE MIRACLE. By Jon Woronoff. Seoul and Los Angeles: Si-sa-yong-o-sa Publishers, 1983, 296 pp. $12.00

Although there are many excellent scholarly works on the South Korean economy, this is one of the most readable and comprehensive for the non-specialist. The author, a journalist who covers East Asia for a number of newspapers, predicts that by the year 2001 the South Korean economy will be nearly four times as big as it now is, with a per capita income of $4,300 in today's dollars.

REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES. By Fred Poole and Max Vanzi. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984, 357 pp. $18.95.

Two journalists tell a story of mass killings, government by goon squad, an overblown and rampaging military, and rapacious oligarchs. All of this is allegedly leading the Philippines to revolution, and a growing communist-led underground will eventually triumph after a period of even harsher dictatorship and civil war. Thus, the Philippines will be the site of America's next foreign policy disaster, all the more traumatic because of the enormous U.S. dependence on air and naval bases in the country. Some of this may in fact be true, and a solid and balanced account of the Filipino crisis is needed at this juncture, but the reader will not find it in this flamboyant and one-sided indictment.

THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE IN THE 1970s. By Tien-hua Tsui. Oakville (Ontario): Mosaic Press, 1984, 151 pp. (New York: Flatiron, distributor, $25.00; paper $12.95).

This compact volume represents an important contribution to the literature on the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Based on original research in Chinese, Russian and English sources, it analyzes the historical evolution of the border, the frontier confrontation in the 1970s, the border negotiations after 1969, and the "academic war" between Soviet and Chinese publicists concerning the respective merits of each country's position. What gives this volume particular significance is that the author is an official in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who served in the Chinese embassy in Canada and completed this volume while studying at McMaster University. He thinks it is unlikely that the Soviets will modify their "obdurate position" on the border talks or reduce their military presence along the border; therefore, "it seems debatable to what degree the Soviet Union can obtain closer ties with China. . . ."

IN EXILE FROM THE LAND OF SNOWS. By John F. Avedon. New York: Knopf, 1984, 384 pp. $18.95.

The story of Tibet since its invasion by China in 1950 is largely unknown in the West. This book, based on interviews with hundreds of refugees and on a careful scrutiny of the official Chinese press, makes a major contribution towards closing that gap. After a background account of Tibet's history, Avedon reconstructs the Chinese conquest, the occupation, the guerrilla resistance, and the tribulations of the Tibetan refugee community now living in India. Despite all efforts, he concludes, the Chinese have failed to subdue the Tibetans, and they know it. Since 1978, the Chinese have been making overtures to the Dalai Lama to enter into negotiations for his possible return.

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BEHIND RUSSIAN LINES: AN AFGHAN JOURNAL. By Sandy Gall. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 194 pp. $22.50.

The author of a highly acclaimed documentary on Afghanistan recounts how and why he took a television team into Afghanistan in the summer of 1982. He believes the Soviet occupation is almost totally unreported in the West and asks why this should be so. "Should not the war correspondents be there, as they were in Vietnam and Lebanon?" It is a fair question.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

CRY AMANDLA!: SOUTH AFRICAN WOMEN AND POWER. By June Goodwin. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984, 253 pp. $27.50 (paper, $14.50).

Through a mosaic of interviews with black, Afrikaner and English women, a former *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent in South Africa depicts the social and political attitudes shaping race relations in that country. Her protagonist is a young Black Consciousness leader, five times detained and tortured, who is ambivalent about the means of struggle but not about the goal. The black domestics at the other end of the scale of activism, though acknowledging their dependence on whites and fear of politics, locate their allegiances firmly outside the apartheid system. For almost all the whites, from confirmed supporters to avowed opponents of apartheid, their self-definition within the system is much more equivocal—and must continue to be so while the forcibly maintained gap between their privileges and black deprivation continues. Across that gap, as Goodwin shows, they talk to each other less and less.

BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1945. By Tom Lodge. London and New York: Longman, 1983, 389 pp.

In this study a South African historian has shaped an extraordinary wealth of detail into the fullest account to date of the evolution of black activism from the early 20th century to the present. Basic themes emerge from the exposition: the continuing reluctance of blacks to adopt a long-term strategy of violent confrontation with whites despite violent white responses to black activism; the importance of class differences among blacks; the move from a strategy of protest to one of resistance—with revolution yet to come. Combining a straight narrative with separate treatments of particular groups, including the nationalist movements, women and labor, he provides especially interesting accounts of resistance in the countryside and exile politics.

THE MAKING OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1800. By Bill Freund. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, 357 pp. $19.50 (paper, $8.95).

This ambitious, broadly cast synthesis ranges over African colonial history in search of the origins of that continent's current institutional crises. While endorsing parts of Lenin's analysis of imperialism, the author insists that "dependence" on the West is not the root of Africa's economic dilemma. He seems less clear about whether and how far Western economic patterns have taken hold at all in Africa (outside of South Africa). What he does show clearly is the persistence of pre-capitalist economic and social patterns throughout the colonial period and into the present.

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IVORY COAST. Edited by I. William Zartman and Christopher Delgado. New York: Praeger, 1984, 255 pp.

The workings of Africa's great "economic miracle," and the policy shifts which threaten its continuation, are anatomized in this trenchantly edited volume. Surprisingly inattentive to the major economic role of French expatriates in the Ivory Coast, the authors emphasize the key Ivorian inputs—stability and cocoa—which come together in the elites' abiding concern for the health of the nation's agriculture. Essays on the way agricultural policy really works and on the effects of alternative trade regimes are of particular interest.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. Edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Robert I. Meltzer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984, 349 pp.

Taking on an elusive subject, the editors have approached it from a variety of perspectives. The chapters comparing traditional African conceptions of human rights with those brought by Western colonizers stand out, elucidating the rights accorded by membership in an extended family, and the erosion of women's security by Western ground-rules for development. The book also contains the best analysis to date of recent African human rights initiatives, pinpointing the deficiencies of the Banjul Charter—and how it was weakened, during the negotiation process, in order to remove restrictions on the power of the state over individuals.

THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS. Edited by Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman. New York: Praeger, 1984, 400 pp. $29.95.

This candid look at a visibly divided institution balances assessments of what the African organization isn't against what it is. In general, OAU links seem strongest when informal and weakest when organizational unity is directly tested. Will the regional structure survive? The authors are noncommittal, but their documentation of ongoing activity makes one suspect that the African states would not permit this outlet to disappear.

QADDAFI AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1969. By P. Edward Haley. New York: Praeger, 1984, 364 pp. $34.95.

This account of U.S.-Libyan relations since Qaddafi is exhaustive on this sometimes hot topic. Researched mainly from the popular media, it includes all the facts. While the author takes a position on policy—that a tough one works better than turning the other cheek—he generally scants implications in favor of details and events.

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Edited by Janet Rigney

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

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

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